Política Internacional

Financial Times publicado na Exame.com

O ministro da Fazenda, Guido Mantega, avisa que o Brasil colocará o tema na Organização Mundial do Comércio e outros foros mundiais

Londres – O ministro da Fazenda, Guido Mantega, adverte de uma “guerra comercial global” pela manipulação monetária e menciona concretamente os Estados Unidos e China, em entrevista publicada nesta segunda-feira pelo “Financial Times”.

Segundo Mantega, o Brasil está tomando medidas para impedir que o real continue se valorizando e colocará o tema na Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) e outros foros mundiais.

“Trata-se de uma guerra monetária que está se transformando em uma guerra comercial”, afirma Mantega em sua primeira entrevista exclusiva desde que Dilma Rousseff substituiu Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva à frente do país.

Seus comentários, assinala o jornal, acompanham as intervenções que foram feitas na semana passada nos mercados de divisas tanto do Brasil como de Chile e Peru, as recentes e fortes altas do franco-suíço e de outras moedas, e a fuga dos investimentos das economias dos EUA e Europa.

O Fundo Monetário Internacional insinuou a semana passada que o mundo precisa de novas regras que governem o recurso pelos Governos aos controles de capitais.

Mantega já utilizou em setembro passado a expressão “guerra de divisas” antes de aplicar controles aos investimentos de bolsa estrangeiras no Brasil para frear uma apreciação de 39% do real frente ao dólar nos dois últimos anos.

Na quinta-feira, o Banco Central do Brasil pôs em prática de surpresa uma medida destinada a impedir a venda a curto prazo do dólar (apostando por sua depreciação) contra o real pelos bancos e anunciou que devem ser esperadas mais medidas “no mercado de futuros”.

Segundo Mantega, o tema das manipulações cambiais estará este ano na agenda do G20 e o Brasil também o apresentará na OMC para que seja considerado como um tipo de subsídio velado às exportações.

Os analistas acham, no entanto, que será difícil mudar as regras da OMC para incluir as taxas de câmbio porque a China seguramente vetaria uma proposta nesse sentido.

Segundo Mantega, o comércio do Brasil com os Estados Unidos passou de um superávit de cerca de US$ 15 bilhões a favor do país para um déficit de US$ 6 bilhões desde que Washington começou a flutuar sua economia mediante uma política monetária relaxada.

Para o ministro, a super-valorizada moeda chinesa também está distorcendo o comércio mundial: “Temos excelentes relações com a China, mas há alguns problemas. Certamente gostaríamos de ver uma valorização do iuane”.

Rafael Rosas | Valor

RIO – A Petrobras aprovou a assinatura de um termo de compromisso de associação com a Camargo Correa Óleo e Gás; a Copersucar; a Cosan; a Odebrecht Transport Participações (OTP); e a Uniduto Logística para estabelecer uma associação, formando uma empresa fechada de capital autorizado para o desenvolvimento, construção e operação de um sistema logístico multimodal para transporte e armazenagem de líquidos, com ênfase em etanol.

O acordo é resultado de estudos preliminares conjuntos da PMCC Soluções Logísticas de Etanol, que tem como acionistas a Petrobras e a Camargo Correa; Uniduto e OTP, visando à implementação de um único projeto de transporte e armazenagem de etanol.

O capital social da nova companhia será, inicialmente, de R$ 100 milhões, composto exclusivamente por ações ordinárias, nominativas e sem valor nominal. Copersucar, Cosan, OTP e Petrobras terão 20% de participação, cada, enquanto Camargo Correa e a Uniduto terão fatias de 10%.

“As partes estudarão o modelo societário e fiscal mais adequado e definirão em 60 dias a forma mais eficiente de associação, garantindo a continuidade dos projetos que estão sendo conduzidos pela PMCC. A associação será efetuada através de uma nova sociedade ou através da PMCC com a incorporação dos novos sócios”, diz a nota divulgada pela Petrobras.

GENEBRA (Reuters) - Até 200 mil haitianos poderão contrair cólera à medida que o surto, que já fez 800 vítimas, se disseminar pelo país, de 10 milhões de habitantes, informou a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) nesta sexta-feira.

Seria o dobro dos casos de uma epidemia gigantesca de cólera no Zimbábue, ocorrida entre agosto de 2008 e julho de 2009, que matou 4.287 pessoas. A estimativa da ONU para o número de casos no Haiti baseia-se em parte no caso do Zimbábue.

Em um plano estratégico desenvolvido com o governo do Haiti e com agências de ajuda humanitária, a ONU disse que o Haiti precisa de um auxílio de 163,9 milhões de dólares ao longo do ano que vem para combater a epidemia, o primeiro surto de cólera no país em um século. O cólera também deve se espalhar para a vizinha República Dominicana, informou a organização.

“A estratégia antecipa que um total de até 200 mil pessoas deverão ter os sintomas do cólera, indo dos casos de leve diarréia até a desidratação mais grave”, disse Elisabeth Byrs, do Escritório da ONU para a Coordenação de Assuntos Humanitários (Ocha), numa entrevista coletiva em Genebra nesta sexta-feira.

“Espera-se que os casos surjam numa explosão de epidemias que ocorrerão subitamente em diferentes partes do país”, afirmou ela.

O total de mortes em decorrência do surto subiu para 800 na quinta-feira. Ao menos 11.125 pacientes foram internados desde o início do surto, há mais de três semanas.

“A taxa de mortes não está aumentando, mas ainda é muito mais elevada do que o habitual: de 6 a 7 por cento. Deveria ser muito mais baixa”, disse o porta-voz da Organização Mundial da Saúde (OMS), Gregory Hartl, na mesma entrevista coletiva.

FATORES DE RISCO CLÁSSICOS

A epidemia no Haiti foi agravada pelas enchentes causadas pelo furacão Tomas este mês e soma-se à emergência humanitária na esteira do forte terremoto de janeiro, que matou mais de 250 mil pessoas.

O tremor deixou cerca de 1,5 milhão de pessoas desabrigadas. As condições de moradia no país mais pobre do Hemisfério Ocidental deixam as pessoas extremamente vulneráveis à doença, disseminada por meio da água ou dos alimentos.

Toda a população está sob risco porque ninguém tem imunidade ao cólera.

O país tem todos os fatores de risco clássicos para a doença - acampamentos superlotados para os sobreviventes desabrigados pelo terremoto, escassez de água potável, eliminação imprópria de dejetos humanos e contaminação de alimentos durante ou após seu preparo.

Já foram confirmados casos em cinco dos dez departamentos, incluindo na capital, Porto Príncipe.

DA FRANCE PRESSE, EM HAVANA

O ex-presidente cubano Fidel Castro qualificou neste sábado a cúpula do G20 de uma “olla de grillos”, um caldeirão de grilos na tradução literal, que quer dizer marcada por muita confusão. E criticou a falta de ajuda dos Estados Unidos para enfrentar a epidemia de cólera no Haiti.

“Foi nisso que se transformou a reunião do G20″ em Seul, afirmou o líder comunista em artigo publicado neste sábado na imprensa local, ao definir o grupo de “embrião do poderoso império e de seus aliados mais ricos”.

Segundo Castro, enquanto o G20 e o Foro de Cooperação Econômica Ásia Pacífico (APEC) tomam decisões de impacto mundial, “não existe qualquer tribuna na qual 160 países possam usar da palavra para denunciar o saque de seus recursos e suas urgentes necessidades econômicas”.

Castro criticou decisões tomadas pelos Estados Unidos como foi a “medida desesperada” do Federal Reserve de injetar R$ 600 bilhões de liquidez no circuito financeiro, antes da cúpula do G20.

Enquanto isto, segundo o líder, de 84 anos, começa a chegar a ajuda americana ao Haiti, meses depois do prometido, apesar do terremoto que matou 250 mil pessoas em janeiro.

Não se disse uma palavra sobre “a epidemia de cólera –que já fez cerca de 800 mortos, também no Haiti”.

by COHA Research Associate Melissa Graham

China’s economic involvement in Latin America reached an all-time high last month when Beijing was able to gain a large stake in the Brazilian petroleum market. The deal, brokered by Chinese petroleum company Sinopec, allows the Spanish firm Repsol to turn 40 percent of its Brazilian oil stake over to the Chinese state corporation. Worth USD 7.9 billion¹, the agreement has prompted other countries in the Western hemisphere to reevaluate China’s ever-changing economic and political role in Latin America. Recent events highlight the seriousness of China’s drive to stake out a major economic presence in Latin America, as well as a readiness to use economic methods in order to achieve its goal.

China Acquires Brazilian Oil: Part of a Persuasive Pattern

Brazil holds one of the largest reserves of oil in the world, totaling an estimated twenty billion barrels in land and offshore deposits.² The majority of Brazilian petroleum remains under the control of Petrobras, the state-funded oil producer. In 1997, the Brazilian government began to take steps to overhaul its oil industry and revitalize its economy. In addition to creating such regulatory bodies as The National Petroleum Agency (ANP), and the National Council of Energy Policies, the government instituted “Law N. 9.478,” which opened Brazil’s oil to foreign investment. These reforms have attracted the attention of a number of foreign investors to the country’s lucrative oil resources.

As China’s second largest oil company, Sinopec is no stranger to extensive foreign investments; in 2009, the company purchased Addex Petroleum, based in the United Kingdom, for USD 7.2 million,³ thereby gaining reserves in both the Middle East and Africa. China’s recently increased interest in foreign oil is to be expected, considering that the country’s dramatic economic rise as a consumer society during the past decade has created an insatiable demand for energy resources. Indeed, China’s GDP for the second quarter of 2010 surpassed that of Japan, which has long dominated trade between Asia and Western nations. Chinese trade with the West totals USD 1.337 trillion, which has transformed China into the second largest economy in the world.⁴ Sinopec’s increasingly aggressive acquisition of foreign oil reserves reflects the Chinese government’s serious commitment to expanding overseas influence, and is a cornerstone of China’s global economic and political strategy.

China Replaces U.S. in Latin America?

Since developing stronger ties with Latin America, Chinese imports from the region have increased by an extraordinary 600 percent, totaling USD 21.7 billion in 2004.⁵ China’s mounting interest in Latin American markets is an attempt to meet the demands of its ever-rising population and economy, which grew an unprecedented 25 percent over the same seven-year period in which the U.S. economy (currently Latin America’s largest trading partner) grew 20 percent.⁶

Some do not consider Beijing’s interest in Latin America as an entirely positive development. The U.S. is closely monitoring China’s expanded role in Latin America, a region that it has historically considered its “backyard.” Like many developing countries, China undervalues its currency so as to encourage rapid economic development that is frequently associated with cheaper trade.⁷ This move has generated much criticism of the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao for his reluctance to increase the value of the Yuan, given its now stronger economy and market shares.⁸ Consequently, China has been able to formulate agreements and offer interest at rates that are lower than other competing developed countries, including the United States. A Washington Post article reported that “in some cases, China has handed out billions of dollars at less than 1% interest; under OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development) rules…the United States must lend at market rates.”⁹ Thus, China remains a more logical partner for many Latin American countries struggling to become greater players in the global economy.

China’s influence in Latin America’s economy has expanded through other, more indirect, avenues as well. China recently loosened Latin American travel restrictions on its citizens, a decision that will, undoubtedly, promote further economic ties between the two. China’s latest dealings have been described as part of an “aggressive push to invest in industries overseas…to bolster the country’s image and political influence.”¹⁰ This is particularly evident in the case of Brazil. China’s investment in various sectors of the Brazilian economy, such as a large port factory in Sao Paulo, is strategically fashioned to boost the volume of Chinese exports to Brazil. Constituting the so-called “BRIC” countries, along with Russia and India, Brazil and China are predicted to be increasingly important players on the global economic stage. In a sign of things to come, China replaced the United States as Brazil’s largest trading partner at the beginning of 2009.¹¹

The Political Persuasion: China’s Effect on the Americas

In addition to its heightened economic influence in Latin America, China’s political presence is growing in the region as well. As China continues to grow as a global power, the topic of Taiwan’s sovereignty becomes the elephant in the room. Currently, twelve Latin American countries still recognize Taiwan’s sovereignty. The loyalty of these countries, which include Panama, Paraguay, and Guatemala, could shift away from Taiwan as China invests more time and money in the region and plays a stronger role in their economic growth. A shared concern among those that recognize Taiwanese sovereignty is that Beijing still “clearly wishes to diminish Taiwan’s formal and informal ties to Latin America.”¹² If China continues to gain political clout in Latin America this fear may prove to be valid and become a contentious issue in the region between those who favor a Chinese political and economic presence and those who do not.

Many Latin American leaders are carefully weighing the positive and negative political implications that China’s growing involvement may have in the region. In March, Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa “compared China to the worst imperialist corporation … and refused to bend on terms for financing a $1 billion hydroelectric dam.”¹³ Despite initial opposition, Correa eventually agreed to China’s conditions after recognizing that the dam project would fall through if he continued his unyielding insistence for more favorable terms. Correa’s climb down demonstrates the overbearing power that China can exert on Latin America’s governments.

Another concern is that China’s increased interest in the region, largely driven by its need to secure new markets for its products, will not have tangible benefits in Latin America. Brazil’s outgoing President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva hinted at his skepticism over the potentially one-sided nature of the Sino-Latin American relationship this past July: “the truth is that sometimes they win a mine contract and they bring all these Chinese to work, and this doesn’t generate opportunity for work in that country.”¹⁴ This concern was previously raised in 1996 when Brazilian Ambassador to Beijing, Roberto Abdeneur, suggested that China might be “more of a challenge to Brazil than an opportunity.”¹⁵

For Better or for Worse: A Marriage of East and West

China’s growing influence in Latin America will continue to raise questions regarding its role in the region’s economic development. If the past decade is any indication, China’s unprecedented power will continue to bring considerable economic growth to the Latin American region. Yet valid concerns exist regarding China’s potential to misuse its influence. At present, a number of Latin American leaders’ are seeking greater independence from the United States. It remains to be seen, however, whether China’s increased presence in Latin America will aid these efforts or simply transfer external power from one economic giant to another

References for this article are available here.

By George Friedman

Stratfor, September 8, 2010

It has now been nine years since al Qaeda attacked the United States. It has been nine years in which the primary focus of the United States has been on the Islamic world. In addition to a massive investment in homeland security, the United States has engaged in two multi-year, multi-divisional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, inserted forces in other countries in smaller operations and conducted a global covert campaign against al Qaeda and other radical jihadist groups.

In order to understand the last nine years you must understand the first 24 hours of the war — and recall your own feelings in those 24 hours. First, the attack was a shock, its audaciousness frightening. Second, we did not know what was coming next. The attack had destroyed the right to complacent assumptions. Were there other cells standing by in the United States? Did they have capabilities even more substantial than what they showed on Sept. 11? Could they be detected and stopped? Any American not frightened on Sept. 12 was not in touch with reality. Many who are now claiming that the United States overreacted are forgetting their own sense of panic. We are all calm and collected nine years after.

At the root of all of this was a profound lack of understanding of al Qaeda, particularly its capabilities and intentions. Since we did not know what was possible, our only prudent course was to prepare for the worst. That is what the Bush administration did. Nothing symbolized this more than the fear that al Qaeda had acquired nuclear weapons and that they would use them against the United States. The evidence was minimal, but the consequences would be overwhelming. Bush crafted a strategy based on the worst-case scenario.

Bush was the victim of a decade of failure in the intelligence community to understand what al Qaeda was and wasn’t. I am not merely talking about the failure to predict the 9/11 attack. Regardless of assertions afterwards, the intelligence community provided only vague warnings that lacked the kind of specificity that makes for actionable intelligence. To a certain degree, this is understandable. Al Qaeda learned from Soviet, Saudi, Pakistani and American intelligence during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and knew how to launch attacks without tipping off the target. The greatest failure of American intelligence was not the lack of a clear warning about 9/11 but the lack, on Sept. 12, of a clear picture of al Qaeda’s global structure, capabilities, weaknesses and intentions. Without such information, implementing U.S. policy was like piloting an airplane with faulty instruments in a snowstorm at night.

The president had to do three things: First, he had to assure the public that he knew what he was doing. Second, he had to do something that appeared decisive. Third, he had to gear up an intelligence and security apparatus to tell him what the threats actually were and what he ought to do. American policy became ready, fire, aim.

In looking back at the past nine years, two conclusions can be drawn: There were no more large-scale attacks on the United States by militant Islamists, and the United States was left with the legacy of responses that took place in the first two years after 9/11. This legacy is no longer useful, if it ever was, to the primary mission of defeating al Qaeda, and it represents an effort that is retrospectively out of proportion to the threat.

If I had been told on Sept.12, 2001, that the attack the day before would be the last major attack for at least nine years, I would not have believed it. In looking at the complexity of the security and execution of the 9/11 attack, I would have assumed that an organization capable of acting once in such a way could act again even more effectively. My assumption was wrong. Al Qaeda did not have the resources to mount other operations, and the U.S. response, in many ways clumsy and misguided and in other ways clever and targeted, disrupted any preparations in which al Qaeda might have been engaged to conduct follow-on attacks.

Knowing that about al Qaeda in 2001 was impossible. Knowing which operations were helpful in the effort to block them was impossible, in the context of what Americans knew in the first years after the war began. Therefore, Washington wound up in the contradictory situation in which American military and covert operations surged while new attacks failed to materialize. This created a massive political problem. Rather than appearing to be the cause for the lack of attacks, U.S. military operations were perceived by many as being unnecessary or actually increasing the threat of attack. Even in hindsight, aligning U.S. actions with the apparent outcome is difficult and controversial. But still we know two things: It has been nine years since Sept. 11, 2001, and the war goes on.

What happened was that an act of terrorism was allowed to redefine U.S. grand strategy. The United States operates with a grand strategy derived from the British strategy in Europe — maintaining the balance of power. For the United Kingdom, maintaining the balance of power in Europe protected any one power from emerging that could unite Europe and build a fleet to invade the United Kingdom or block its access to its empire. British strategy was to help create coalitions to block emerging hegemons such as Spain, France or Germany. Using overt and covert means, the United Kingdom aimed to ensure that no hegemonic power could emerge.

The Americans inherited that grand strategy from the British but elevated it to a global rather than regional level. Having blocked the Soviet Union from hegemony over Europe and Asia, the United States proceeded with a strategy whose goal, like that of the United Kingdom, was to nip potential regional hegemons in the bud. The U.S. war with Iraq in 1990-91 and the war with Serbia/Yugoslavia in 1999 were examples of this strategy. It involved coalition warfare, shifting America’s weight from side to side and using minimal force to disrupt the plans of regional aspirants to gain power. This U.S. strategy also was cloaked in the ideology of global liberalism and human rights.

The key to this strategy was its global nature. The emergence of a hegemonic contender that could challenge the United States globally, as the Soviet Union had done, was the worst-case scenario. Therefore, the containment of emerging powers wherever they might emerge was the centerpiece of American balance-of-power strategy.

The most significant effect of 9/11 was that it knocked the United States off its strategy. Rather than adapting its standing global strategy to better address the counterterrorism issue, the United States became obsessed with a single region, the area between the Mediterranean and the Hindu Kush. Within that region, the United States operated with a balance-of-power strategy. It played off all of the nations in the region against each other. It did the same with ethnic and religious groups throughout the region and particularly within Iraq and Afghanistan, the main theaters of the war. In both cases, the United States sought to take advantage of internal divisions, shifting its support in various directions to create a balance of power. That, in the end, was what the surge strategy was all about.

The American obsession with this region in the wake of 9/11 is understandable. Nine years later, with no clear end in sight, the question is whether this continued focus is strategically rational for the United States. Given the uncertainties of the first few years, obsession and uncertainty are understandable, but as a long-term U.S. strategy — the long war that the U.S. Department of Defense is preparing for — it leaves the rest of the world uncovered.

Consider that the Russians have used the American absorption in this region as a window of opportunity to work to reconstruct their geopolitical position. When Russia went to war with Georgia in 2008, an American ally, the United States did not have the forces with which to make a prudent intervention. Similarly, the Chinese have had a degree of freedom of action they could not have expected to enjoy prior to 9/11. The single most important result of 9/11 was that it shifted the United States from a global stance to a regional one, allowing other powers to take advantage of this focus to create significant potential challenges to the United States.

One can make the case, as I have, that whatever the origin of the Iraq war, remaining in Iraq to contain Iran is necessary. It is difficult to make a similar case for Afghanistan. Its strategic interest to the United States is minimal. The only justification for the war is that al Qaeda launched its attacks on the United States from Afghanistan. But that justification is no longer valid. Al Qaeda can launch attacks from Yemen or other countries. The fact that Afghanistan was the base from which the attacks were launched does not mean that al Qaeda depends on Afghanistan to launch attacks. And given that the apex leadership of al Qaeda has not launched attacks in a while, the question is whether al Qaeda is capable of launching such attacks any longer. In any case, managing al Qaeda today does not require nation building in Afghanistan.

But let me state a more radical thesis: The threat of terrorism cannot become the singular focus of the United States. Let me push it further: The United States cannot subordinate its grand strategy to simply fighting terrorism even if there will be occasional terrorist attacks on the United States. Three thousand people died in the 9/11 attack. That is a tragedy, but in a nation of over 300 million, 3,000 deaths cannot be permitted to define the totality of national strategy. Certainly, resources must be devoted to combating the threat and, to the extent possible, disrupting it. But it must also be recognized that terrorism cannot always be blocked, that terrorist attacks will occur and that the world’s only global power cannot be captive to this single threat.

The initial response was understandable and necessary. The United States must continue its intelligence gathering and covert operations against militant Islamists throughout the world. The intelligence failures of the 1990s must not be repeated. But waging a multi-divisional war in Afghanistan makes no strategic sense. The balance-of-power strategy must be used. Pakistan will intervene and discover the Russians and Iranians. The great game will continue. As for Iran, regional counters must be supported at limited cost to the United States. The United States should not be patrolling the far reaches of the region. It should be supporting a balance of power among the native powers of the region.

The United States is a global power and, as such, it must have a global view. It has interests and challenges beyond this region and certainly beyond Afghanistan. The issue there is not whether the United States can or can’t win, however that is defined. The issue is whether it is worth the effort considering what is going on in the rest of the world. Gen. David Petraeus cast the war in terms of whether the United States can win it. That’s reasonable; he’s the commander. But American strategy has to ask another question: What does the United States lose elsewhere while it focuses on the future of Kandahar?

The 9/11 attack shocked the United States and made counterterrorism the centerpiece of American foreign policy. That is too narrow a basis on which to base U.S. foreign policy. It is certainly an important strand of that policy, and it must be addressed, but it should be addressed through the regional balance of power. It is the good fortune of the United States that the Islamic world is torn by internal rivalries.

This is not dismissing the threat of terror. It is recognizing that the United States has done well in suppressing it over the past nine years but at a cost in other regions, a cost that can’t be sustained indefinitely and a cost that could well result in challenges more threatening than a rising Islamist militancy. The United States must now settle into a long-term strategy of managing terrorism as best as it can while not neglecting the rest of its interests.

After nine years, the issue is not what to do in Afghanistan but how the global power can return to managing all of its global interests, along with the war on al Qaeda.

Integra da reportagem publicada no site Atlantic

Fidel: ‘Cuban Model Doesn’t Even Work For Us Anymore’

By Jeffrey Goldberg

There were many odd things about my recent Havana stopover (apart from the dolphin show, which I’ll get to shortly), but one of the most unusual was Fidel Castro’s level of self-reflection. I only have limited experience with Communist autocrats (I have more experience with non-Communist autocrats) but it seemed truly striking that Castro was willing to admit that he misplayed his hand at a crucial moment in the Cuban Missile Crisis (you can read about what he said toward the end of my previous post - but he said, in so many words, that he regrets asking Khruschev to nuke the U.S.).

Even more striking was something he said at lunch on the day of our first meeting. We were seated around a smallish table; Castro, his wife, Dalia, his son; Antonio; Randy Alonso, a major figure in the government-run media; and Julia Sweig, the friend I brought with me to make sure, among other things, that I didn’t say anything too stupid (Julia is a leading Latin American scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations). I initially was mainly interested in watching Fidel eat – it was a combination of digestive problems that conspired to nearly kill him, and so I thought I would do a bit of gastrointestinal Kremlinology and keep a careful eye on what he took in (for the record, he ingested small amounts of fish and salad, and quite a bit of bread dipped in olive oil, as well as a glass of red wine). But during the generally lighthearted conversation (we had just spent three hours talking about Iran and the Middle East), I asked him if he believed the Cuban model was still something worth exporting.

“The Cuban model doesn’t even work for us anymore,” he said.

This struck me as the mother of all Emily Litella moments. Did the leader of the Revolution just say, in essence, “Never mind”?

I asked Julia to interpret this stunning statement for me. She said, “He wasn’t rejecting the ideas of the Revolution. I took it to be an acknowledgment that under ‘the Cuban model’ the state has much too big a role in the economic life of the country.”

Julia pointed out that one effect of such a sentiment might be to create space for his brother, Raul, who is now president, to enact the necessary reforms in the face of what will surely be push-back from orthodox communists within the Party and the bureaucracy.  Raul Castro is already loosening the state’s hold on the economy. He recently announced, in fact, that small businesses can now operate and that foreign investors could now buy Cuban real estate. (The joke of this new announcement, of course, is that Americans are not allowed to invest in Cuba, not because of Cuban policy, but because of American policy. In other words, Cuba is beginning to adopt the sort of economic ideas that America has long-demanded it adopt, but Americans are not allowed to participate in this free-market experiment because of our government’s hypocritical and stupidly self-defeating embargo policy. We’ll regret this, of course, when Cubans partner with Europeans and Brazilians to buy up all the best hotels).

But I digress. Toward the end of this long, relaxed lunch, Fidel proved to us that he was truly semi-retired. The next day was Monday, when maximum leaders are expected to be busy single-handedly managing their economies, throwing dissidents into prison, and the like. But Fidel’s calendar was open. He asked us, “Would you like to go the aquarium with me to see the dolphin show?”

I wasn’t sure I heard him correctly. (This happened a number of times during my visit). “The dolphin show?”

“The dolphins are very intelligent animals,” Castro said.

I noted that we had a meeting scheduled for the next morning, with Adela Dworin, the president of Cuba’s Jewish community.

“Bring her,” Fidel said.

Someone at the table mentioned that the aquarium was closed on Mondays. Fidel said, “It will be open tomorrow.”

And so it was.

Late the next morning, after collecting Adela at the synagogue, we met Fidel on the steps of the dolphin house. He kissed Dworin, not incidentally in front of the cameras (another message for Ahmadinejad, perhaps). We went together into a large, blue-lit room that faces a massive, glass-enclosed dolphin tank. Fidel explained, at length, that the Havana Aquarium’s dolphin show was the best dolphin show in the world, “completely unique,” in fact, because it is an underwater show. Three human divers enter the water, without breathing equipment, and perform intricate acrobatics with the dolphins. “Do you like dolphins?” Fidel asked me.

“I like dolphins a lot,” I said.

Fidel called over Guillermo Garcia, the director of the aquarium (every employee of the aquarium, of course, showed up for work — “voluntarily,” I was told) and told him to sit with us.

“Goldberg,” Fidel said, “ask him questions about dolphins.”

“What kind of questions?” I asked.

“You’re a journalist, ask good questions,” he said, and then interrupted himself. “He doesn’t know much about dolphins anyway,” he said, pointing to Garcia. He’s actually a nuclear physicist.”

“You are?” I asked.

“Yes,” Garcia said, somewhat apologetically.

“Why are you running the aquarium?” I asked.

“We put him here to keep him from building nuclear bombs!” Fidel said, and then cracked-up laughing.

“In Cuba, we would only use nuclear power for peaceful means,” Garcia said, earnestly.

“I didn’t think I was in Iran,” I answered.

Fidel pointed to the small rug under the special swivel chair his bodyguards bring along for him.

“It’s Persian!” he said, and laughed again. Then he said, “Goldberg, ask your questions about dolphins.”

Now on the spot, I turned to Garcia and asked, “How much do the dolphins weigh?”

They weigh between 100 and 150 kilograms, he said.

“How do you train the dolphins to do what they do?”  I asked.

“That’s a good question,” Fidel said.

Garcia called over one of the aquarium’s veterinarians to help answer the question. Her name was Celia. A few minutes later, Antonio Castro told me her last name: Guevara.

“You’re Che’s daughter?” I asked.

“Yes,” she said.

“And you’re a dolphin veterinarian?”

“I take care of all the inhabitants of the aquarium,” she said.

“Che liked animals very much,” Antonio Castro said.

It was time for the show to start. The lights dimmed, and the divers entered the water. Without describing it overly much, I will say that once again, and to my surprise, I found myself agreeing with Fidel: The aquarium in Havana puts on a fantastic dolphin show, the best I’ve ever seen, and as the father of three children, I’ve seen a lot of dolphin shows. I will also say this: I’ve never seen someone enjoy a dolphin show as much as Fidel Castro enjoyed the dolphin show.

In the next installment, I will deal with such issues as the American embargo, the status of religion in Cuba, the plight of political dissidents, and economic reform. For now, I leave you with this image from our day at the aquarium (I’m in the low chair; Che’s daughter is behind me, with the short, blondish hair; Fidel is the guy who looks like Fidel if Fidel shopped at L.L. Bean).

‘Modelo cubano não funciona mais nem mesmo para nós’, diz Fidel

Ex-presidente admitiu que o modelo não tem apelo para ser exportado.

Especialista diz que declaração deve abrir espaço para reformas em Cuba.

Do G1, em São Paulo

O ex-presidente cubano Fidel Castro admitiu que o “modelo cubano” não tem mais apelo para ser exportado para outros países. A declaração faz parte de uma longa entrevista que concedeu à revista americana “The Atlantic Monthly”, cuja segunda parte foi publicada nesta quarta-feira (8). Questionado pelo o jornalista Jeffrey Goldberg se achava que o modelo cubano ainda poderia ser exportado para algum lugar, Fidel respondeu: “O modelo cubano não funciona mais nem mesmo para nós”.

Segundo Julia Sweig, diretora de pesquisas sobre a América Latina no Council of Foreign Relations, que acompanhou o jornalista em sua viagem a Cuba, “ele não rejeitou as ideias da revolução”, mas apenas admitiu que sob o “modelo cubano” o Estado tem um papel grande demais na vida econômica do país. Segundo ela, trata-se de uma forma de abrir espaço para que Raúl Castro, irmão de Fidel que está no poder desde que ele saiu da Presidência, faça as reformas necessárias para abrir a economia do país.

Na mesma entrevista, o ex-ditador cubano criticou a retórica antissemita usada pelo presidente iraniano, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. “Não acredito que alguém tenha sido mais difamado que os judeus. Diria que muito mais do que os muçulmanos. Foram mais difamados que os muçulmanos porque são acusados e caluniados por tudo. Ninguém culpa os muçulmanos de nada”, estimou Fidel.

“Digo isso para que você possa dizer a ele”, respondeu Fidel, indagado pelo correspondente Jeffrey Goldberg se tem a intenção de compartilhar com Ahmadinejad seu ponto de vista.

Goldberg foi convidado pelo próprio Fidel, que se interessou por um artigo seu sobre as tensões entre Irã e Israel. “Os judeus tiveram uma vida muito mais dura do que a nossa. Não há nada que se compare ao Holocausto”, afirmou Fidel Castro, que foi entrevistado pelo jornalista em Havana durante três dias.

Fidel Castro, que voltou a aparecer em público e escrever com frequência nas últimas semanas, criticou Ahmadinejad por negar o Holocausto, e afirmou que o governo iraniano contribuiria para a paz se tentasse entender porque os israelenses temem por sua existência, escreveu Goldberg.

Editorial do The New York Times.

We were glad to see President Obama go to Fort Bliss on Tuesday before his Oval Office speech on Iraq, to thank those Americans who most shouldered the burdens of a tragic, pointless war. One of the few rays of light in the conflict has been the distance America has come since Vietnam, when blameless soldiers were scorned for decisions made by politicians.

President George W. Bush tried to make Iraq an invisible, seemingly cost-free war. He refused to attend soldiers’ funerals and hid their returning coffins from the public. So it was fitting that Mr. Obama, who has improved veterans’ health care and made the Pentagon budget more rational, paid tribute to them.

“At every turn, America’s men and women in uniform have served with courage and resolve,” he said on Tuesday night. He added: “There were patriots who supported this war, and patriots who opposed it. And all of us are united in appreciation for our servicemen and women, and our hope for Iraq’s future.”

The speech also made us reflect on how little Mr. Bush accomplished by needlessly invading Iraq in March 2003 — and then ludicrously declaring victory two months later.

Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction proved to be Bush administration propaganda. The war has not created a new era of democracy in the Middle East — or in Iraq for that matter. There are stirrings of democratic politics in Iraq that give us hope. But there is no government six months after national elections.

In many ways, the war made Americans less safe, creating a new organization of terrorists and diverting the nation’s military resources and political will from Afghanistan. Deprived of its main adversary, a strong Iraq, Iran was left freer to pursue its nuclear program, to direct and finance extremist groups and to meddle in Iraq.

Mr. Obama graciously said it was time to put disagreements over Iraq behind us, but it is important not to forget how much damage Mr. Bush caused by misleading Americans about exotic weapons, about American troops being greeted with open arms, about creating a model democracy in Baghdad.

That is why it was so important that Mr. Obama candidly said the United States is not free of this conflict; American troops will see more bloodshed. We hope he follows through on his vow to work with Iraq’s government after the withdrawal of combat troops.

There was no victory to declare last night, and Mr. Obama was right not to try. If victory was ever possible in this war, it has not been won, and America still faces the daunting challenges of the other war, in Afghanistan.

Mr. Obama, addressing those who either believe that he is not committed to the fight in Afghanistan or believe that he will not leave, said Americans should “make no mistake” — he will stick to his plan to begin withdrawing troops next August. He still needs to clearly explain, and soon, how he will “disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda” and meet that timetable.

As we heard Mr. Obama speak from his desk with his usual calm clarity and eloquence, it made us wish we heard more from him on many issues. We are puzzled about why he talks to Americans directly so rarely and with seeming reluctance. This was only his second Oval Office address in more than 19 months of crisis upon crisis. The country particularly needs to hear more from Mr. Obama about what he rightly called the most urgent task — “to restore our economy and put the millions of Americans who have lost their jobs back to work.”

For this day, it was worth dwelling on this milestone in Iraq and on some grim numbers: more than 4,400 Americans dead and some 35,000 wounded, many with lost limbs. And on one number that American politicians are loath to mention: at least 100,000 Iraqis dead.

Obama anuncia fim da guerra no Iraque ‘no prazo’

AE – Agência Estado

O presidente dos Estados Unidos, Barack Obama, afirmou nesta segunda-feira que a guerra do Iraque se aproxima do final “como prometido e no prazo”, comemorando o que ele chamou de um sucesso de seu governo, que ocorreria em meio ao persistente instabilidade e incerteza no Iraque. Obama citou o progresso para cumprir o prazo final de retirar todas as tropas de combate do Iraque até o final de agosto. Numa lembrança da situação muito instável no Iraque, ataques a bombas e disparos de armas de fogo mataram 12 pessoas nesta segunda-feira.

“A dura verdade é que nós não vimos o final do sacrifício norte-americano no Iraque”, disse Obama aos veteranos, em discurso na convenção nacional dos Veteranos Americanos, que reúne soldados que foram mutilados na guerra. “Não se enganem: nosso comprometimento com o Iraque está mudando, passando de um esforço militar liderado por nossas tropas para um esforço civil conduzido por nossos diplomatas”, afirmou o mandatário.

O anúncio de Obama vem à tona em um momento no qual a situação no Iraque parece voltar a se deteriorar. O governo norte-americano vem prometendo há dois anos um fim responsável para a guerra no Iraque, atualmente em seu sétimo ano. No entanto, julho foi o mês com mais mortes relacionadas ao conflito em mais de dois anos, segundo números oficiais divulgados pelo governo iraquiano no fim de semana. Ao mesmo tempo, o país árabe encontra-se sem um governo efetivo desde as eleições gerais de março, que terminaram sem um vencedor claro. As diferentes facções políticas do país ainda não conseguiram um acordo para a formação de uma coalizão.

Os EUA manterão uma força de 50 mil soldados no Iraque, a qual deverá ter como missão o treinamento das tropas iraquianas. Sob um acordo negociado em 2008 com o governo iraquiano, todas as tropas dos EUA deverão deixar o país do Oriente Médio até o final de 2011. Há cerca de 65 mil militares norte-americanos atualmente no Iraque. Quando Obama assumiu a presidência, em janeiro de 2009, os EUA tinham 140 mil soldados no Iraque. Em 2007, durante a presidência de George W. Bush, os EUA chegaram a ter 167 mil soldados no Iraque.