Política Internacional

By MARTIN INDYK

The New York Times Journal

NOW that President Obama has finally succeeded in bringing the Israelis and the Palestinians back to the negotiating table, the commentariat is already dismissing his chances of reaching a peace agreement. But there are four factors that distinguish the direct talks that will get under way on Sept. 2 in Washington from previous attempts — factors that offer some reason for optimism.

First, violence is down considerably in the region. Throughout the 1990s, Israel was plagued by terrorist attacks, which undermined its leaders’ ability to justify tangible concessions. Israelis came to believe that the Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat was playing a double game, professing peace in the negotiations while allowing terrorists to operate in territory he was supposed to control.

Today, the Palestinian Authority is policing its West Bank territory to prevent violent attacks on Israelis and to prove its reliability as a negotiating partner. Hamas — mainly out of fear of an Israeli intervention that might remove it from power — is doing the same in Gaza.

These efforts, combined with more effective Israeli security measures, have meant that the number of Israeli civilians killed in terrorist attacks has dropped from an intifada high of 452 in 2002 to 6 last year and only 2 so far this year.

Second, settlement activity has slowed significantly. As a result of Israel’s 10-month settlement moratorium, no new housing starts in the West Bank were reported by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics in the first quarter of this year. What’s more, there have been hardly any new housing projects in East Jerusalem since the brouhaha in March, when Vice President Joe Biden, during a visit to Israel, condemned the announcement of 1,600 additional residential units. The demolition of Palestinian houses there is also down compared with recent years.

The settlement moratorium, however, is due to expire on Sept. 26. The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, seems unlikely to extend it, and Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority president, has declared that he will withdraw from negotiations if settlement activity resumes.

However, there could be a workable compromise if Mr. Netanyahu restricts building to modest growth in the settlement blocs that will most likely be absorbed into Israel in the final agreement, while offering changes that would make a real difference to West Bank Palestinians. Israel could promise that there would be no more Israeli Army incursions into areas under Palestinian control; it could also allow the Palestinian police to patrol in most West Bank villages.

Third, the public on both sides supports a two-state solution. So do a majority of Arabs. The simple truth is that most people in the Middle East are exhausted by this conflict, and if Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Abbas can reach a viable agreement, the public on all sides will likely support it by a large majority.

Yes, Mr. Netanyahu would face strident opposition from within his Likud party, but he could lean on the support of the Israeli center and left to ensure a Knesset majority. And because a referendum on Palestinian statehood would likely receive overwhelming support in Gaza as well as the West Bank, Hamas — always attuned to Palestinian public opinion — would have a hard time standing in the way.

Fourth, there isn’t a lot to negotiate. In the 17 years since the Oslo accords were signed, detailed final status negotiations have dealt exhaustively with all the critical issues. If an independent Palestinian state is to be established, the zone of agreement is clear and the necessary trade-offs are already known.

Security arrangements were all but settled in 2000 at Camp David before the talks collapsed. The increased threat of rocket attacks since then, among other developments, require the two sides to agree on stricter border controls and a robust third-party force in the Jordan Valley. But one year is ample time to resolve this. In fact, if the leaders are sincere in their intent to make a deal, dragging out the negotiations would only weaken them politically and give time for the opponents of peace to rally.

In short, the negotiating environment is better suited to peacemaking today than it has been at any point in the last decade. The prospects for peace depend now on the willpower of the leaders.

Does President Abbas, already a weakened figure, have the courage to defend the necessary concessions to his people, particularly when it comes to conceding the “right of return” to Israel? Does Prime Minister Netanyahu have the determination to withdraw from at least 95 percent of the West Bank and to accept a Palestinian capital in Arab East Jerusalem? And does President Obama have the statesmanship to persuade both parties to make the deal and to reassure them that the United States will be there with a safety net if it fails?

At the end of the Clinton administration, Shimon Peres observed that “history is like a horse that gallops past your window and the true test of statesmanship is to jump from that window onto the horse.” Arafat failed that test, leaving Palestinians and Israelis mired in conflict. We cannot know whether Mr. Abbas and Mr. Netanyahu will take the politically perilous leap. But for the time being, we should suspend disbelief and welcome the fact that American diplomacy has ensured they will soon be put to the test.

Martin Indyk, the director of the foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution and the author of “Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East,” was the United States ambassador to Israel during the Clinton administration.

By PAUL KRUGMAN

The New York Times Journal

What will Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, say in his big speech Friday in Jackson Hole, Wyo.? Will he hint at new steps to boost the economy? Stay tuned.

But we can safely predict what he and other officials will say about where we are right now: that the economy is continuing to recover, albeit more slowly than they would like. Unfortunately, that’s not true: this isn’t a recovery, in any sense that matters. And policy makers should be doing everything they can to change that fact.

The small sliver of truth in claims of continuing recovery is the fact that G.D.P. is still rising: we’re not in a classic recession, in which everything goes down. But so what?

The important question is whether growth is fast enough to bring down sky-high unemployment. We need about 2.5 percent growth just to keep unemployment from rising, and much faster growth to bring it significantly down. Yet growth is currently running somewhere between 1 and 2 percent, with a good chance that it will slow even further in the months ahead. Will the economy actually enter a double dip, with G.D.P. shrinking? Who cares? If unemployment rises for the rest of this year, which seems likely, it won’t matter whether the G.D.P. numbers are slightly positive or slightly negative.

All of this is obvious. Yet policy makers are in denial.

After its last monetary policy meeting, the Fed released a statement declaring that it “anticipates a gradual return to higher levels of resource utilization” — Fedspeak for falling unemployment. Nothing in the data supports that kind of optimism. Meanwhile, Tim Geithner, the Treasury secretary, says that “we’re on the road to recovery.” No, we aren’t.

Why are people who know better sugar-coating economic reality? The answer, I’m sorry to say, is that it’s all about evading responsibility.

In the case of the Fed, admitting that the economy isn’t recovering would put the institution under pressure to do more. And so far, at least, the Fed seems more afraid of the possible loss of face if it tries to help the economy and fails than it is of the costs to the American people if it does nothing, and settles for a recovery that isn’t.

In the case of the Obama administration, officials seem loath to admit that the original stimulus was too small. True, it was enough to limit the depth of the slump — a recent analysis by the Congressional Budget Office says unemployment would probably be well into double digits now without the stimulus — but it wasn’t big enough to bring unemployment down significantly.

Now, it’s arguable that even in early 2009, when President Obama was at the peak of his popularity, he couldn’t have gotten a bigger plan through the Senate. And he certainly couldn’t pass a supplemental stimulus now. So officials could, with considerable justification, place the onus for the non-recovery on Republican obstructionism. But they’ve chosen, instead, to draw smiley faces on a grim picture, convincing nobody. And the likely result in November — big gains for the obstructionists — will paralyze policy for years to come.

So what should officials be doing, aside from telling the truth about the economy?

The Fed has a number of options. It can buy more long-term and private debt; it can push down long-term interest rates by announcing its intention to keep short-term rates low; it can raise its medium-term target for inflation, making it less attractive for businesses to simply sit on their cash. Nobody can be sure how well these measures would work, but it’s better to try something that might not work than to make excuses while workers suffer.

The administration has less freedom of action, since it can’t get legislation past the Republican blockade. But it still has options. It can revamp its deeply unsuccessful attempt to aid troubled homeowners. It can use Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored lenders, to engineer mortgage refinancing that puts money in the hands of American families — yes, Republicans will howl, but they’re doing that anyway. It can finally get serious about confronting China over its currency manipulation: how many times do the Chinese have to promise to change their policies, then renege, before the administration decides that it’s time to act?

Which of these options should policy makers pursue? If I had my way, all of them.

I know what some players both at the Fed and in the administration will say: they’ll warn about the risks of doing anything unconventional. But we’ve already seen the consequences of playing it safe, and waiting for recovery to happen all by itself: it’s landed us in what looks increasingly like a permanent state of stagnation and high unemployment. It’s time to admit that what we have now isn’t a recovery, and do whatever we can to change that situation.

Anxious Iraqis Look at Uncertain Future

Interviewee: Jane Arraf, Baghdad Correspondent, Christian Science Monitor

Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org

by Council on Foreign Relations – CFR.

With the pullout of U.S. combat units completed, many Iraqis, even those who deplored the presence of foreign troops, are “fearful about what happens” if the U.S. withdraws completely next year as planned, says Jane Arraf, a long-time Baghdad correspondent who served as an Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow at CFR. Beyond concerns about whether Iraq will be able to defend itself when all U.S. troops have gone, there’s also anxiety about the unsettled political situation. Arraf says Iraqis seem to be unable to forge a compromise between Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister, whose bloc had the most seats in last March’s elections, and the current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. “We keep thinking that perhaps there’s a lot going on beneath the surface, but apparently there isn’t. It is what it is. It’s stalled. There’s talk about what to do, but nothing’s been established yet.”

President Obama is planning to give a speech on Iraq next week marking the pullout of U.S. combat troops from the country. Does their departure make a big difference in Iraq?

It really doesn’t. A lot of that is because it isn’t a development that has had much of an impact on the ground. Some have called it a “rebranding” of the conflict, and there is some truth to that. What we’ve got left are fifty thousand other troops, a substantial number, and a lot of those are actually combat troops. Any brigade here is ready, equipped, and trained for combat. It’s just that the mission is changing. So with that many troops on the ground, the latest withdrawals really don’t have that much of an impact, particularly since we haven’t been seeing the United States in unilateral combat missions since June of last year. As part of the security agreement signed by the Bush administration, the U.S. forces are taking a backseat to the Iraqi forces. The bottom line is that nothing really will change on September 1. What we’re really looking at is what happens as next year’s deadline of December 31, 2011, approaches for all the troops to leave.

Are Americans regarded as friends or enemies? Are people happy to see the Americans out of Iraq? Or do they want the Americans to have more influence? Clearly there’s a chaotic security and political situation in Iraq, right?

It’s a love-hate relationship that, right now, is turning into a feeling almost of abandonment. Even Iraqis who have absolutely despised the thought of a presence of a large number of foreign troops here are quite nervous, quite fearful about what happens if they pull out next year. It’s something that I hear constantly in the streets, when I stop to talk to people, when I go to the sites of these attacks. When I talk to political leaders, there is quite a lot of apprehension about what happens when there is no big U.S. presence here and Iraq can’t really defend its borders or its airspace.

Will the United States be providing long-term air defense? Or is that supposed to end next year too?

Everything ends next year, so it really all has to be negotiated. The commanding general in charge of training Iraqi forces told me they are in the midst of negotiating an agreement to allow NATO to continue training. Such an agreement of course to replace the Iraq-U.S. security agreement will actually have to be negotiated by whatever new government is formed. The assumption is that it will be a pro-Western, pro-U.S. government, but that’s not a certainty. What if, for instance, the Sadrists have a large role to play in the new government? What if it’s a much more Iranian-friendly government than some people are suggesting? They could turn to Iran for a security agreement.

When terrorist attacks occur and hundreds of people get killed or wounded, is this regarded by Iraqis as comparable to another day of car crashes in the United States?

We might think so, because on the surface, life continues on—people go to work, they open up their shops just hours after an explosion on their street, people send their kids to school. But it has had a significant effect in terms of human investment. Those Iraqis—many of them middle class, a lot of the engineers, the doctors, the professionals needed to rebuild Iraq—will look at the headlines and say, “Why should I want to come back to Iraq? What is there to come back for?” Also, because these attacks have been very focused on the Iraqi police forces, there has been an effect on the ground. With every attack on the police, they retreat further into their police stations. The hope was to have a police force that could eventually replace, first U.S. soldiers, and then Iraqi soldiers that are still here in the streets. When the police get out, they do investigations and they keep the streets safe. When they retreat back, they’re more worried about protecting themselves against these almost constant attacks, either individual or collective, and that really does eventually have a significant effect on security in urban areas.

How do you feel when you walk on the street? Do you worry a lot?

It’s like being a teenager—I’m not allowed to go out on the street on my own. When I’m out on the streets, there’s still obviously some danger, but I do have my Iraqi staff, one or two of them with me at all times. The prevailing feeling is uncertainty. When I go grocery shopping, the shops are full of people. They’re not letting these events deter them from going out. There are new clothing stores, there are new stores selling electronics, but this is all small investment—you don’t see the big things happening. And you don’t see a lot of faith in a near-term optimistic future. People pretty much think it’ll get better, but it’ll take a long time. A long time means a decade, perhaps. People aren’t really thinking it’s going to get better in the new year or two years from now.

Why can’t the Iraqis get electricity working? I gather this is a major complaint.

Most of us do not completely understand why it is there is still no electricity. Officials will tell you that it’s because there is a greatly increased demand— there are more air conditioners and other appliances. Those attacks we saw during the height of the insurgency, on refineries, on oil installations have not been repaired. Everything is on hold, waiting for those billions of dollars in investment to come in. That will happen, but it will take a long time.

And there is all this corruption. Corruption here is at the basis of almost everything. If you talk to Iraqis, they’re more worried about corruption than they are about terrorism. Certainly that’s a lot of the reason why a lot of money that is to be spent on things like electricity has seemed to have gone astray. And it’s part of the reason why the infrastructure, seven years on, is still in such bad shape. Here in Baghdad, people generally get one hour of electricity and then it goes off for four hours or five hours, comes back for another hour. In some places, they don’t even get that. And it’s not just the electricity, there are water shortages. We’re sweltering in 120 degrees and then the water gets cut off. There is a building resentment here and it’s more to do with basic services than it is about security.

The corruption is among officials? Money is allocated to building up an electrical infrastructure, for instance, and somehow the money gets diverted?

It’s as blatant as government officials, deputy ministers, directors of departments stuffing cash into their suitcases and leaving the country and as prevalent as bribes paid on contracts. On a day-to-day level, it’s very hard for anybody here to get anything done unless they pay a bribe, and that includes getting documents that you need from any government department, that includes getting an electricity meter installed so you can get city power in less than a week, instead of six months. You pretty much pay anybody to do anything here and that itself has a very destabilizing effect.

There has been a stalemate between the top political contenders, Ayad Allawi and Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki since the election ended in March. What do you think will happen?

Almost anything is the short answer, which is why this is so fascinating. It’s fascinating because it’s terribly important not just in the national sense, but in the regional sense. But it’s also endlessly fascinating because if you look at the shifts in political alliances, you see people who started off saying that they would never have anything to do with some of the other political leaders now saying there are no red lines. We essentially see the same players we’ve had throughout this war. We’ve got Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; we’ve got Ibrahim Jaafari, who was the prime minister in 2005; we’ve got Ayad Allawi, who was the prime minister in 2004; we’ve got Muqtada al-Sadr—the major players haven’t changed and they won’t change. It’s just really a matter of how they’re all going to fit together.

What the United States wants to see, and what a lot of people do want to see, actually, is some sort of government in which Maliki has a role and Allawi has a role. Maliki is the front runner among the Shiites—he has perhaps the greatest personal popularity—and Allawi represents a very important constituency that is otherwise left out. When Iraqis went to the polls in March, this election was billed as absolutely crucial to Iraqi stability, crucial for U.S. troops to be able to leave, crucial for the United States to walk away from Iraq. This election needed to be broad-based and it needed to have a government that had Sunni participation. For better or worse, Allawi—a Shiite, but a secular Shiite—has a lot of that Sunni backing. He needs to be given a role, and this is agreed by pretty much everyone.

The problem is that Iraqis aren’t used to compromise and almost six months later, that’s what we’re seeing: Nobody is compromising. Everyone wants to be prime minister. One of the things suggested that would be backed by the United States would be the creation of a superstructure that would oversee strategic policies and security policies, and look at all oil policies. The proposal was that it would be headed by Allawi and that Malaki would be prime minister. Now, the problem about that is it’s unconstitutional.

So you can’t really predict, then, who will emerge as the prime minister unless they work out this new superstructure?

I’m not discounting Maliki. The thing with Maliki is that he aligned himself with the other major Shiite players. They have proposed a series of measures that will limit his power. The Sadrists will not support him as prime minister because he sent the Iraqi army into Baghdad and into Basra to get rid of their militia. They’ve actually suggested that they could pull out of that coalition and back Allawi, which would be an interesting development.

But whatever way you cut it, Maliki remains a key politician simply because he has support on the street. It’s entirely unclear as to whether Allawi will back down or whether Maliki will accept a reduced role as prime minister, and agree to have his power curtailed. We keep thinking that perhaps there’s a lot going on beneath the surface, but apparently there isn’t. It is what it is. It’s stalled. There’s talk about what to do, but nothing’s been established yet.

Valor Econômico

Opinião por Marcos Galvão*

Em pouco mais de dois anos foram realizadas cinco cúpulas de líderes.

A escolha do G-20 como principal foro para deliberação de questões econômico-financeiras foi uma das maiores mudanças ocorridas no mundo

A elevação do G-20 ao papel de principal foro para deliberação sobre questões econômico-financeiras foi uma das maiores transformações ocorridas na governança mundial desde o final da Segunda Grande Guerra. Embora a crise tenha sido o principal catalisador desse momento de “aceleração do tempo histórico”, a transformação só ocorreu porque o crescimento econômico e a maior participação das nações emergentes no comércio e nos investimentos globais, entre outros fatores, há muito cobravam o aumento de sua presença nas grandes deliberações internacionais.

A ascensão do G-20 requeria, porém, duas medidas demandadas pelo Brasil desde o começo de 2008, ano em que exerceu a presidência rotativa do Grupo. Primeiro, a transformação do G-20 em foro de líderes. Segundo, o aumento da frequência e qualidade da interação entre seus membros. Criado em 1999, em seguida à “crise asiática”, o Grupo era um foro de ministros da Fazenda e presidentes de bancos centrais que se reunia apenas uma vez por ano. Tinha pouco espaço para influir decisivamente nos principais debates econômicos internacionais.

O próprio G-20, portanto, cuja criação havia sido um passo no rumo certo, precisava ser aperfeiçoado para melhor cumprir a sua missão.

E assim se fez. O Grupo tornou-se um foro de chefes de governo e suas reuniões passaram a ser convocadas de acordo com as exigências da realidade. Em pouco mais de dois anos, contados de outubro de 2008 até novembro próximo, terão ocorrido nada menos de cinco cúpulas de líderes do G-20 e dez reuniões ministeriais. Esse dado reflete com clareza o lugar central que o G-20 ocupa nas relações internacionais contemporâneas.

Além de representar mudança fundamental, o G-20 passou a promover importantes transformações. De início, no auge da crise, os governos do Grupo assumiram o compromisso de adotar todas as ações necessárias para estabilizar o sistema financeiro. Embora fossem respostas de caráter nacional, e variassem de acordo com as circunstâncias específicas, a coordenação sem precedentes dos esforços das maiores economias do mundo foi essencial para a reversão do clima de pânico que se vivia no final de 2008. Desde então, o G-20 conduz processos inéditos de troca de informações, avaliação mútua e articulação de políticas macroeconômicas.

Diretrizes emanadas do G-20 também têm sido essenciais no contexto da reforma do sistema financeiro, em dimensões como as da regulação de capital e liquidez dos bancos, transações com derivativos, remuneração de agentes financeiros e combate aos paraísos fiscais. Por proposta do G-20, o Brasil e outros emergentes passaram a integrar o Conselho de Estabilidade Financeira (FSB) e o Comitê de Basileia, principais foros de regulação do sistema, cuja composição era antes limitada a economias avançadas.

Diante da necessidade de se reforçar a legitimidade das instituições financeiras internacionais, o G-20 tem servido de foro para a negociação de reformas de governança no Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) e no Banco Mundial. Delas deverá resultar uma maior participação dos países emergentes e em desenvolvimento nos respectivos processos decisórios, compatível com o seu peso crescente na economia global. Foi, também, por decisão adotada no G-20, que o FMI teve seus recursos triplicados e que os bancos internacionais de desenvolvimento, com capital ampliado, aumentaram seus empréstimos em US$ 100 bilhões.

A folha de serviços do novo G-20 é impressionante. E não parece razoável criticar o grupo pelo defeito de suas virtudes, pela dificuldade que, por vezes, lá enfrentamos para alcançar consensos. Afinal, o grande avanço que o G-20 traz, em comparação ao G-8, é justamente sua maior diversidade, a presença de países de todas as regiões do mundo, vivendo distintas circunstâncias e estágios de desenvolvimento. É natural que suas negociações sejam mais complexas e que as decisões do grupo reflitam essa variedade de pontos de vista, experiências e interesses.

O Brasil tem participado do G-20 de forma ativa e construtiva. Não se trata, é claro, de um arranjo perfeito e acabado. A ordem internacional está sempre em construção. Em futuro oxalá próximo, o próprio G-20 deverá ajustar o seu papel ao mundo pós-crise.

Essa perspectiva de renovação da agenda gera para os membros do Grupo, sobretudo para os países emergentes, o desafio de sermos capazes de atuar de modo cada vez mais propositivo. Até aqui, o G-20 dedicou-se sobretudo à superação da crise. Logo, porém, deverá voltar-se mais para o delineamento do futuro. Temos de estar prontos para participar plenamente dessa transição, de modo a assegurar que as visões e os interesses do Brasil sejam sempre levados em conta e que o G-20 nos ajude a alcançar uma economia global mais segura, equilibrada e justa, a um ambiente que favoreça o crescimento, a superação da pobreza e a realização integral das potencialidades de desenvolvimento em todo o mundo.

Marcos Galvão é embaixador, Secretário de Assuntos Internacionais do Ministério da Fazenda.

KHARTOUM (Reuters) – O Sudão planeja construir um reator nuclear e sua primeira usina de energia nuclear para fins pacíficos até 2020, informou a agência estatal SUNA.

A economia do Sudão vem sofrendo sanções norte-americanas desde 1997, além de décadas de guerra, mas conseguiu elevar a produção de petróleo a 470 mil barris por dia, impulsionando seu crescimento.

O país também construiu usinas no entorno dos rios Nilo Azul e Branco, que se unem no Sudão, para gerar eletricidades. Entretanto, grandes áreas do país ainda não contam com energia elétrica regular.

Citando o diretor-geral da Agência de Energia Atômica Sudanesa, Mohamed Ahmed Hassan el-Tayeb, a agência informou que o governo começou a planejar no início deste ano o desenvolvimento de energia nuclear.

O Ministério de Eletricidade e Usinas já começou a preparar o projeto para produzir eletricidade a partir de energia nuclear em parceria com a Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica e deve construir a primeira usina em 2020″, segundo a agência.

By the CNN Wire Staff

Japan apologized to the South, but not the North, for colonization

(CNN) — North Korea is demanding reparations from Japan for colonizing the Korean peninsula for more than three decades in the early 1900s, after Tokyo once again apologized to South Korea earlier this month.

“The Japanese imperialists enforced the harshest colonial rule in history over Korea, bringing unspeakably horrible misfortune and sufferings and disasters to the Korean nation,” said a spokesman for the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of Korea, according to the the state-run Korean Central News Agency.

“Japan should make a sincere apology and make full reparation to the Korean nation for its aggression and crimes against humanity,” KCNA quoted the spokesman as saying.

There was no immediate reaction from the Japanese government.

Japan’s August 10 apology to South Korea wasn’t its first to Seoul, but it coincided with the 100th anniversary this month of the annexation of the Korean peninsula.

In his statement, Prime Minister Naoto Kan expressed “deep regret over the suffering inflicted” during Japan’s rule.

Cabinet members endorsed the statement, Japan’s Kyodo news agency reported.

Kan also said Japan will hand over precious cultural artifacts that South Korea has been demanding. Among them are records of an ancient Korean royal dynasty.

Japan controlled Korea from 1910 to 1945. During that time, Japan’s military is accused of forcing about 200,000 women, mainly from Korea and China, to serve as sex slaves.

They were known as “comfort women” for soldiers in Japan’s Imperial Army. In the past, there have been street protests and lawsuits in South Korea over the sufferings of the comfort women.

South Korea’s ruling Grand National Party said earlier this month the statement was “a step forward” from past statements, but “not enough to allay” Korean anger, the country’s Yonhap news agency said.

The statement “has no mention of illegitimacy of the forced annexation and Koreans forced to work as sex slaves or manual laborers by the Japanese army,” Ahn Hyoung-hwan, a spokesman of the party, said, according to Yonhap.

La Republica – Uruguai

Brasil y el mundo. Cambian de forma acelerada

La reciente crisis financiera puso de manifiesto de manera aún más evidente el hecho de que el mundo ya no puede estar gobernado por un consorcio de pocos.

Por Celso Amorin | MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE BRASIL

Hace siete años, cuando se hablaba de la necesidad de cambios en la geografía económica mundial o se decía que Brasil y otros países deberían desempeñar un papel más relevante en la OMC o integrar de un modo permanente el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, muchos reaccionaban con escepticismo.

El mundo y Brasil han cambiado a una velocidad acelerada y algunas supuestas “verdades” del pasado se van rindiendo ante la evidencia de los hechos. Las diferencias en el ritmo de su crecimiento económico con relación a los países desarrollados convirtieron a los países en vías de desarrollo en actores centrales de la economía mundial.

La mayor capacidad de articulación Sur-Sur  en la OMC, en el FMI, en la ONU y en nuevas coaliciones, como el BRIC, eleva la voz de países que antes estaban relegados a una posición secundaria. Cuanto más hablan y cooperan entre sí los países en desarrollo, más son escuchados por los ricos. La reciente crisis financiera puso de manifiesto de manera aún más evidente el hecho de que el mundo ya no puede estar gobernado por un consorcio de pocos.

Brasil ha intentado de forma osada desempeñar su papel en este nuevo cuadro. Pasados siete años y medio del gobierno del presidente Lula, la visión que se tiene del país en el exterior es otra. Es innegable el peso cada vez mayor que hoy tenemos, así como un grupo nuevo de países, en la discusión de los principales temas de la agenda internacional, desde el cambio climático al comercio, desde las finanzas a la paz y la seguridad. Esos países aportan una nueva forma de mirar los problemas del mundo y contribuyen a un nuevo equilibrio internacional.

En el caso de Brasil, ese cambio de percepción se debió, en primer lugar, a la transformación de la realidad económica, social y política del país. Avances en los más variados rubros, desde el equilibrio macroeconómico hasta el rescate de la deuda social, tornaron a Brasil más estable y menos injusto. Las cualidades personales y el compromiso directo del presidente Lula en temas internacionales colaboraron para llevar la contribución brasileña a los principales debates de la agenda internacional.

Fue en ese contexto que Brasil desarrolló una política externa abarcadora y proactiva. Buscamos construir coaliciones que fueran más allá de las alianzas y las relaciones tradicionales, a las que tratamos sin embargo de mantener y profundizar, como la formalización de la relación estratégica con la Unión Europea y el diálogo global con Estados Unidos.

El elocuente crecimiento de nuestras exportaciones hacia los países en desarrollo y la creación de mecanismos de diálogo y concertación, como la Unasur, el G-20 en la OMC, el Foro IBAS (India, Brasil y Africa del Sur) y el grupo BRIC (Brasil, Rusia, India y China) reflejaron esa política externa universalista y libre de visiones pequeñas de lo que puede y debe ser la actuación externa de un país con las características de Brasil.

La base de esa nueva política exterior fue la profundización de la integración sudamericana. Uno de los principales activos de que dispone Brasil en el escenario internacional es la convivencia armoniosa con sus vecinos, comenzando por la intensa relación que mantenemos con Argentina. El gobierno del presidente Lula se ha empeñado, desde el primer día, en integrar el continente sudamericano por medio del comercio, de la infraestructura y del diálogo político.

El acuerdo Mercosur  Comunidad Andina creó, en la práctica, una zona de libre comercio que abarca toda la América del Sur. La integración física del continente avanzó de una forma notable, inclusive con la conexión entre el Atlántico y el Pacífico. Nuestros esfuerzos para la creación de una comunidad sudamericana llevaron a la fundación de una nueva entidad: la Unión de las Naciones Sudamericanas (Unasur).

Sobre las bases de una América del Sur más integrada, Brasil contribuyó en la creación de mecanismos de diálogo y cooperación con países de otras regiones, fundados en la percepción de que la realidad internacional ya no permite la marginalización del mundo en desarrollo. La formación del G-20 de la OMC, en la Reunión Ministerial de Cancún, en 2003, marcó la madurez de los países del Sur, cambiando de forma definitiva el modelo de toma de decisiones en las negociaciones comerciales.

El IBAS respondió a los anhelos de concertación entre tres grandes democracias multiétnicas y multiculturales, que tienen mucho que decirle al mundo en términos de afirmación de la tolerancia y de conciliación entre el desarrollo y la democracia. Además de la concertación política y de la cooperación entre los tres países, el IBAS se convirtió en un modelo para los proyectos en pro de naciones más pobres, demostrando, en la práctica, que la solidaridad no es un atributo exclusivo de los ricos. También lanzamos las cumbres de los países sudamericanos con los países africanos (ASA) y con los países árabes (ASPA).

Construimos puentes y políticas entre regiones hasta ahora distantes unas de las otras, a despecho de sus complementariedades naturales. Esa aproximación política derivó en notables avances en las relaciones económicas. El comercio de Brasil con los países árabes se cuadruplicó en siete años. Con Africa se multiplicó por cinco y llegó a más de US$ 26 mil millones, cifra esta superior a la del intercambio con socios tradicionales como Alemania y Japón.

Estas nuevas coaliciones ayudan a cambiar el mundo. En el campo económico, la sustitución del G-7 por el G-20 como principal instancia de deliberación sobre los rumbos de la producción y de las finanzas internacionales es el reconocimiento de que las decisiones sobre la economía mundial carecían de legitimidad y eficacia sin la participación de los países emergentes.

También en el terreno de la seguridad internacional, cuando Brasil y Turquía convencieron a Irán para que asumiera los compromisos previstos en la Declaración de Teherán, quedó demostrado que nuevas visiones y formas de actuar son necesarias para lidiar con temas tratados hasta entonces de forma exclusiva por los actuales miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. A pesar de las resistencias iniciales a una iniciativa que nació fuera del cerrado club de las potencias nucleares, estamos seguros de que la dirección del diálogo allí señalada servirá de base para las futuras negociaciones y para la eventual solución de la cuestión.

Una buena política externa exige prudencia. Pero también exige osadía. No puede basarse en la timidez o en el complejo de inferioridad. Es común escuchar que los países deben actuar de acuerdo con sus medios, lo que es casi una obviedad. Pero el mayor error es subestimarlos.

A lo largo de estos casi ocho años Brasil actuó con osadía y, al igual que otros países en desarrollo, cambió su lugar en el mundo. Esos países son vistos hoy, inclusive por los eventuales críticos, como actores a los que les tocan crecientes responsabilidades y un papel cada vez más central en las decisiones que afectan los destinos del planeta.”

The Independent Editorial

The deportations began yesterday. Two flights left France, bound for Bucharest, with 93 Roma immigrants on board. Some 700 Roma are expected to be removed by the end of August. And 300 illegal Roma camps in the country will be demolished over the next three months. The explanation of the French government for the deportations is that the camps have become bases for people-trafficking, prostitution and crime. But critics of the policy detect an uglier motive: a hope from President Nicolas Sarkozy to distract public attention away from allegations of corruption that swirl around his administration.

If true, this would be nothing new. Immigrants often find themselves made into scapegoats, especially at times of economic stress. And France is by no means alone in this respect. The Italian state has been harassing and deporting its Roma migrants for several years now. A legal battle is raging in the US over a law passed by the state government in Arizona giving police the right to demand that individuals show their identification in order to detect illegal immigrants from Mexico, something that opponents say has resulted in racial profiling. Popular concern about the children of illegal immigrants in the US has also led to some suggestions in Republican circles that the constitutional provision that grants citizenship to those born on US soil should be revoked. Meanwhile, the two candidates in the Australian election, the Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, and Tony Abbott of the opposition Liberal Party, are locked in competition over who can adopt a tougher line on the “boat people”, a reference to the desperate asylum seekers who make for Australia’s shores by sea.

The hypocrisy of all this is rich. In Australia, Ms Gillard and Mr Abbott are both immigrants themselves, the Prime Minister having been born in Wales and the opposition leader in London. President Sarkozy’s father was a Hungarian aristocrat who fled to France in the wake of the Second World War.

But the hypocrisy is not confined to politicians. Most economically advanced nations – Australia and America above all – have been enriched by migrants. To see the citizens of such countries turning on those who hope to follow their path – a path which history shows is generally to the benefit of the migrants and the host country – is depressing indeed.

Yet, however unpalatable they are, these public pressures are real. The question is: what should be done to counter them? A return to economic growth would help. When people are economically insecure they tend to be much more susceptible to the demagogues who peddle the simplistic and false notion that less immigration will mean more prosperity.

But the primary response has to be political. Democratic leaders need to be prepared to stand firm against xenophobic impulses, rather than pander to them. Where there are legitimate grievances over stresses imposed by migration patterns on public services, they must act to ease the burden. But that must not be confused with punishing or harassing immigrants themselves. Politicians also need to be prepared to explain to their electorates that immigrants, with their skills and their labour, are essential to helping our economies return to health.

Sadly, Britain can hardly be said to be setting much of an example in this respect. Our own government intends to impose an annual cap on the number of migrants who can enter the country, even though its own economic watchdog, the Office for Budget Responsibility, says this is likely to restrict growth.

The global economy remains weak and xenophobia is likely to remain a potent force in democracies around the world. Responsible political leaders everywhere need to summon the courage to explain to their citizens that immigrants are not the cause of their problems.

Vasculhando os rincões da rede de computadores encontrei uma tirinha que demonstra claramente o espírito do brasileiro frente a alguns episódios sociais. O que muito me chamou a atenção foi a propriedade com que descreve a posição de nós brasileiros diante do cenário político. Confiram:

Não é a toa que mulheres frutas e comediantes diversos estão tentando uma vaga na política brasileira e não duvido que venham a ter êxito. Ces´t la vie, ou melhor, é o Brasil.

O programa da Globo News, Sem Fronteiras, analisa as críticas ao projeto do centro religioso em Nova Iorque, a apenas dois quarteirões de onde ficavam as Torres Gêmeas. Pondera que tal obra repercute com a polêmica sobre o preconceito contra os muçulmanos no Ocidente. Interessante em virtude de várias ondas xenofóbicas que estão aparecendo em várias partes do mundo, sobretudo, em países com déficits econômicos decorrentes da crise de 2008.

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