From Guardian.co.uk

. Massive new leak lifts lid on negotiations

. PLO offered up key settlements in East Jerusalem

. Concessions made on refugees and Holy sites

The biggest leak of confidential documents in the history of the Middle East conflict has revealed that Palestinian negotiators secretly agreed to accept Israel‘s annexation of all but one of the settlements built illegally in occupied East Jerusalem. This unprecedented proposal was one of a string of concessions that will cause shockwaves among Palestinians and in the wider Arab world.

A cache of thousands of pages of confidential Palestinian records covering more than a decade of negotiations with Israel and the US has been obtained by al-Jazeera TV and shared exclusively with the Guardian. The papers provide an extraordinary and vivid insight into the disintegration of the 20-year peace process, which is now regarded as all but dead.

The documents – many of which will be published by the Guardian over the coming days – also reveal:

• The scale of confidential concessions offered by Palestinian negotiators, including on the highly sensitive issue of the right of return of Palestinian refugees.

• How Israeli leaders privately asked for some Arab citizens to be transferred to a new Palestinian state.

• The intimate level of covert co-operation between Israeli security forces and the Palestinian Authority.

• The central role of British intelligence in drawing up a secret plan to crush Hamas in the Palestinian territories.

• How Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders were privately tipped off about Israel’s 2008-9 war in Gaza.

As well as the annexation of all East Jerusalem settlements except Har Homa, the Palestine papers show PLO leaders privately suggested swapping part of the flashpoint East Jerusalem Arab neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah for land elsewhere.

Most controversially, they also proposed a joint committee to take over the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount holy sites in Jerusalem’s Old City – the neuralgic issue that helped sink the Camp David talks in 2000 after Yasser Arafat refused to concede sovereignty around the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosques.

The offers were made in 2008-9, in the wake of President George Bush’s Annapolis conference, and were privately hailed by the chief Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erekat, as giving Israel “the biggest Yerushalayim [the Hebrew name for Jerusalem] in history” in order to resolve the world’s most intractable conflict. Israeli leaders, backed by the US government, said the offers were inadequate.

Intensive efforts to revive talks by the Obama administration foundered last year over Israel’s refusal to extend a 10-month partial freeze on settlement construction. Prospects are now uncertain amid increasing speculation that a negotiated two-state solution to the conflict is no longer attainable – and fears of a new war.

Many of the 1,600 leaked documents – drawn up by PA officials and lawyers working for the British-funded PLO negotiations support unit and include extensive verbatim transcripts of private meetings – have been independently authenticated by the Guardian and corroborated by former participants in the talks and intelligence and diplomatic sources.

The Guardian’s coverage is supplemented by WikiLeaks cables, emanating from the US consulate in Jerusalem and embassy in Tel Aviv. Israeli officials also kept their own records of the talks, which may differ from the confidential Palestinian accounts.

The concession in May 2008 by Palestinian leaders to allow Israel to annex the settlements in East Jerusalem – including Gilo, which is a current focus of controversy after Israeli authorities gave the go-ahead for 1,400 new homes – has never been made public before.

All settlements built on territory occupied by Israel in the 1967 war are illegal under international law, but the Jerusalem homes are routinely described, and perceived, by Israel as municipal “neighbourhoods”. Israeli governments have consistently sought to annex the largest settlements as part of a peace deal – and came close to doing so at Camp David.

Erekat told Israeli leaders in 2008: “This is the first time in Palestinian-Israeli history in which such a suggestion is officially made.” No such concession had been made at Camp David. But the offer was rejected out of hand by Israel because it did not include a big settlement near the city Ma’ale Adumim as well as Har Homa and several others deeper in the West Bank, including Ariel. “We do not like this suggestion because it does not meet our demands,” Israel’s then foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, told the Palestinians, “and probably it was not easy for you to think about it, but I really appreciate it”.

The overall impression that emerges from the documents, which stretch from 1999 to 2010, is of the weakness and growing desperation of PA leaders as failure to reach agreement or even halt all settlement temporarily undermines their credibility in relation to their Hamas rivals; the papers also reveal the unyielding confidence of Israeli negotiators and the often dismissive attitude of US politicians towards Palestinian representatives.

Palestinian and Israeli officials both point out that any position in negotiations is subject to the principle that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” and therefore is invalid without a overarching deal. But PA leaders are likely to be embarrassed by the revelation of private concessions that go far beyond what much of their population would regard as acceptable – particularly since Mahmoud Abbas’s mandate as Palestinian president expired in 2009.

The PA, set up as a transitional administration after the 1993 Oslo agreement between Israel and the PLO, is under pressure from a disaffected Palestinian public and from Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement. Hamas won the Palestinian elections in 2006 and has controlled the Gaza Strip since its violent takeover in 2007.

Unlike the PLO, Hamas rejects negotiations with Israel, except for a long-term ceasefire, and refuses to recognise it. Its founding charter also contains antisemitic elements. Supported by Iran and Syria, it is sanctioned as a terrorist organisation by Israel, the US and the EU, despite pressure for it to be included in a wider political process.

Clarín.com

La diplomacia europea se declaró “decepcionada”. No se prevé otra reunión.

Las conversaciones realizadas en Estambul sobre el programa nuclear iraní entre Teherán y las grandes potencias mundiales, que temen que Irán prepare un arma atómica, terminaron ayer con un fracaso y no se prevé ninguna otra reunión al respecto.

El enriquecimiento de uranio se ha convertido en foco de preocupación internacional debido a que permite la elaboración de combustible nuclear y materiales para la fabricación de ojivas atómicas. Irán insiste que su programa de enriquecimiento de uranio busca la generación de energía con fines pacíficos, pero Occidente sospecha que intenta construir una bomba atómica. Irán se niega a colaborar con la ONU en la inspección de sus instalaciones atómicas.

La jefa de la diplomacia de la Unión Europea, Catherine Ashton, intermediaria en las conversaciones del viernes y ayer entre el Grupo Cinco (Estados Unidos, Reino Unido, Francia, Rusia, China) y Alemania e Irán sobre el programa iraní se declaró “decepcionada” al término de esas discusiones. Ashton agregó que no había “nuevas conversaciones planeadas” entre las seis potencias mundiales y Teherán acerca del controvertido programa iraní. “Sigue siendo esencial que Irán demuestre que su programa nuclear es pacífico”, añadió Ashton.

La cumbre anterior, que tuvo lugar a principios de diciembre en Ginebra después de 14 meses de interrupción de las discusiones, había creado algunas esperanzas, al anunciarse el encuentro de Estambul. Otra indicación del fracaso de estas negociaciones fue que durante estos dos días no se realizó ninguna reunión bilateral entre la delegación estadounidense y la de Irán, según un diplomático norteamericano, a pesar de la insistencia de los seis en que se llevase a cabo un encuentro.

Irán afirmó durante esos dos días que se negaba a tratar una suspensión de esas actividades de enriquecimiento, y que pedía el levantamiento de las sanciones internacionales en su contra.

Pero más allá del fracaso en Estambul, Irán se declaró listo para reflotar un acuerdo consensuado el año pasado con Brasil y Turquía, pero rechazado por Washington, que prevé la entrega de uranio iraní de bajo enriquecimiento a Rusia a cambio de uranio altamente enriquecido. El acuerdo estipula que el uranio iraní permanezca almacenado en Turquía en espera que desde el exterior sean entregados a Irán 120 kilos de combustible. Si esto no ocurre, Turquía se comprometió a restituir “pronto” el uranio a Irán. Sin embargo, el plan fue rechazado por EE.UU., que acusa a Irán –apoyado por Israel– de desarrollar su plan nuclear con objetivos bélicos.

Blair admite que ignorou alertas de conselheiros sobre invasão ao Iraque

DAS AGÊNCIAS DE NOTÍCIAS

O ex-primeiro-ministro do Reino Unido Tony Blair voltou a depor nesta sexta-feira e admitiu que ignorou as advertências do procurador-geral do Reino Unido sobre a ilegalidade de invadir o Iraque sem o respaldo expresso da ONU (Organização das Nações Unidas). Ele justificou dizendo que considerava um conselho meramente “provisório”.

À comissão que investiga o processo político que levou o Reino Unido a participar da guerra, Blair disse acreditar que o principal advogado do país mudaria eventualmente de opinião.

Em janeiro de 2003, o então procurador-geral do Estado, Peter Goldsmith, advertiu duas vezes Blair de que a resolução 1441 da ONU não era suficiente para justificar o uso da força contra o Iraque. Em 7 de março, Goldsmith mudou de opinião.

Blair argumentou que, naquele momento, “ainda não tinha pedido formalmente assessoria legal, nem ele (o Goldsmith) tinha chegado ao ponto de dá-la”. “Por isso mantive minha posição de que não era preciso uma segunda resolução”, explicou, na carta.

“Achava que, uma vez conhecido o histórico de negociações britânico, mas sobretudo americano, concluiria que a 1441 significava precisamente o que dizia: que Saddam [Hussein] tinha uma última oportunidade e que, se não o fizesse [provasse que seu país não armazenava armas nucleares], estaria infringindo as condições, o que por sua vez revivia anteriores resoluções que autorizavam o uso da força”, acrescentou.

Na terça-feira passada (18), Goldsmith disse perante a mesma comissão que o ex-primeiro-ministro o excluiu de deliberações importantes sobre a legalidade da Guerra do Iraque, algo que este admitiu hoje ter feito ao afirmar que poderia tê-lo incluído mais no processo.

MAIS DO MESMO

O presidente da comissão, John Chilcot, enviou por escrito mais de cem perguntas complementares antes da sessão, que tinha como objetivo, segundo o parlamentar, “esclarecer” as declarações feitas até agora por Blair.

Mas na metade do interrogatório, exibido ao vivo pelos canais de televisão, o tom pareceu menos inquisitivo e as respostas menos abrasivas que na polêmica sessão de 29 de janeiro de 2010.

O trabalhista, que governou de 1997 a 2007, não mudou a linha de argumentação e não apresentou elementos novos.

Blair se negou ainda, contra a opinião de Chilcot, a autorizar a publicação de sua correspondência privada com o ex-presidente americano George W. Bush, referente ao período em que os dois teriam decidido por uma “mudança de regime” no Iraque. A discussão ocorreu durante uma reunião no rancho texano de Bush, em abril de 2002, 11 meses antes da invasão.

Blair afirmou que “as notas ao presidente Bush eram privadas”. “Foram redigidas quando queria obter uma mudança ou um ajuste político. São confidenciais”, explicou Blair. “E estas notas coincidem essencialmente com as declarações que expressei em público”.

Interrogado pelas declarações que são atribuídas a ele, o carismático ex-premiê negou ter afirmado ou escrito “George, seja qual for sua decisão, eu o acompanharei”.

MANIPULAÇÃO

Como em janeiro de 2010, os debates desta sexta-feira giraram em torno de três perguntas chaves: a guerra era legal sem uma resolução explícita da ONU? Blair manipulou deliberadamente a opinião pública sobre a presença nunca comprovada de armas de destruição em massa (ADM) iraquianas, que justificaram a entrada na guerra? Qual foi a realidade da aliança de Blair (apelidado então de “poodle de Bush” pelos detratores) com os neoconservadores americanos?

No ano passado, Blair afirmou que não se arrependia de ter envolvido o Reino Unido em uma guerra contra “o monstro Saddam Hussein”, uma “decisão justa” que ele disse que voltaria a tomar.

“O regime de Saddam era brutal, era uma ditadura militar repressiva. Constituía uma fonte de instabilidade e de perigo para a região”, afirmou nesta sexta-feira.

Blair entrou em 2010 por uma porta lateral para não enfrentar os manifestantes e os jornalistas. Desta vez, no entanto, entrou pela porta principal e até posou por alguns segundos para os fotógrafos, enquanto 20 manifestantes gritavam “Bliar”, um jogo de palavras entre “liar” (mentiroso em inglês) e seu sobrenome.

Um dos manifestantes, Peter Brierley, que perdeu o filho no Iraque, pediu que o ex-premiê seja julgado como “criminoso de guerra”.

DA FRANCE PRESSE, EM BAGDÁ

O presidente do Iraque de origem curda, Jalal Talabani, reconduzido nesta quinta-feira à Presidência para um novo mandato de quatro anos, é um homem doente e enfraquecido por uma contestação crescente em sua região de origem, o Curdistão.

Com o rosto arredondo, dotado de um grande senso de humor, tem sempre à mão uma bengala para se apoiar. Este ex-guerrilheiro curdo, que festeja nesta sexta-feira o 77º aniversário, tomou um tal gosto pelo poder que se recusou a deixar o cargo para o líder leigo Iyad Allawi, como lhe havia pedido com insistência o presidente americano Barack Obama.

“Vamos embora e vocês vão ficar sob a influência do Irã”, havia-lhe dito Obama.

“O Irã não nos incomoda e vocês podem partir amanhã”, respondeu-lhe furioso Jalal Talabani’, segundo contou à AFP um deputado de seu partido.

Embora Talabani, que se submeteu a várias cirurgias nos Estados Unidos, tenha prestado homenagem aos sacrifícios dos soldados americanos que capturaram seu inimigo, o ex-ditador iraquoano Saddam Hussein, ele mantém contatos estreitos com a Síria e, sobretudo, com o Irã, onde viveu e fala a língua com fluência.

Mas aquele que seus camaradas chamam afetuosamente “Oncle Jalal” perdeu prestígio. Seus detratores fustigam a corrupção que reina em seu feudo de Suleimaniyeh no Curdistão (norte) e denunciam o enriquecimento de pessoas ligadas a ele.

Seu partido, a União Patriótica do Curdistão (UPK), vem sendo ameaçado por uma nova chapa de oposição, Goran, composta por ex-amigos políticos, que obtiveram importantes vitórias eleitorais.

Ele também vem perdendo para o rival de sempre, Massoud Barzani, o líder do Partido Democrático do Curdistão (PDK), a quem combateu com armas na década de 1990.

BIOGRAFIA

Nascido em 1933 em Kalkan, uma aldeia na montanha, a 400 km a nordeste de Bagdá, Talabani começou muito jovem na política, por admiração a Moustafa Barzani, figura legendária do nacionalismo curdo.

Criado em Kirkuk, sonhou, aos 15 anos, tornar-se médico, optando finalmente pelo direito, a fim de se consagrar à política. Sua participação, em 1952, em manifestação anticolonialista em Bagdá, obrigou-o a interromper seus estudos, que retomou após 1958.

Realizou seu serviço militar na artilharia, somando-se, depois, ao PDK, fundado em 1946. Ele também combateu nas montanhas durante a primeira grande revolta curda de 1961.

Mas quando o líder carismático Barzani assinou em fevereiro de 1964 um acordo de paz com Bagdá, sem mencionar a autonomia do Curdistão, Jalal Talabani optou pela dissidência, partindo para o Irã.

Após a ruptura definitiva com o PDK, ele anunciou, em junho de 1975, em Damasco, a criação do UPK, que pretendeu estar mais à esquerda do que seu rival.

A rivalidade UPK/PDK marcou, a partir daí a vida política curda.

By George Friedman

Stratfor, September 8, 2010

It has now been nine years since al Qaeda attacked the United States. It has been nine years in which the primary focus of the United States has been on the Islamic world. In addition to a massive investment in homeland security, the United States has engaged in two multi-year, multi-divisional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, inserted forces in other countries in smaller operations and conducted a global covert campaign against al Qaeda and other radical jihadist groups.

In order to understand the last nine years you must understand the first 24 hours of the war — and recall your own feelings in those 24 hours. First, the attack was a shock, its audaciousness frightening. Second, we did not know what was coming next. The attack had destroyed the right to complacent assumptions. Were there other cells standing by in the United States? Did they have capabilities even more substantial than what they showed on Sept. 11? Could they be detected and stopped? Any American not frightened on Sept. 12 was not in touch with reality. Many who are now claiming that the United States overreacted are forgetting their own sense of panic. We are all calm and collected nine years after.

At the root of all of this was a profound lack of understanding of al Qaeda, particularly its capabilities and intentions. Since we did not know what was possible, our only prudent course was to prepare for the worst. That is what the Bush administration did. Nothing symbolized this more than the fear that al Qaeda had acquired nuclear weapons and that they would use them against the United States. The evidence was minimal, but the consequences would be overwhelming. Bush crafted a strategy based on the worst-case scenario.

Bush was the victim of a decade of failure in the intelligence community to understand what al Qaeda was and wasn’t. I am not merely talking about the failure to predict the 9/11 attack. Regardless of assertions afterwards, the intelligence community provided only vague warnings that lacked the kind of specificity that makes for actionable intelligence. To a certain degree, this is understandable. Al Qaeda learned from Soviet, Saudi, Pakistani and American intelligence during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and knew how to launch attacks without tipping off the target. The greatest failure of American intelligence was not the lack of a clear warning about 9/11 but the lack, on Sept. 12, of a clear picture of al Qaeda’s global structure, capabilities, weaknesses and intentions. Without such information, implementing U.S. policy was like piloting an airplane with faulty instruments in a snowstorm at night.

The president had to do three things: First, he had to assure the public that he knew what he was doing. Second, he had to do something that appeared decisive. Third, he had to gear up an intelligence and security apparatus to tell him what the threats actually were and what he ought to do. American policy became ready, fire, aim.

In looking back at the past nine years, two conclusions can be drawn: There were no more large-scale attacks on the United States by militant Islamists, and the United States was left with the legacy of responses that took place in the first two years after 9/11. This legacy is no longer useful, if it ever was, to the primary mission of defeating al Qaeda, and it represents an effort that is retrospectively out of proportion to the threat.

If I had been told on Sept.12, 2001, that the attack the day before would be the last major attack for at least nine years, I would not have believed it. In looking at the complexity of the security and execution of the 9/11 attack, I would have assumed that an organization capable of acting once in such a way could act again even more effectively. My assumption was wrong. Al Qaeda did not have the resources to mount other operations, and the U.S. response, in many ways clumsy and misguided and in other ways clever and targeted, disrupted any preparations in which al Qaeda might have been engaged to conduct follow-on attacks.

Knowing that about al Qaeda in 2001 was impossible. Knowing which operations were helpful in the effort to block them was impossible, in the context of what Americans knew in the first years after the war began. Therefore, Washington wound up in the contradictory situation in which American military and covert operations surged while new attacks failed to materialize. This created a massive political problem. Rather than appearing to be the cause for the lack of attacks, U.S. military operations were perceived by many as being unnecessary or actually increasing the threat of attack. Even in hindsight, aligning U.S. actions with the apparent outcome is difficult and controversial. But still we know two things: It has been nine years since Sept. 11, 2001, and the war goes on.

What happened was that an act of terrorism was allowed to redefine U.S. grand strategy. The United States operates with a grand strategy derived from the British strategy in Europe — maintaining the balance of power. For the United Kingdom, maintaining the balance of power in Europe protected any one power from emerging that could unite Europe and build a fleet to invade the United Kingdom or block its access to its empire. British strategy was to help create coalitions to block emerging hegemons such as Spain, France or Germany. Using overt and covert means, the United Kingdom aimed to ensure that no hegemonic power could emerge.

The Americans inherited that grand strategy from the British but elevated it to a global rather than regional level. Having blocked the Soviet Union from hegemony over Europe and Asia, the United States proceeded with a strategy whose goal, like that of the United Kingdom, was to nip potential regional hegemons in the bud. The U.S. war with Iraq in 1990-91 and the war with Serbia/Yugoslavia in 1999 were examples of this strategy. It involved coalition warfare, shifting America’s weight from side to side and using minimal force to disrupt the plans of regional aspirants to gain power. This U.S. strategy also was cloaked in the ideology of global liberalism and human rights.

The key to this strategy was its global nature. The emergence of a hegemonic contender that could challenge the United States globally, as the Soviet Union had done, was the worst-case scenario. Therefore, the containment of emerging powers wherever they might emerge was the centerpiece of American balance-of-power strategy.

The most significant effect of 9/11 was that it knocked the United States off its strategy. Rather than adapting its standing global strategy to better address the counterterrorism issue, the United States became obsessed with a single region, the area between the Mediterranean and the Hindu Kush. Within that region, the United States operated with a balance-of-power strategy. It played off all of the nations in the region against each other. It did the same with ethnic and religious groups throughout the region and particularly within Iraq and Afghanistan, the main theaters of the war. In both cases, the United States sought to take advantage of internal divisions, shifting its support in various directions to create a balance of power. That, in the end, was what the surge strategy was all about.

The American obsession with this region in the wake of 9/11 is understandable. Nine years later, with no clear end in sight, the question is whether this continued focus is strategically rational for the United States. Given the uncertainties of the first few years, obsession and uncertainty are understandable, but as a long-term U.S. strategy — the long war that the U.S. Department of Defense is preparing for — it leaves the rest of the world uncovered.

Consider that the Russians have used the American absorption in this region as a window of opportunity to work to reconstruct their geopolitical position. When Russia went to war with Georgia in 2008, an American ally, the United States did not have the forces with which to make a prudent intervention. Similarly, the Chinese have had a degree of freedom of action they could not have expected to enjoy prior to 9/11. The single most important result of 9/11 was that it shifted the United States from a global stance to a regional one, allowing other powers to take advantage of this focus to create significant potential challenges to the United States.

One can make the case, as I have, that whatever the origin of the Iraq war, remaining in Iraq to contain Iran is necessary. It is difficult to make a similar case for Afghanistan. Its strategic interest to the United States is minimal. The only justification for the war is that al Qaeda launched its attacks on the United States from Afghanistan. But that justification is no longer valid. Al Qaeda can launch attacks from Yemen or other countries. The fact that Afghanistan was the base from which the attacks were launched does not mean that al Qaeda depends on Afghanistan to launch attacks. And given that the apex leadership of al Qaeda has not launched attacks in a while, the question is whether al Qaeda is capable of launching such attacks any longer. In any case, managing al Qaeda today does not require nation building in Afghanistan.

But let me state a more radical thesis: The threat of terrorism cannot become the singular focus of the United States. Let me push it further: The United States cannot subordinate its grand strategy to simply fighting terrorism even if there will be occasional terrorist attacks on the United States. Three thousand people died in the 9/11 attack. That is a tragedy, but in a nation of over 300 million, 3,000 deaths cannot be permitted to define the totality of national strategy. Certainly, resources must be devoted to combating the threat and, to the extent possible, disrupting it. But it must also be recognized that terrorism cannot always be blocked, that terrorist attacks will occur and that the world’s only global power cannot be captive to this single threat.

The initial response was understandable and necessary. The United States must continue its intelligence gathering and covert operations against militant Islamists throughout the world. The intelligence failures of the 1990s must not be repeated. But waging a multi-divisional war in Afghanistan makes no strategic sense. The balance-of-power strategy must be used. Pakistan will intervene and discover the Russians and Iranians. The great game will continue. As for Iran, regional counters must be supported at limited cost to the United States. The United States should not be patrolling the far reaches of the region. It should be supporting a balance of power among the native powers of the region.

The United States is a global power and, as such, it must have a global view. It has interests and challenges beyond this region and certainly beyond Afghanistan. The issue there is not whether the United States can or can’t win, however that is defined. The issue is whether it is worth the effort considering what is going on in the rest of the world. Gen. David Petraeus cast the war in terms of whether the United States can win it. That’s reasonable; he’s the commander. But American strategy has to ask another question: What does the United States lose elsewhere while it focuses on the future of Kandahar?

The 9/11 attack shocked the United States and made counterterrorism the centerpiece of American foreign policy. That is too narrow a basis on which to base U.S. foreign policy. It is certainly an important strand of that policy, and it must be addressed, but it should be addressed through the regional balance of power. It is the good fortune of the United States that the Islamic world is torn by internal rivalries.

This is not dismissing the threat of terror. It is recognizing that the United States has done well in suppressing it over the past nine years but at a cost in other regions, a cost that can’t be sustained indefinitely and a cost that could well result in challenges more threatening than a rising Islamist militancy. The United States must now settle into a long-term strategy of managing terrorism as best as it can while not neglecting the rest of its interests.

After nine years, the issue is not what to do in Afghanistan but how the global power can return to managing all of its global interests, along with the war on al Qaeda.

Editorial do The New York Times.

We were glad to see President Obama go to Fort Bliss on Tuesday before his Oval Office speech on Iraq, to thank those Americans who most shouldered the burdens of a tragic, pointless war. One of the few rays of light in the conflict has been the distance America has come since Vietnam, when blameless soldiers were scorned for decisions made by politicians.

President George W. Bush tried to make Iraq an invisible, seemingly cost-free war. He refused to attend soldiers’ funerals and hid their returning coffins from the public. So it was fitting that Mr. Obama, who has improved veterans’ health care and made the Pentagon budget more rational, paid tribute to them.

“At every turn, America’s men and women in uniform have served with courage and resolve,” he said on Tuesday night. He added: “There were patriots who supported this war, and patriots who opposed it. And all of us are united in appreciation for our servicemen and women, and our hope for Iraq’s future.”

The speech also made us reflect on how little Mr. Bush accomplished by needlessly invading Iraq in March 2003 — and then ludicrously declaring victory two months later.

Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction proved to be Bush administration propaganda. The war has not created a new era of democracy in the Middle East — or in Iraq for that matter. There are stirrings of democratic politics in Iraq that give us hope. But there is no government six months after national elections.

In many ways, the war made Americans less safe, creating a new organization of terrorists and diverting the nation’s military resources and political will from Afghanistan. Deprived of its main adversary, a strong Iraq, Iran was left freer to pursue its nuclear program, to direct and finance extremist groups and to meddle in Iraq.

Mr. Obama graciously said it was time to put disagreements over Iraq behind us, but it is important not to forget how much damage Mr. Bush caused by misleading Americans about exotic weapons, about American troops being greeted with open arms, about creating a model democracy in Baghdad.

That is why it was so important that Mr. Obama candidly said the United States is not free of this conflict; American troops will see more bloodshed. We hope he follows through on his vow to work with Iraq’s government after the withdrawal of combat troops.

There was no victory to declare last night, and Mr. Obama was right not to try. If victory was ever possible in this war, it has not been won, and America still faces the daunting challenges of the other war, in Afghanistan.

Mr. Obama, addressing those who either believe that he is not committed to the fight in Afghanistan or believe that he will not leave, said Americans should “make no mistake” — he will stick to his plan to begin withdrawing troops next August. He still needs to clearly explain, and soon, how he will “disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda” and meet that timetable.

As we heard Mr. Obama speak from his desk with his usual calm clarity and eloquence, it made us wish we heard more from him on many issues. We are puzzled about why he talks to Americans directly so rarely and with seeming reluctance. This was only his second Oval Office address in more than 19 months of crisis upon crisis. The country particularly needs to hear more from Mr. Obama about what he rightly called the most urgent task — “to restore our economy and put the millions of Americans who have lost their jobs back to work.”

For this day, it was worth dwelling on this milestone in Iraq and on some grim numbers: more than 4,400 Americans dead and some 35,000 wounded, many with lost limbs. And on one number that American politicians are loath to mention: at least 100,000 Iraqis dead.

Obama anuncia fim da guerra no Iraque ‘no prazo’

AE – Agência Estado

O presidente dos Estados Unidos, Barack Obama, afirmou nesta segunda-feira que a guerra do Iraque se aproxima do final “como prometido e no prazo”, comemorando o que ele chamou de um sucesso de seu governo, que ocorreria em meio ao persistente instabilidade e incerteza no Iraque. Obama citou o progresso para cumprir o prazo final de retirar todas as tropas de combate do Iraque até o final de agosto. Numa lembrança da situação muito instável no Iraque, ataques a bombas e disparos de armas de fogo mataram 12 pessoas nesta segunda-feira.

“A dura verdade é que nós não vimos o final do sacrifício norte-americano no Iraque”, disse Obama aos veteranos, em discurso na convenção nacional dos Veteranos Americanos, que reúne soldados que foram mutilados na guerra. “Não se enganem: nosso comprometimento com o Iraque está mudando, passando de um esforço militar liderado por nossas tropas para um esforço civil conduzido por nossos diplomatas”, afirmou o mandatário.

O anúncio de Obama vem à tona em um momento no qual a situação no Iraque parece voltar a se deteriorar. O governo norte-americano vem prometendo há dois anos um fim responsável para a guerra no Iraque, atualmente em seu sétimo ano. No entanto, julho foi o mês com mais mortes relacionadas ao conflito em mais de dois anos, segundo números oficiais divulgados pelo governo iraquiano no fim de semana. Ao mesmo tempo, o país árabe encontra-se sem um governo efetivo desde as eleições gerais de março, que terminaram sem um vencedor claro. As diferentes facções políticas do país ainda não conseguiram um acordo para a formação de uma coalizão.

Os EUA manterão uma força de 50 mil soldados no Iraque, a qual deverá ter como missão o treinamento das tropas iraquianas. Sob um acordo negociado em 2008 com o governo iraquiano, todas as tropas dos EUA deverão deixar o país do Oriente Médio até o final de 2011. Há cerca de 65 mil militares norte-americanos atualmente no Iraque. Quando Obama assumiu a presidência, em janeiro de 2009, os EUA tinham 140 mil soldados no Iraque. Em 2007, durante a presidência de George W. Bush, os EUA chegaram a ter 167 mil soldados no Iraque.

Em homenagem a minha tia Jake, apresento uma versão simplificada da notícia anterior, em português, e aproveito e mando um recado para ela: Obrigado por todas as palavras de incentivo e pelos olhares críticos!

Acordo de paz no Oriente Médio é possível em um ano, diz Abbas

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – O presidente palestino, Mahmoud Abbas, disse na quarta-feira que um acordo de paz no Oriente Médio é possível “dentro de um ano” e condenou os últimos ataques contra judeus na Cisjordânia.

Falando a líderes israelenses e árabes e para o presidente norte-americano, Barack Obama, na Casa Branca, Abbas pediu a Israel que congele todas as atividades de assentamento e disse que é tempo de fazer a paz, terminar a ocupação de Israel e estabelecer um Estado palestino.

No mesmo encontro, o primeiro-ministro de Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, afirmou que seu país não deixará terroristas bloquearem o caminho para a paz no Oriente Médio. Qualquer acordo de paz deve garantir a segurança, disse.

Obama pediu aos líderes que não deixem escapar a chance para a paz ao abrir uma cúpula patrocinada pelos Estados Unidos para retomar as conversações diretas assombradas pela violência na região.

Na terça-feira, quatro colonos israelenses foram mortos a tiros na Cisjordânia ocupada, num ataque que o grupo islâmico palestino Hamas disse ter sido seu primeiro gesto contra as negociações de paz que começaram na quarta-feira em Washington.

New York Times

WASHINGTON — President Obama began his foray into Middle East peace-making on Wednesday, as the Israeli and Palestinian leaders committed to work on a comprehensive Middle East peace treaty in the next year intended to end a conflict that has endured for six decades.

In a remarkable tableau at the White House, Mr. Obama, flanked by the leaders of Israel, the Palestinians, and the only two Arab states with whom Israel has made peace, vowed to do everything within his power to achieve the comprehensive agreement that has eluded negotiators since Israel was established.

“We are but five men,” Mr. Obama said Wednesday night. “But when we come together, we will not be alone. We will be joined by the generations of those who have gone before.” He spoke of Anwar el-Sadat and Yitzhak Rabin, the Egyptian and Israeli leaders who lost their lives because they pursued peace; of Jordan’s King Hussein and Israel’s Menachem Begin — “statesmen,” Mr. Obama said, “who imagined the world as it should be.”

Mr. Obama said that he and the other leaders owed it to those men to “work diligently to fulfill their aspirations.”

In somber, emotional tones, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority expressed their own determination to make peace.

Mr. Netanyahyu, turning toward to Mr. Abbas, called him his “partner in peace.” He said he came to find a “historic compromise” but warned that any deal must be anchored in ensuring Israel’s security.

Mr. Abbas, for his part, said he would push hard despite “the difficulties we’re going to face tomorrow.” But he quickly foreshadowed the biggest early sticking point in the talks, calling for Mr. Netanyahu to freeze settlement activity in the West Bank.

The East Room gathering was a rare moment of diplomatic theater, endorsed by the attendance of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah II of Jordan, and orchestrated by Mr. Obama as part of an effort to invest the process with his own personal stature. It came after Mr. Obama held a series of one-on-one meetings with the men throughout the day, and just before they were to begin a working dinner. On Thursday, Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Abbas are to begin direct talks.

For Mr. Netanyahu and Mr.Abbas, the talks, with their very real chance of failure, represent a huge risk: President Bill Clinton’s failed attempt in 2000 led to the Palestinian intifada while President George W. Bush’s Annapolis peace attempt dissolved amid chronic violence in Gaza.

“Too much blood has already been shed, too many hearts have already been broken,” Mr. Obama said. “This moment of opportunity may not return soon again.”

The inclusion of Mr. Mubarak and King Abdullah underlines the administration’s hopes to forge a regional solution to the conflict. Egypt and Jordan are critical to providing Israel with security guarantees that would enable it to accept the creation of a Palestinian state.

Mr. Mubarak has offered to host subsequent rounds of talks in Egypt, though officials said he was pushing for Mr. Obama to take a direct personal role in the process. The standing of Mr. Mubarak, 82, in the region is such that officials said the administration was eager to get direct talks going quickly, because his health is said to be fragile and the United States is worried about the uncertainty that will come after he passes from the scene.

Jordan is a crucial player because of the difficult question of how to secure its border with a new Palestinian state. Israel currently has troops on that frontier and would balk at withdrawing them without a guarantee that the border would not become a conduit for missiles that militant groups opposed to the peace process, chiefly Hamas, could fire at Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities.

Previous attempts to involve Israel’s Arab neighbors in constructing a peace deal between Israelis and Palestinians have fared poorly. Mr. Obama’s most recent attempt, when he sought to win confidence-building measures from Israel’s neighbors like allowing Israeli carriers to fly over their countries, failed when Saudi Arabia and other Arab states refused. But more recently, the Saudis pressed Mr. Abbas to agree to the direct talks, using their financial aid to the Palestinian Authority as a lever.

The Arab League also has put its stamp of approval on the negotiations.

The success of the talks, all sides said, will depend in part on whether Mr. Obama can succeed where his predecessors have failed in pushing Palestinians and Israelis toward resolving the core final status issues that have bedeviled peace negotiators since 1979. They include the dismantling of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the borders of a Palestinian state, the security of Israel, the status of Jerusalem and the fate of Palestinian refugees who left, or were forced to leave, their homes in Israel.

Mr. Obama will know quickly whether he has any more chance of success than the eight failed attempts that have gone before this one. At the end of September, Israel’s 10-month moratorium on settlement construction will expire. Mr. Netanyahu so far has not indicated any willingness to extend it, and Mr. Abbas has said that he will withdraw from negotiations if settlement activity resumes.

American officials have been working with their Israeli and Palestinian counterparts to try to come up with a way around the issue to no avail so far.

During the meeting on Wednesday afternoon between Mr. Obama and Mr. Abbas, American officials said they would press the Israelis to find a way around the moratorium expiration, but they also asked the Palestinian president to try to be flexible, according to advisers to all three sides.

Mr. Netanyahu made no specific mention of settlements during his remarks before the dinner. The closest he came was in an acknowledgment of Palestinian claims to land.

“The Jewish people are not strangers in our homeland, the land of our forefathers,” he said. “But we recognize that another people share this land with us. And I came here today to find an historic compromise that will enable both peoples to live in peace, security and dignity.”

For Mr. Obama, the settlements issue is doubly important because if it blows up the talks, Middle East experts said, he will once again have left the perception in the Arab world of escorting Mr. Abbas out on a limb and then leaving him there.

Many Palestinian officials complain that Mr. Obama’s decision last year to drop his demand for Israel to halt settlement construction as a prelude to peace talks may have delayed the start of these negotiations, since it was difficult for the Palestinian leader to back down.

While the issues are daunting, some analysts also saw a reed of hope in the resolute response of Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Abbas to the killing by Hamas gunmen of four Israeli settlers in the West Bank on the eve of the talks. Both men immediately said the attack should not be allowed to derail the negotiations, and the Palestinian Authority condemned the killings.

“Normally, it’s been reliably easy to torpedo, or veto, any progress between Israelis and Palestinians,” said Ziad J. Asali, the president of the American Task Force on Palestine. “This means an incredible loss of a weapon.”

O ex-premiê britânico Tony Blair revelou, em um livro de memórias que está sendo lançado nesta quarta-feira, que recorreu a bebidas alcoólicas para conseguir relaxar e lidar com as pressões do cargo.

“Uísque puro ou gim e tônica depois da janta, alguns copos de vinho ou até mesmo meia garrafa com a refeição. Nada excessivamente excessivo. Eu tinha limite. Mas eu estava percebendo que a bebida estava virando um amparo ['prop', em inglês]“, escreve Blair no livro A Journey (Uma Jornada, em português).

Tony Blair, do Partido Trabalhista, foi primeiro-ministro da Grã-Bretanha entre 1997 e 2007. Sua chegada ao poder interrompeu 18 anos de governo dos conservadores no país.

Sob a bandeira do New Labour (Novo Trabalhismo, em tradução livre) que pregava uma Terceira Via no debate ideológico entre esquerda e direita, Blair governou a Grã-Bretanha durante a invasão do Iraque, em 2003, que marcou seu governo.

“Ele era uma pessoa difícil, às vezes enlouquecedora? Sim”

Tony Blair sobre Gordon Brown

No livro, Blair fala sobre o seu período no poder, a guerra do Iraque e a ascensão dos trabalhistas na Grã-Bretanha, entre outros temas.

Gordon Brown

O livro provocou polêmica, em particular entre os trabalhistas britânicos devido a críticas ao seu sucessor no cargo, Gordon Brown. Os trabalhistas estão escolhendo neste mês quem será o sucessor do ex-premiê Brown na liderança do partido.

Brown renunciou à liderança do partido e ao cargo de primeiro-ministro em maio, quando foi derrotado pelo Partido Conservador de David Cameron em eleições gerais.

Em meio a algumas palavras elogiosas, Blair refere-se a Brown como “enlouquecedor” e diz que sabia que caso seu sucessor não mudasse algumas políticas, seu governo seria “um desastre”.

“Ele era uma pessoa difícil, às vezes enlouquecedora? Sim”, escreve Blair, que em seguida elogia Brown. “Mas ele também era forte, capaz e brilhante, e essas eram qualidades que eu nunca deixei de respeitar.”

Blair ainda diz no livro que Brown, que foi ministro das Finanças do seu governo antes de sucedê-lo como premiê, era um “sujeito estranho” e com “inteligência emocional zero”.

Ele sugere que caso tivesse demitido Brown, “o partido e o governo se desestabilizariam imediatamente e de forma grave, e sua ascensão ao cargo de primeiro-ministro seria talvez até mais rápida”.

Em entrevista à BBC, Blair diz que seu relacionamento com Brown era “francamente difícil, quase impossível”, mas que seu ministro sempre foi também uma fonte de força para o governo.

O porta-voz de Gordon Brown disse que o político não fará nenhum comentário sobre o livro de Blair.

Mas entre os trabalhistas, que estão passando pelo processo de escolha do sucessor de Brown para a liderança do partido, houve muitas críticas a Blair.

“Estou surpresa que Tony Blair não tenha esperado um intervalo maior antes de enfiar a faca em Gordon Brown. Isso não ajuda o partido neste momento”, disse a trabalhista Diane Abbott, que concorre para suceder Brown na liderança do partido.

Um parlamentar trabalhista ligado à Brown disse que “a versão unilateral de Blair” sobre os fatos já era esperada.

Iraque

Sobre a guerra do Iraque, Tony Blair diz que deixar Saddam Hussein no poder no país seria “um risco maior” do que removê-lo do poder.

Blair foi um dos principais defensores da ideia de invadir o Iraque junto com os Estados Unidos, em 2003, para derrubar o regime de Saddam.

“Eu não consigo satisfazer aos desejos nem mesmo de alguns dos meus apoiadores, que gostariam que eu dissesse: [invadir o Iraque] foi um erro, mas um erro cometido de boa-fé. Amigos que se opõem à guerra acham que eu estou sendo teimoso; outros, menos amigáveis, acham que eu sou delirante. A ambos, eu posso dizer: mantenham uma mente aberta”, escreve Blair.

Em suas memórias, Blair reconhece que houve problemas no planejamento da invasão do Iraque. Ele escreve que “nós não antecipamos o papel da Al-Qaeda ou do Irã” no planejamento sobre o que aconteceria depois da invasão.

Ele também falou sobre o seu “sofrimento” com as mortes provocadas pelo conflito na Grã-Bretanha.

“Eu lamento desesperadamente por eles [os soldados mortos], lamento pelas famílias cujo sofrimento foi agravado pela polêmica sobre o porquê de seus amados terem morrido, lamento pela seleção injusta de que quem perdeu a vida.”