Em livro, ex-secretário de Defesa dos EUA defende decisões sobre guerra do Iraque

Alessandra Corrêa

Da BBC Brasil em Washington

Em entrevista à ABC, Rumsfeld disse que se arrepende de não ter deixado o poder após o escândalo de Abu Ghraib

Em uma autobiografia que chegou nesta terça-feira às livrarias dos Estados Unidos, o ex-secretário de Defesa americano Donald Rumsfeld defende as decisões tomadas sobre a guerra do Iraque e revela sua visão dos bastidores do período que antecedeu a invasão.

No livro de 800 páginas, intitulado Known and Unknown (Conhecido e Desconhecido, em tradução livre), Rumsfeld, considerado o principal articulador da invasão americana ao Iraque, diz que se Saddam Hussein permanecesse no poder, o mundo seria um lugar “muito mais perigoso do que é hoje”.

A obra – ainda sem previsão de lançamento no Brasil – vem causando reações nos Estados Unidos desde a semana passada, quando alguns trechos foram vazados pela imprensa.

Em suas memórias, Rumsfeld reforça a ideia de que o governo de George W. Bush já tinha o Iraque em mente desde a época do planejamento da guerra no Afeganistão.

O ex-secretário relata uma reunião privada com Bush no Salão Oval da Casa Branca, apenas 15 dias depois dos atentados de 11 de setembro de 2001, quando o então presidente teria pedido que revisasse os planos do Pentágono para o Iraque e que as opções fossem “criativas”.

Rumsfeld também revela as tensões entre o Pentágono e o Departamento de Estado no Conselho de Segurança Nacional durante o período – atribuídas por muitos críticos a ele próprio.

Defesa

O livro relata desde a infância de Rumsfeld, durante a Grande Depressão, até seu período no Congresso e sua atuação nos governos de diferentes presidentes americanos.

Em resenhas publicadas nesta terça-feira nos principais jornais americanos, muitos analistas dizem que Rumsfeld não demonstra remorsos, defendendo suas decisões à frente do Departamento de Estado e transferindo para outras pessoas a culpa pelos erros cometidos.

“Havia alguma dúvida sobre se Rumsfeld iria usar suas memórias para se desculpar pelo que deu errado no Iraque, como as memórias de Robert McNamara fizeram em relação à Guerra do Vietnã”, escreveu Dana Milbank, do The Washington Post.

“Mas depois de quatro anos de reflexão, Rumsfeld permanece repudiando aqueles menos brilhantes do que ele – o que significa praticamente todo o mundo”, diz o crítico.

Arrependimento

No entanto, Rumsfeld, de 78 anos, revela alguns arrependimentos.

Na noite de segunda-feira, em uma entrevista exclusiva ao canal de TV ABC News, o ex-secretário disse que seu maior arrependimento foi não ter convencido o presidente Bush a aceitar sua demissão após o escândalo envolvendo abuso de detentos na prisão de Abu Ghraib, no Iraque.

Disse também que o país e o Pentágono provavelmente estariam melhor se ele tivesse deixado o cargo em 2004.

No livro, Rumsfeld admite ainda que poderia ter enviado mais tropas ao Iraque.

“Em retrospecto, talvez tenha havido períodos em que mais tropas poderiam ter ajudado”, afirma o ex-secretário.

No entanto, ele diz que comandantes militares nunca relataram qualquer tipo de reserva quanto ao tamanho das forças ou pediram o envio de mais tropas, nem mesmo quando questionados especificamente sobre o assunto.

Blair admite que ignorou alertas de conselheiros sobre invasão ao Iraque

DAS AGÊNCIAS DE NOTÍCIAS

O ex-primeiro-ministro do Reino Unido Tony Blair voltou a depor nesta sexta-feira e admitiu que ignorou as advertências do procurador-geral do Reino Unido sobre a ilegalidade de invadir o Iraque sem o respaldo expresso da ONU (Organização das Nações Unidas). Ele justificou dizendo que considerava um conselho meramente “provisório”.

À comissão que investiga o processo político que levou o Reino Unido a participar da guerra, Blair disse acreditar que o principal advogado do país mudaria eventualmente de opinião.

Em janeiro de 2003, o então procurador-geral do Estado, Peter Goldsmith, advertiu duas vezes Blair de que a resolução 1441 da ONU não era suficiente para justificar o uso da força contra o Iraque. Em 7 de março, Goldsmith mudou de opinião.

Blair argumentou que, naquele momento, “ainda não tinha pedido formalmente assessoria legal, nem ele (o Goldsmith) tinha chegado ao ponto de dá-la”. “Por isso mantive minha posição de que não era preciso uma segunda resolução”, explicou, na carta.

“Achava que, uma vez conhecido o histórico de negociações britânico, mas sobretudo americano, concluiria que a 1441 significava precisamente o que dizia: que Saddam [Hussein] tinha uma última oportunidade e que, se não o fizesse [provasse que seu país não armazenava armas nucleares], estaria infringindo as condições, o que por sua vez revivia anteriores resoluções que autorizavam o uso da força”, acrescentou.

Na terça-feira passada (18), Goldsmith disse perante a mesma comissão que o ex-primeiro-ministro o excluiu de deliberações importantes sobre a legalidade da Guerra do Iraque, algo que este admitiu hoje ter feito ao afirmar que poderia tê-lo incluído mais no processo.

MAIS DO MESMO

O presidente da comissão, John Chilcot, enviou por escrito mais de cem perguntas complementares antes da sessão, que tinha como objetivo, segundo o parlamentar, “esclarecer” as declarações feitas até agora por Blair.

Mas na metade do interrogatório, exibido ao vivo pelos canais de televisão, o tom pareceu menos inquisitivo e as respostas menos abrasivas que na polêmica sessão de 29 de janeiro de 2010.

O trabalhista, que governou de 1997 a 2007, não mudou a linha de argumentação e não apresentou elementos novos.

Blair se negou ainda, contra a opinião de Chilcot, a autorizar a publicação de sua correspondência privada com o ex-presidente americano George W. Bush, referente ao período em que os dois teriam decidido por uma “mudança de regime” no Iraque. A discussão ocorreu durante uma reunião no rancho texano de Bush, em abril de 2002, 11 meses antes da invasão.

Blair afirmou que “as notas ao presidente Bush eram privadas”. “Foram redigidas quando queria obter uma mudança ou um ajuste político. São confidenciais”, explicou Blair. “E estas notas coincidem essencialmente com as declarações que expressei em público”.

Interrogado pelas declarações que são atribuídas a ele, o carismático ex-premiê negou ter afirmado ou escrito “George, seja qual for sua decisão, eu o acompanharei”.

MANIPULAÇÃO

Como em janeiro de 2010, os debates desta sexta-feira giraram em torno de três perguntas chaves: a guerra era legal sem uma resolução explícita da ONU? Blair manipulou deliberadamente a opinião pública sobre a presença nunca comprovada de armas de destruição em massa (ADM) iraquianas, que justificaram a entrada na guerra? Qual foi a realidade da aliança de Blair (apelidado então de “poodle de Bush” pelos detratores) com os neoconservadores americanos?

No ano passado, Blair afirmou que não se arrependia de ter envolvido o Reino Unido em uma guerra contra “o monstro Saddam Hussein”, uma “decisão justa” que ele disse que voltaria a tomar.

“O regime de Saddam era brutal, era uma ditadura militar repressiva. Constituía uma fonte de instabilidade e de perigo para a região”, afirmou nesta sexta-feira.

Blair entrou em 2010 por uma porta lateral para não enfrentar os manifestantes e os jornalistas. Desta vez, no entanto, entrou pela porta principal e até posou por alguns segundos para os fotógrafos, enquanto 20 manifestantes gritavam “Bliar”, um jogo de palavras entre “liar” (mentiroso em inglês) e seu sobrenome.

Um dos manifestantes, Peter Brierley, que perdeu o filho no Iraque, pediu que o ex-premiê seja julgado como “criminoso de guerra”.

DA FRANCE PRESSE, EM BAGDÁ

O presidente do Iraque de origem curda, Jalal Talabani, reconduzido nesta quinta-feira à Presidência para um novo mandato de quatro anos, é um homem doente e enfraquecido por uma contestação crescente em sua região de origem, o Curdistão.

Com o rosto arredondo, dotado de um grande senso de humor, tem sempre à mão uma bengala para se apoiar. Este ex-guerrilheiro curdo, que festeja nesta sexta-feira o 77º aniversário, tomou um tal gosto pelo poder que se recusou a deixar o cargo para o líder leigo Iyad Allawi, como lhe havia pedido com insistência o presidente americano Barack Obama.

“Vamos embora e vocês vão ficar sob a influência do Irã”, havia-lhe dito Obama.

“O Irã não nos incomoda e vocês podem partir amanhã”, respondeu-lhe furioso Jalal Talabani’, segundo contou à AFP um deputado de seu partido.

Embora Talabani, que se submeteu a várias cirurgias nos Estados Unidos, tenha prestado homenagem aos sacrifícios dos soldados americanos que capturaram seu inimigo, o ex-ditador iraquoano Saddam Hussein, ele mantém contatos estreitos com a Síria e, sobretudo, com o Irã, onde viveu e fala a língua com fluência.

Mas aquele que seus camaradas chamam afetuosamente “Oncle Jalal” perdeu prestígio. Seus detratores fustigam a corrupção que reina em seu feudo de Suleimaniyeh no Curdistão (norte) e denunciam o enriquecimento de pessoas ligadas a ele.

Seu partido, a União Patriótica do Curdistão (UPK), vem sendo ameaçado por uma nova chapa de oposição, Goran, composta por ex-amigos políticos, que obtiveram importantes vitórias eleitorais.

Ele também vem perdendo para o rival de sempre, Massoud Barzani, o líder do Partido Democrático do Curdistão (PDK), a quem combateu com armas na década de 1990.

BIOGRAFIA

Nascido em 1933 em Kalkan, uma aldeia na montanha, a 400 km a nordeste de Bagdá, Talabani começou muito jovem na política, por admiração a Moustafa Barzani, figura legendária do nacionalismo curdo.

Criado em Kirkuk, sonhou, aos 15 anos, tornar-se médico, optando finalmente pelo direito, a fim de se consagrar à política. Sua participação, em 1952, em manifestação anticolonialista em Bagdá, obrigou-o a interromper seus estudos, que retomou após 1958.

Realizou seu serviço militar na artilharia, somando-se, depois, ao PDK, fundado em 1946. Ele também combateu nas montanhas durante a primeira grande revolta curda de 1961.

Mas quando o líder carismático Barzani assinou em fevereiro de 1964 um acordo de paz com Bagdá, sem mencionar a autonomia do Curdistão, Jalal Talabani optou pela dissidência, partindo para o Irã.

Após a ruptura definitiva com o PDK, ele anunciou, em junho de 1975, em Damasco, a criação do UPK, que pretendeu estar mais à esquerda do que seu rival.

A rivalidade UPK/PDK marcou, a partir daí a vida política curda.

By George Friedman

Stratfor, September 8, 2010

It has now been nine years since al Qaeda attacked the United States. It has been nine years in which the primary focus of the United States has been on the Islamic world. In addition to a massive investment in homeland security, the United States has engaged in two multi-year, multi-divisional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, inserted forces in other countries in smaller operations and conducted a global covert campaign against al Qaeda and other radical jihadist groups.

In order to understand the last nine years you must understand the first 24 hours of the war — and recall your own feelings in those 24 hours. First, the attack was a shock, its audaciousness frightening. Second, we did not know what was coming next. The attack had destroyed the right to complacent assumptions. Were there other cells standing by in the United States? Did they have capabilities even more substantial than what they showed on Sept. 11? Could they be detected and stopped? Any American not frightened on Sept. 12 was not in touch with reality. Many who are now claiming that the United States overreacted are forgetting their own sense of panic. We are all calm and collected nine years after.

At the root of all of this was a profound lack of understanding of al Qaeda, particularly its capabilities and intentions. Since we did not know what was possible, our only prudent course was to prepare for the worst. That is what the Bush administration did. Nothing symbolized this more than the fear that al Qaeda had acquired nuclear weapons and that they would use them against the United States. The evidence was minimal, but the consequences would be overwhelming. Bush crafted a strategy based on the worst-case scenario.

Bush was the victim of a decade of failure in the intelligence community to understand what al Qaeda was and wasn’t. I am not merely talking about the failure to predict the 9/11 attack. Regardless of assertions afterwards, the intelligence community provided only vague warnings that lacked the kind of specificity that makes for actionable intelligence. To a certain degree, this is understandable. Al Qaeda learned from Soviet, Saudi, Pakistani and American intelligence during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and knew how to launch attacks without tipping off the target. The greatest failure of American intelligence was not the lack of a clear warning about 9/11 but the lack, on Sept. 12, of a clear picture of al Qaeda’s global structure, capabilities, weaknesses and intentions. Without such information, implementing U.S. policy was like piloting an airplane with faulty instruments in a snowstorm at night.

The president had to do three things: First, he had to assure the public that he knew what he was doing. Second, he had to do something that appeared decisive. Third, he had to gear up an intelligence and security apparatus to tell him what the threats actually were and what he ought to do. American policy became ready, fire, aim.

In looking back at the past nine years, two conclusions can be drawn: There were no more large-scale attacks on the United States by militant Islamists, and the United States was left with the legacy of responses that took place in the first two years after 9/11. This legacy is no longer useful, if it ever was, to the primary mission of defeating al Qaeda, and it represents an effort that is retrospectively out of proportion to the threat.

If I had been told on Sept.12, 2001, that the attack the day before would be the last major attack for at least nine years, I would not have believed it. In looking at the complexity of the security and execution of the 9/11 attack, I would have assumed that an organization capable of acting once in such a way could act again even more effectively. My assumption was wrong. Al Qaeda did not have the resources to mount other operations, and the U.S. response, in many ways clumsy and misguided and in other ways clever and targeted, disrupted any preparations in which al Qaeda might have been engaged to conduct follow-on attacks.

Knowing that about al Qaeda in 2001 was impossible. Knowing which operations were helpful in the effort to block them was impossible, in the context of what Americans knew in the first years after the war began. Therefore, Washington wound up in the contradictory situation in which American military and covert operations surged while new attacks failed to materialize. This created a massive political problem. Rather than appearing to be the cause for the lack of attacks, U.S. military operations were perceived by many as being unnecessary or actually increasing the threat of attack. Even in hindsight, aligning U.S. actions with the apparent outcome is difficult and controversial. But still we know two things: It has been nine years since Sept. 11, 2001, and the war goes on.

What happened was that an act of terrorism was allowed to redefine U.S. grand strategy. The United States operates with a grand strategy derived from the British strategy in Europe — maintaining the balance of power. For the United Kingdom, maintaining the balance of power in Europe protected any one power from emerging that could unite Europe and build a fleet to invade the United Kingdom or block its access to its empire. British strategy was to help create coalitions to block emerging hegemons such as Spain, France or Germany. Using overt and covert means, the United Kingdom aimed to ensure that no hegemonic power could emerge.

The Americans inherited that grand strategy from the British but elevated it to a global rather than regional level. Having blocked the Soviet Union from hegemony over Europe and Asia, the United States proceeded with a strategy whose goal, like that of the United Kingdom, was to nip potential regional hegemons in the bud. The U.S. war with Iraq in 1990-91 and the war with Serbia/Yugoslavia in 1999 were examples of this strategy. It involved coalition warfare, shifting America’s weight from side to side and using minimal force to disrupt the plans of regional aspirants to gain power. This U.S. strategy also was cloaked in the ideology of global liberalism and human rights.

The key to this strategy was its global nature. The emergence of a hegemonic contender that could challenge the United States globally, as the Soviet Union had done, was the worst-case scenario. Therefore, the containment of emerging powers wherever they might emerge was the centerpiece of American balance-of-power strategy.

The most significant effect of 9/11 was that it knocked the United States off its strategy. Rather than adapting its standing global strategy to better address the counterterrorism issue, the United States became obsessed with a single region, the area between the Mediterranean and the Hindu Kush. Within that region, the United States operated with a balance-of-power strategy. It played off all of the nations in the region against each other. It did the same with ethnic and religious groups throughout the region and particularly within Iraq and Afghanistan, the main theaters of the war. In both cases, the United States sought to take advantage of internal divisions, shifting its support in various directions to create a balance of power. That, in the end, was what the surge strategy was all about.

The American obsession with this region in the wake of 9/11 is understandable. Nine years later, with no clear end in sight, the question is whether this continued focus is strategically rational for the United States. Given the uncertainties of the first few years, obsession and uncertainty are understandable, but as a long-term U.S. strategy — the long war that the U.S. Department of Defense is preparing for — it leaves the rest of the world uncovered.

Consider that the Russians have used the American absorption in this region as a window of opportunity to work to reconstruct their geopolitical position. When Russia went to war with Georgia in 2008, an American ally, the United States did not have the forces with which to make a prudent intervention. Similarly, the Chinese have had a degree of freedom of action they could not have expected to enjoy prior to 9/11. The single most important result of 9/11 was that it shifted the United States from a global stance to a regional one, allowing other powers to take advantage of this focus to create significant potential challenges to the United States.

One can make the case, as I have, that whatever the origin of the Iraq war, remaining in Iraq to contain Iran is necessary. It is difficult to make a similar case for Afghanistan. Its strategic interest to the United States is minimal. The only justification for the war is that al Qaeda launched its attacks on the United States from Afghanistan. But that justification is no longer valid. Al Qaeda can launch attacks from Yemen or other countries. The fact that Afghanistan was the base from which the attacks were launched does not mean that al Qaeda depends on Afghanistan to launch attacks. And given that the apex leadership of al Qaeda has not launched attacks in a while, the question is whether al Qaeda is capable of launching such attacks any longer. In any case, managing al Qaeda today does not require nation building in Afghanistan.

But let me state a more radical thesis: The threat of terrorism cannot become the singular focus of the United States. Let me push it further: The United States cannot subordinate its grand strategy to simply fighting terrorism even if there will be occasional terrorist attacks on the United States. Three thousand people died in the 9/11 attack. That is a tragedy, but in a nation of over 300 million, 3,000 deaths cannot be permitted to define the totality of national strategy. Certainly, resources must be devoted to combating the threat and, to the extent possible, disrupting it. But it must also be recognized that terrorism cannot always be blocked, that terrorist attacks will occur and that the world’s only global power cannot be captive to this single threat.

The initial response was understandable and necessary. The United States must continue its intelligence gathering and covert operations against militant Islamists throughout the world. The intelligence failures of the 1990s must not be repeated. But waging a multi-divisional war in Afghanistan makes no strategic sense. The balance-of-power strategy must be used. Pakistan will intervene and discover the Russians and Iranians. The great game will continue. As for Iran, regional counters must be supported at limited cost to the United States. The United States should not be patrolling the far reaches of the region. It should be supporting a balance of power among the native powers of the region.

The United States is a global power and, as such, it must have a global view. It has interests and challenges beyond this region and certainly beyond Afghanistan. The issue there is not whether the United States can or can’t win, however that is defined. The issue is whether it is worth the effort considering what is going on in the rest of the world. Gen. David Petraeus cast the war in terms of whether the United States can win it. That’s reasonable; he’s the commander. But American strategy has to ask another question: What does the United States lose elsewhere while it focuses on the future of Kandahar?

The 9/11 attack shocked the United States and made counterterrorism the centerpiece of American foreign policy. That is too narrow a basis on which to base U.S. foreign policy. It is certainly an important strand of that policy, and it must be addressed, but it should be addressed through the regional balance of power. It is the good fortune of the United States that the Islamic world is torn by internal rivalries.

This is not dismissing the threat of terror. It is recognizing that the United States has done well in suppressing it over the past nine years but at a cost in other regions, a cost that can’t be sustained indefinitely and a cost that could well result in challenges more threatening than a rising Islamist militancy. The United States must now settle into a long-term strategy of managing terrorism as best as it can while not neglecting the rest of its interests.

After nine years, the issue is not what to do in Afghanistan but how the global power can return to managing all of its global interests, along with the war on al Qaeda.

Editorial do The New York Times.

We were glad to see President Obama go to Fort Bliss on Tuesday before his Oval Office speech on Iraq, to thank those Americans who most shouldered the burdens of a tragic, pointless war. One of the few rays of light in the conflict has been the distance America has come since Vietnam, when blameless soldiers were scorned for decisions made by politicians.

President George W. Bush tried to make Iraq an invisible, seemingly cost-free war. He refused to attend soldiers’ funerals and hid their returning coffins from the public. So it was fitting that Mr. Obama, who has improved veterans’ health care and made the Pentagon budget more rational, paid tribute to them.

“At every turn, America’s men and women in uniform have served with courage and resolve,” he said on Tuesday night. He added: “There were patriots who supported this war, and patriots who opposed it. And all of us are united in appreciation for our servicemen and women, and our hope for Iraq’s future.”

The speech also made us reflect on how little Mr. Bush accomplished by needlessly invading Iraq in March 2003 — and then ludicrously declaring victory two months later.

Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction proved to be Bush administration propaganda. The war has not created a new era of democracy in the Middle East — or in Iraq for that matter. There are stirrings of democratic politics in Iraq that give us hope. But there is no government six months after national elections.

In many ways, the war made Americans less safe, creating a new organization of terrorists and diverting the nation’s military resources and political will from Afghanistan. Deprived of its main adversary, a strong Iraq, Iran was left freer to pursue its nuclear program, to direct and finance extremist groups and to meddle in Iraq.

Mr. Obama graciously said it was time to put disagreements over Iraq behind us, but it is important not to forget how much damage Mr. Bush caused by misleading Americans about exotic weapons, about American troops being greeted with open arms, about creating a model democracy in Baghdad.

That is why it was so important that Mr. Obama candidly said the United States is not free of this conflict; American troops will see more bloodshed. We hope he follows through on his vow to work with Iraq’s government after the withdrawal of combat troops.

There was no victory to declare last night, and Mr. Obama was right not to try. If victory was ever possible in this war, it has not been won, and America still faces the daunting challenges of the other war, in Afghanistan.

Mr. Obama, addressing those who either believe that he is not committed to the fight in Afghanistan or believe that he will not leave, said Americans should “make no mistake” — he will stick to his plan to begin withdrawing troops next August. He still needs to clearly explain, and soon, how he will “disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda” and meet that timetable.

As we heard Mr. Obama speak from his desk with his usual calm clarity and eloquence, it made us wish we heard more from him on many issues. We are puzzled about why he talks to Americans directly so rarely and with seeming reluctance. This was only his second Oval Office address in more than 19 months of crisis upon crisis. The country particularly needs to hear more from Mr. Obama about what he rightly called the most urgent task — “to restore our economy and put the millions of Americans who have lost their jobs back to work.”

For this day, it was worth dwelling on this milestone in Iraq and on some grim numbers: more than 4,400 Americans dead and some 35,000 wounded, many with lost limbs. And on one number that American politicians are loath to mention: at least 100,000 Iraqis dead.

Obama anuncia fim da guerra no Iraque ‘no prazo’

AE – Agência Estado

O presidente dos Estados Unidos, Barack Obama, afirmou nesta segunda-feira que a guerra do Iraque se aproxima do final “como prometido e no prazo”, comemorando o que ele chamou de um sucesso de seu governo, que ocorreria em meio ao persistente instabilidade e incerteza no Iraque. Obama citou o progresso para cumprir o prazo final de retirar todas as tropas de combate do Iraque até o final de agosto. Numa lembrança da situação muito instável no Iraque, ataques a bombas e disparos de armas de fogo mataram 12 pessoas nesta segunda-feira.

“A dura verdade é que nós não vimos o final do sacrifício norte-americano no Iraque”, disse Obama aos veteranos, em discurso na convenção nacional dos Veteranos Americanos, que reúne soldados que foram mutilados na guerra. “Não se enganem: nosso comprometimento com o Iraque está mudando, passando de um esforço militar liderado por nossas tropas para um esforço civil conduzido por nossos diplomatas”, afirmou o mandatário.

O anúncio de Obama vem à tona em um momento no qual a situação no Iraque parece voltar a se deteriorar. O governo norte-americano vem prometendo há dois anos um fim responsável para a guerra no Iraque, atualmente em seu sétimo ano. No entanto, julho foi o mês com mais mortes relacionadas ao conflito em mais de dois anos, segundo números oficiais divulgados pelo governo iraquiano no fim de semana. Ao mesmo tempo, o país árabe encontra-se sem um governo efetivo desde as eleições gerais de março, que terminaram sem um vencedor claro. As diferentes facções políticas do país ainda não conseguiram um acordo para a formação de uma coalizão.

Os EUA manterão uma força de 50 mil soldados no Iraque, a qual deverá ter como missão o treinamento das tropas iraquianas. Sob um acordo negociado em 2008 com o governo iraquiano, todas as tropas dos EUA deverão deixar o país do Oriente Médio até o final de 2011. Há cerca de 65 mil militares norte-americanos atualmente no Iraque. Quando Obama assumiu a presidência, em janeiro de 2009, os EUA tinham 140 mil soldados no Iraque. Em 2007, durante a presidência de George W. Bush, os EUA chegaram a ter 167 mil soldados no Iraque.

O ex-premiê britânico Tony Blair revelou, em um livro de memórias que está sendo lançado nesta quarta-feira, que recorreu a bebidas alcoólicas para conseguir relaxar e lidar com as pressões do cargo.

“Uísque puro ou gim e tônica depois da janta, alguns copos de vinho ou até mesmo meia garrafa com a refeição. Nada excessivamente excessivo. Eu tinha limite. Mas eu estava percebendo que a bebida estava virando um amparo ['prop', em inglês]“, escreve Blair no livro A Journey (Uma Jornada, em português).

Tony Blair, do Partido Trabalhista, foi primeiro-ministro da Grã-Bretanha entre 1997 e 2007. Sua chegada ao poder interrompeu 18 anos de governo dos conservadores no país.

Sob a bandeira do New Labour (Novo Trabalhismo, em tradução livre) que pregava uma Terceira Via no debate ideológico entre esquerda e direita, Blair governou a Grã-Bretanha durante a invasão do Iraque, em 2003, que marcou seu governo.

“Ele era uma pessoa difícil, às vezes enlouquecedora? Sim”

Tony Blair sobre Gordon Brown

No livro, Blair fala sobre o seu período no poder, a guerra do Iraque e a ascensão dos trabalhistas na Grã-Bretanha, entre outros temas.

Gordon Brown

O livro provocou polêmica, em particular entre os trabalhistas britânicos devido a críticas ao seu sucessor no cargo, Gordon Brown. Os trabalhistas estão escolhendo neste mês quem será o sucessor do ex-premiê Brown na liderança do partido.

Brown renunciou à liderança do partido e ao cargo de primeiro-ministro em maio, quando foi derrotado pelo Partido Conservador de David Cameron em eleições gerais.

Em meio a algumas palavras elogiosas, Blair refere-se a Brown como “enlouquecedor” e diz que sabia que caso seu sucessor não mudasse algumas políticas, seu governo seria “um desastre”.

“Ele era uma pessoa difícil, às vezes enlouquecedora? Sim”, escreve Blair, que em seguida elogia Brown. “Mas ele também era forte, capaz e brilhante, e essas eram qualidades que eu nunca deixei de respeitar.”

Blair ainda diz no livro que Brown, que foi ministro das Finanças do seu governo antes de sucedê-lo como premiê, era um “sujeito estranho” e com “inteligência emocional zero”.

Ele sugere que caso tivesse demitido Brown, “o partido e o governo se desestabilizariam imediatamente e de forma grave, e sua ascensão ao cargo de primeiro-ministro seria talvez até mais rápida”.

Em entrevista à BBC, Blair diz que seu relacionamento com Brown era “francamente difícil, quase impossível”, mas que seu ministro sempre foi também uma fonte de força para o governo.

O porta-voz de Gordon Brown disse que o político não fará nenhum comentário sobre o livro de Blair.

Mas entre os trabalhistas, que estão passando pelo processo de escolha do sucessor de Brown para a liderança do partido, houve muitas críticas a Blair.

“Estou surpresa que Tony Blair não tenha esperado um intervalo maior antes de enfiar a faca em Gordon Brown. Isso não ajuda o partido neste momento”, disse a trabalhista Diane Abbott, que concorre para suceder Brown na liderança do partido.

Um parlamentar trabalhista ligado à Brown disse que “a versão unilateral de Blair” sobre os fatos já era esperada.

Iraque

Sobre a guerra do Iraque, Tony Blair diz que deixar Saddam Hussein no poder no país seria “um risco maior” do que removê-lo do poder.

Blair foi um dos principais defensores da ideia de invadir o Iraque junto com os Estados Unidos, em 2003, para derrubar o regime de Saddam.

“Eu não consigo satisfazer aos desejos nem mesmo de alguns dos meus apoiadores, que gostariam que eu dissesse: [invadir o Iraque] foi um erro, mas um erro cometido de boa-fé. Amigos que se opõem à guerra acham que eu estou sendo teimoso; outros, menos amigáveis, acham que eu sou delirante. A ambos, eu posso dizer: mantenham uma mente aberta”, escreve Blair.

Em suas memórias, Blair reconhece que houve problemas no planejamento da invasão do Iraque. Ele escreve que “nós não antecipamos o papel da Al-Qaeda ou do Irã” no planejamento sobre o que aconteceria depois da invasão.

Ele também falou sobre o seu “sofrimento” com as mortes provocadas pelo conflito na Grã-Bretanha.

“Eu lamento desesperadamente por eles [os soldados mortos], lamento pelas famílias cujo sofrimento foi agravado pela polêmica sobre o porquê de seus amados terem morrido, lamento pela seleção injusta de que quem perdeu a vida.”

Anxious Iraqis Look at Uncertain Future

Interviewee: Jane Arraf, Baghdad Correspondent, Christian Science Monitor

Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org

by Council on Foreign Relations – CFR.

With the pullout of U.S. combat units completed, many Iraqis, even those who deplored the presence of foreign troops, are “fearful about what happens” if the U.S. withdraws completely next year as planned, says Jane Arraf, a long-time Baghdad correspondent who served as an Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow at CFR. Beyond concerns about whether Iraq will be able to defend itself when all U.S. troops have gone, there’s also anxiety about the unsettled political situation. Arraf says Iraqis seem to be unable to forge a compromise between Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister, whose bloc had the most seats in last March’s elections, and the current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. “We keep thinking that perhaps there’s a lot going on beneath the surface, but apparently there isn’t. It is what it is. It’s stalled. There’s talk about what to do, but nothing’s been established yet.”

President Obama is planning to give a speech on Iraq next week marking the pullout of U.S. combat troops from the country. Does their departure make a big difference in Iraq?

It really doesn’t. A lot of that is because it isn’t a development that has had much of an impact on the ground. Some have called it a “rebranding” of the conflict, and there is some truth to that. What we’ve got left are fifty thousand other troops, a substantial number, and a lot of those are actually combat troops. Any brigade here is ready, equipped, and trained for combat. It’s just that the mission is changing. So with that many troops on the ground, the latest withdrawals really don’t have that much of an impact, particularly since we haven’t been seeing the United States in unilateral combat missions since June of last year. As part of the security agreement signed by the Bush administration, the U.S. forces are taking a backseat to the Iraqi forces. The bottom line is that nothing really will change on September 1. What we’re really looking at is what happens as next year’s deadline of December 31, 2011, approaches for all the troops to leave.

Are Americans regarded as friends or enemies? Are people happy to see the Americans out of Iraq? Or do they want the Americans to have more influence? Clearly there’s a chaotic security and political situation in Iraq, right?

It’s a love-hate relationship that, right now, is turning into a feeling almost of abandonment. Even Iraqis who have absolutely despised the thought of a presence of a large number of foreign troops here are quite nervous, quite fearful about what happens if they pull out next year. It’s something that I hear constantly in the streets, when I stop to talk to people, when I go to the sites of these attacks. When I talk to political leaders, there is quite a lot of apprehension about what happens when there is no big U.S. presence here and Iraq can’t really defend its borders or its airspace.

Will the United States be providing long-term air defense? Or is that supposed to end next year too?

Everything ends next year, so it really all has to be negotiated. The commanding general in charge of training Iraqi forces told me they are in the midst of negotiating an agreement to allow NATO to continue training. Such an agreement of course to replace the Iraq-U.S. security agreement will actually have to be negotiated by whatever new government is formed. The assumption is that it will be a pro-Western, pro-U.S. government, but that’s not a certainty. What if, for instance, the Sadrists have a large role to play in the new government? What if it’s a much more Iranian-friendly government than some people are suggesting? They could turn to Iran for a security agreement.

When terrorist attacks occur and hundreds of people get killed or wounded, is this regarded by Iraqis as comparable to another day of car crashes in the United States?

We might think so, because on the surface, life continues on—people go to work, they open up their shops just hours after an explosion on their street, people send their kids to school. But it has had a significant effect in terms of human investment. Those Iraqis—many of them middle class, a lot of the engineers, the doctors, the professionals needed to rebuild Iraq—will look at the headlines and say, “Why should I want to come back to Iraq? What is there to come back for?” Also, because these attacks have been very focused on the Iraqi police forces, there has been an effect on the ground. With every attack on the police, they retreat further into their police stations. The hope was to have a police force that could eventually replace, first U.S. soldiers, and then Iraqi soldiers that are still here in the streets. When the police get out, they do investigations and they keep the streets safe. When they retreat back, they’re more worried about protecting themselves against these almost constant attacks, either individual or collective, and that really does eventually have a significant effect on security in urban areas.

How do you feel when you walk on the street? Do you worry a lot?

It’s like being a teenager—I’m not allowed to go out on the street on my own. When I’m out on the streets, there’s still obviously some danger, but I do have my Iraqi staff, one or two of them with me at all times. The prevailing feeling is uncertainty. When I go grocery shopping, the shops are full of people. They’re not letting these events deter them from going out. There are new clothing stores, there are new stores selling electronics, but this is all small investment—you don’t see the big things happening. And you don’t see a lot of faith in a near-term optimistic future. People pretty much think it’ll get better, but it’ll take a long time. A long time means a decade, perhaps. People aren’t really thinking it’s going to get better in the new year or two years from now.

Why can’t the Iraqis get electricity working? I gather this is a major complaint.

Most of us do not completely understand why it is there is still no electricity. Officials will tell you that it’s because there is a greatly increased demand— there are more air conditioners and other appliances. Those attacks we saw during the height of the insurgency, on refineries, on oil installations have not been repaired. Everything is on hold, waiting for those billions of dollars in investment to come in. That will happen, but it will take a long time.

And there is all this corruption. Corruption here is at the basis of almost everything. If you talk to Iraqis, they’re more worried about corruption than they are about terrorism. Certainly that’s a lot of the reason why a lot of money that is to be spent on things like electricity has seemed to have gone astray. And it’s part of the reason why the infrastructure, seven years on, is still in such bad shape. Here in Baghdad, people generally get one hour of electricity and then it goes off for four hours or five hours, comes back for another hour. In some places, they don’t even get that. And it’s not just the electricity, there are water shortages. We’re sweltering in 120 degrees and then the water gets cut off. There is a building resentment here and it’s more to do with basic services than it is about security.

The corruption is among officials? Money is allocated to building up an electrical infrastructure, for instance, and somehow the money gets diverted?

It’s as blatant as government officials, deputy ministers, directors of departments stuffing cash into their suitcases and leaving the country and as prevalent as bribes paid on contracts. On a day-to-day level, it’s very hard for anybody here to get anything done unless they pay a bribe, and that includes getting documents that you need from any government department, that includes getting an electricity meter installed so you can get city power in less than a week, instead of six months. You pretty much pay anybody to do anything here and that itself has a very destabilizing effect.

There has been a stalemate between the top political contenders, Ayad Allawi and Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki since the election ended in March. What do you think will happen?

Almost anything is the short answer, which is why this is so fascinating. It’s fascinating because it’s terribly important not just in the national sense, but in the regional sense. But it’s also endlessly fascinating because if you look at the shifts in political alliances, you see people who started off saying that they would never have anything to do with some of the other political leaders now saying there are no red lines. We essentially see the same players we’ve had throughout this war. We’ve got Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; we’ve got Ibrahim Jaafari, who was the prime minister in 2005; we’ve got Ayad Allawi, who was the prime minister in 2004; we’ve got Muqtada al-Sadr—the major players haven’t changed and they won’t change. It’s just really a matter of how they’re all going to fit together.

What the United States wants to see, and what a lot of people do want to see, actually, is some sort of government in which Maliki has a role and Allawi has a role. Maliki is the front runner among the Shiites—he has perhaps the greatest personal popularity—and Allawi represents a very important constituency that is otherwise left out. When Iraqis went to the polls in March, this election was billed as absolutely crucial to Iraqi stability, crucial for U.S. troops to be able to leave, crucial for the United States to walk away from Iraq. This election needed to be broad-based and it needed to have a government that had Sunni participation. For better or worse, Allawi—a Shiite, but a secular Shiite—has a lot of that Sunni backing. He needs to be given a role, and this is agreed by pretty much everyone.

The problem is that Iraqis aren’t used to compromise and almost six months later, that’s what we’re seeing: Nobody is compromising. Everyone wants to be prime minister. One of the things suggested that would be backed by the United States would be the creation of a superstructure that would oversee strategic policies and security policies, and look at all oil policies. The proposal was that it would be headed by Allawi and that Malaki would be prime minister. Now, the problem about that is it’s unconstitutional.

So you can’t really predict, then, who will emerge as the prime minister unless they work out this new superstructure?

I’m not discounting Maliki. The thing with Maliki is that he aligned himself with the other major Shiite players. They have proposed a series of measures that will limit his power. The Sadrists will not support him as prime minister because he sent the Iraqi army into Baghdad and into Basra to get rid of their militia. They’ve actually suggested that they could pull out of that coalition and back Allawi, which would be an interesting development.

But whatever way you cut it, Maliki remains a key politician simply because he has support on the street. It’s entirely unclear as to whether Allawi will back down or whether Maliki will accept a reduced role as prime minister, and agree to have his power curtailed. We keep thinking that perhaps there’s a lot going on beneath the surface, but apparently there isn’t. It is what it is. It’s stalled. There’s talk about what to do, but nothing’s been established yet.

The last American combat brigade in Iraq has left the country, the US military has said.

The 4th Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division began crossing by land into Kuwait in the early hours of the morning, said a spokesman.

Their departure comes ahead of a 31 August deadline for an end to the US combat mission in the country.

But the Pentagon has not confirmed that the move marks an early end to combat operations.

Most of the 4,000 Stryker Brigade troops drove out of Iraq in a convoy of armoured vehicles, say reports.

The journey along potentially hostile desert roads had been carefully planned for weeks.

Some of the brigade remained behind to complete logistical and administrative tasks but would leave the country by air later in the day, the Associated Press reported.

The BBC’s Jane O’Brien in Washington says the brigade’s departure after seven and a half years is a significant step.

But the Pentagon has stressed that the official end to Operation Iraqi Freedom – the US military mission in the country – remains scheduled for the end of the month.

Some 50,000 US troops are set to remain in Iraq until the end of 2011 to advise Iraqi forces and protect US interests.

Those soldiers will be armed but will only use their weapons in self-defence or at the request of the Iraqi government.

State Department spokesman PJ Crowley said the US involvement in Iraq was far from over, but that it would be less intrusive and more civilian focused.

“We are ending the war … but we are not ending our work in Iraq. We have a long-term commitment to Iraq,” he told MSNBC.

Mr Crowley said the US had a trillion dollar investment to protect in the country and also wanted to see a significant return on the 4,415 troops who have lost their lives in the conflict.

Pakistan’s Double Game

There is a lot to be disturbed by in the battlefield reports from Afghanistan released Sunday by WikiLeaks. The close-up details of war are always unsettling, even more so with this war, which was so badly neglected and bungled by President George W. Bush.

But the most alarming of the reports were the ones that described the cynical collusion between Pakistan’s military intelligence service and the Taliban. Despite the billions of dollars the United States has sent in aid to Pakistan since Sept. 11, they offer powerful new evidence that crucial elements of Islamabad’s power structure have been actively helping to direct and support the forces attacking the American-led military coalition.

The time line of the documents from WikiLeaks, an organization devoted to exposing secrets, stops before President Obama put his own military and political strategy into effect last December. Administration officials say they have made progress with Pakistan since, but it is hard to see much evidence of that so far.

Most of the WikiLeaks documents, which were the subject of in-depth coverage in The Times on Monday, cannot be verified. However, they confirm a picture of Pakistani double-dealing that has been building for years.

On a trip to Pakistan last October, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton suggested that officials in the Pakistani government knew where Al Qaeda leaders were hiding. Gen. David Petraeus, the new top military commander in Afghanistan, recently acknowledged longstanding ties between Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, known as the ISI, and the “bad guys.”

The Times’s report of the new documents suggests the collusion goes even deeper, that representatives of the ISI have worked with the Taliban to organize networks of militants to fight American soldiers in Afghanistan and hatch plots to assassinate Afghan leaders.

The article painted a chilling picture of the activities of Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul of Pakistan, who ran the ISI from 1987 to 1989, when the agency and the C.I.A. were together arming the Afghan militias fighting Soviet troops. General Gul kept working with those forces, which eventually formed the Taliban.

Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States said the reports were unsubstantiated and “do not reflect the current on-ground realities.” But at this point, denials about links with the militants are simply not credible.

Why would Pakistan play this dangerous game? The ISI has long seen the Afghan Taliban as a proxy force, a way to ensure its influence on the other side of the border and keep India’s influence at bay.

Pakistani officials also privately insist that they have little choice but to hedge their bets given their suspicions that Washington will once again lose interest as it did after the Soviets were ousted from Afghanistan in 1989. And until last year, when the Pakistani Taliban came within 60 miles of Islamabad, the country’s military and intelligence establishment continued to believe it could control the extremists when it needed to.

In recent months, the Obama administration has said and done many of the right things toward building a long-term relationship with Pakistan. It has committed to long-term economic aid. It is encouraging better relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is constantly reminding Pakistani leaders that the extremists, on both sides of the border, pose a mortal threat to Pakistan’s fragile democracy — and their own survival. We don’t know if they’re getting through. We know they have to.

It has been only seven months since Mr. Obama announced his new strategy for Afghanistan, and a few weeks since General Petraeus took command. But Americans are increasingly weary of this costly war. If Mr. Obama cannot persuade Islamabad to cut its ties to, and then aggressively fight, the extremists in Pakistan, there is no hope of defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan.