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	<title>Política Internacional &#187; Principal</title>
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		<title>The War in Iraq&#8230;</title>
		<link>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/the-war-in-iraq/</link>
		<comments>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/the-war-in-iraq/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Sep 2010 01:48:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jefferson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Américas]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/?p=876</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Editorial do The New York Times. We were glad to see President Obama go to Fort Bliss on Tuesday before his Oval Office speech on Iraq, to thank those Americans who most shouldered the burdens of a tragic, pointless war. One of the few rays of light in the conflict has been the distance America [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Editorial do The New York Times.</p>
<p>We were glad to see President Obama go to Fort Bliss on Tuesday before his Oval Office speech on Iraq, to thank those Americans who most shouldered the burdens of a tragic, pointless war. One of the few rays of light in the conflict has been the distance America has come since Vietnam, when blameless soldiers were scorned for decisions made by politicians.</p>
<p>President George W. Bush tried to make Iraq an invisible, seemingly cost-free war. He refused to attend soldiers’ funerals and hid their returning coffins from the public. So it was fitting that Mr. Obama, who has improved veterans’ health care and made the Pentagon budget more rational, paid tribute to them.</p>
<p>“At every turn, America’s men and women in uniform have served with courage and resolve,” he said on Tuesday night. He added: “There were patriots who supported this war, and patriots who opposed it. And all of us are united in appreciation for our servicemen and women, and our hope for Iraq’s future.”</p>
<p>The speech also made us reflect on how little Mr. Bush accomplished by needlessly invading Iraq in March 2003 — and then ludicrously declaring victory two months later.</p>
<p>Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction proved to be Bush administration propaganda. The war has not created a new era of democracy in the Middle East — or in Iraq for that matter. There are stirrings of democratic politics in Iraq that give us hope. But there is no government six months after national elections.</p>
<p>In many ways, the war made Americans less safe, creating a new organization of terrorists and diverting the nation’s military resources and political will from Afghanistan. Deprived of its main adversary, a strong Iraq, Iran was left freer to pursue its nuclear program, to direct and finance extremist groups and to meddle in Iraq.</p>
<p>Mr. Obama graciously said it was time to put disagreements over Iraq behind us, but it is important not to forget how much damage Mr. Bush caused by misleading Americans about exotic weapons, about American troops being greeted with open arms, about creating a model democracy in Baghdad.</p>
<p>That is why it was so important that Mr. Obama candidly said the United States is not free of this conflict; American troops will see more bloodshed. We hope he follows through on his vow to work with Iraq’s government after the withdrawal of combat troops.</p>
<p>There was no victory to declare last night, and Mr. Obama was right not to try. If victory was ever possible in this war, it has not been won, and America still faces the daunting challenges of the other war, in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Mr. Obama, addressing those who either believe that he is not committed to the fight in Afghanistan or believe that he will not leave, said Americans should “make no mistake” — he will stick to his plan to begin withdrawing troops next August. He still needs to clearly explain, and soon, how he will “disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda” and meet that timetable.</p>
<p>As we heard Mr. Obama speak from his desk with his usual calm clarity and eloquence, it made us wish we heard more from him on many issues. We are puzzled about why he talks to Americans directly so rarely and with seeming reluctance. This was only his second Oval Office address in more than 19 months of crisis upon crisis. The country particularly needs to hear more from Mr. Obama about what he rightly called the most urgent task — “to restore our economy and put the millions of Americans who have lost their jobs back to work.”</p>
<p>For this day, it was worth dwelling on this milestone in Iraq and on some grim numbers: more than 4,400 Americans dead and some 35,000 wounded, many with lost limbs. And on one number that American politicians are loath to mention: at least 100,000 Iraqis dead.</p>
<center><div style=" margin-bottom:-20px;"><a href="http://www.submarino.com.br">Submarino.com.br</a></div><div><script language="JavaScript1.1" type="text/javascript" src="http://www.submarino.com.br/afiliados/get_banner.asp?tipo=full&franq=296021"></script></div></center><h2  class="related_post_title">Artigos Relacionados:</h2><ul class="related_post"><li>August 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/o-futuro-incerto-dos-iraquianos/" title="O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;">O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 18, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/18/last-us-combat-brigade-quits-iraq/" title="Last US combat brigade quits Iraq">Last US combat brigade quits Iraq</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/leaders-call-for-peace-as-mideast-talks-begin/" title="Leaders Call for Peace as Mideast Talks Begin">Leaders Call for Peace as Mideast Talks Begin</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/e-a-marvada-e-comum-na-politica-mesmo/" title="E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;">E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/for-once-hope-in-the-middle-east/" title="For Once, Hope in the Middle East&#8230;">For Once, Hope in the Middle East&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/this-is-not-a-recovery/" title="This Is Not a Recovery&#8230;">This Is Not a Recovery&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 22, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/22/a-rising-global-tide-of-xenophobia/" title="A rising global tide of xenophobia">A rising global tide of xenophobia</a> (0)</li><li>August 16, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/16/um-monstro-ressurge/" title="Um monstro ressurge&#8230;">Um monstro ressurge&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/um-dia-cravado-na-historia/" title="Um dia cravado na história&#8230;">Um dia cravado na história&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/acordo-de-paz/" title="Acordo de Paz&#8230;">Acordo de Paz&#8230;</a> (0)</li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Um dia cravado na história&#8230;</title>
		<link>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/um-dia-cravado-na-historia/</link>
		<comments>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/um-dia-cravado-na-historia/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Sep 2010 01:44:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jefferson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Américas]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/?p=873</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Obama anuncia fim da guerra no Iraque &#8216;no prazo&#8217; AE &#8211; Agência Estado O presidente dos Estados Unidos, Barack Obama, afirmou nesta segunda-feira que a guerra do Iraque se aproxima do final &#8220;como prometido e no prazo&#8221;, comemorando o que ele chamou de um sucesso de seu governo, que ocorreria em meio ao persistente instabilidade [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Obama anuncia fim da guerra no Iraque &#8216;no prazo&#8217;</strong></p>
<p>AE &#8211; Agência Estado</p>
<p>O presidente dos Estados Unidos, Barack Obama, afirmou nesta segunda-feira que a guerra do Iraque se aproxima do final &#8220;como prometido e no prazo&#8221;, comemorando o que ele chamou de um sucesso de seu governo, que ocorreria em meio ao persistente instabilidade e incerteza no Iraque. Obama citou o progresso para cumprir o prazo final de retirar todas as tropas de combate do Iraque até o final de agosto. Numa lembrança da situação muito instável no Iraque, ataques a bombas e disparos de armas de fogo mataram 12 pessoas nesta segunda-feira.</p>
<p>&#8220;A dura verdade é que nós não vimos o final do sacrifício norte-americano no Iraque&#8221;, disse Obama aos veteranos, em discurso na convenção nacional dos Veteranos Americanos, que reúne soldados que foram mutilados na guerra. &#8220;Não se enganem: nosso comprometimento com o Iraque está mudando, passando de um esforço militar liderado por nossas tropas para um esforço civil conduzido por nossos diplomatas&#8221;, afirmou o mandatário.</p>
<p>O anúncio de Obama vem à tona em um momento no qual a situação no Iraque parece voltar a se deteriorar. O governo norte-americano vem prometendo há dois anos um fim responsável para a guerra no Iraque, atualmente em seu sétimo ano. No entanto, julho foi o mês com mais mortes relacionadas ao conflito em mais de dois anos, segundo números oficiais divulgados pelo governo iraquiano no fim de semana. Ao mesmo tempo, o país árabe encontra-se sem um governo efetivo desde as eleições gerais de março, que terminaram sem um vencedor claro. As diferentes facções políticas do país ainda não conseguiram um acordo para a formação de uma coalizão.</p>
<p>Os EUA manterão uma força de 50 mil soldados no Iraque, a qual deverá ter como missão o treinamento das tropas iraquianas. Sob um acordo negociado em 2008 com o governo iraquiano, todas as tropas dos EUA deverão deixar o país do Oriente Médio até o final de 2011. Há cerca de 65 mil militares norte-americanos atualmente no Iraque. Quando Obama assumiu a presidência, em janeiro de 2009, os EUA tinham 140 mil soldados no Iraque. Em 2007, durante a presidência de George W. Bush, os EUA chegaram a ter 167 mil soldados no Iraque.</p>
<h2  class="related_post_title">Artigos Relacionados:</h2><ul class="related_post"><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/the-war-in-iraq/" title="The War in Iraq&#8230;">The War in Iraq&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/o-futuro-incerto-dos-iraquianos/" title="O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;">O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/acordo-de-paz/" title="Acordo de Paz&#8230;">Acordo de Paz&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/leaders-call-for-peace-as-mideast-talks-begin/" title="Leaders Call for Peace as Mideast Talks Begin">Leaders Call for Peace as Mideast Talks Begin</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/e-a-marvada-e-comum-na-politica-mesmo/" title="E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;">E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 20, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/20/israel-and-palestinians-to-resume-peace-talks-in-washington/" title="Israel and Palestinians to resume peace talks in Washington">Israel and Palestinians to resume peace talks in Washington</a> (0)</li><li>August 18, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/18/last-us-combat-brigade-quits-iraq/" title="Last US combat brigade quits Iraq">Last US combat brigade quits Iraq</a> (0)</li><li>August 15, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/15/palestinian-authority-ready-for-peace-talks-ashton-says/" title="Palestinian Authority ready for peace talks, Ashton says">Palestinian Authority ready for peace talks, Ashton says</a> (0)</li><li>August 15, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/15/as-arizona-went-so-goes-virginia/" title="As Arizona Went, So Goes Virginia&#8230;">As Arizona Went, So Goes Virginia&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 15, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/15/general-dos-eua-ve-areas-de-progresso-no-afeganistao/" title="General dos EUA vê &#8220;áreas de progresso&#8221; no Afeganistão">General dos EUA vê &#8220;áreas de progresso&#8221; no Afeganistão</a> (0)</li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Acordo de Paz&#8230;</title>
		<link>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/acordo-de-paz/</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Sep 2010 01:29:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jefferson</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/?p=868</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Em homenagem a minha tia Jake, apresento uma versão simplificada da notícia anterior, em português, e aproveito e mando um recado para ela: Obrigado por todas as palavras de incentivo e pelos olhares críticos! Acordo de paz no Oriente Médio é possível em um ano, diz Abbas WASHINGTON (Reuters) &#8211; O presidente palestino, Mahmoud Abbas, [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>Em homenagem a minha tia Jake, apresento uma versão simplificada da notícia anterior, em português, e aproveito e mando um recado para ela: Obrigado por todas as palavras de incentivo e pelos olhares críticos!</p></blockquote>
<p><strong>Acordo de paz no Oriente Médio é possível em um ano, diz Abbas</strong></p>
<p><a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/02mideast_cnd_337-395-articleLarge.jpg"><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-871" title="02mideast_cnd_337-395-articleLarge" src="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/02mideast_cnd_337-395-articleLarge.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="330" /></a></p>
<p>WASHINGTON (Reuters) &#8211; O presidente palestino, Mahmoud Abbas, disse na quarta-feira que um acordo de paz no Oriente Médio é possível &#8220;dentro de um ano&#8221; e condenou os últimos ataques contra judeus na Cisjordânia.</p>
<p>Falando a líderes israelenses e árabes e para o presidente norte-americano, Barack Obama, na Casa Branca, Abbas pediu a Israel que congele todas as atividades de assentamento e disse que é tempo de fazer a paz, terminar a ocupação de Israel e estabelecer um Estado palestino.</p>
<p>No mesmo encontro, o primeiro-ministro de Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, afirmou que seu país não deixará terroristas bloquearem o caminho para a paz no Oriente Médio. Qualquer acordo de paz deve garantir a segurança, disse.</p>
<p>Obama pediu aos líderes que não deixem escapar a chance para a paz ao abrir uma cúpula patrocinada pelos Estados Unidos para retomar as conversações diretas assombradas pela violência na região.</p>
<p>Na terça-feira, quatro colonos israelenses foram mortos a tiros na Cisjordânia ocupada, num ataque que o grupo islâmico palestino Hamas disse ter sido seu primeiro gesto contra as negociações de paz que começaram na quarta-feira em Washington.</p>
<h2  class="related_post_title">Artigos Relacionados:</h2><ul class="related_post"><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/leaders-call-for-peace-as-mideast-talks-begin/" title="Leaders Call for Peace as Mideast Talks Begin">Leaders Call for Peace as Mideast Talks Begin</a> (0)</li><li>August 20, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/20/israel-and-palestinians-to-resume-peace-talks-in-washington/" title="Israel and Palestinians to resume peace talks in Washington">Israel and Palestinians to resume peace talks in Washington</a> (0)</li><li>August 15, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/15/palestinian-authority-ready-for-peace-talks-ashton-says/" title="Palestinian Authority ready for peace talks, Ashton says">Palestinian Authority ready for peace talks, Ashton says</a> (0)</li><li>July 5, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/07/05/palestinos-e-israel-negociam-diretamente-apos-mediacao-dos-eua/" title="Palestinos e Israel negociam diretamente após mediação dos EUA">Palestinos e Israel negociam diretamente após mediação dos EUA</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/the-war-in-iraq/" title="The War in Iraq&#8230;">The War in Iraq&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/e-a-marvada-e-comum-na-politica-mesmo/" title="E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;">E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/for-once-hope-in-the-middle-east/" title="For Once, Hope in the Middle East&#8230;">For Once, Hope in the Middle East&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/o-futuro-incerto-dos-iraquianos/" title="O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;">O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>July 24, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/07/24/politica-externa-debate-e-balanco/" title="Política Externa: Debate e Balanço">Política Externa: Debate e Balanço</a> (0)</li><li>June 22, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/06/22/easing-the-gaza-blockade/" title="Easing the Gaza Blockade&#8230;">Easing the Gaza Blockade&#8230;</a> (0)</li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Leaders Call for Peace as Mideast Talks Begin</title>
		<link>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/leaders-call-for-peace-as-mideast-talks-begin/</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Sep 2010 01:24:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jefferson</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/?p=866</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[New York Times WASHINGTON — President Obama began his foray into Middle East peace-making on Wednesday, as the Israeli and Palestinian leaders committed to work on a comprehensive Middle East peace treaty in the next year intended to end a conflict that has endured for six decades. In a remarkable tableau at the White House, [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>New York Times</p>
<p>WASHINGTON — President Obama began his foray into Middle East peace-making on Wednesday, as the Israeli and Palestinian leaders committed to work on a comprehensive Middle East peace treaty in the next year intended to end a conflict that has endured for six decades.</p>
<p>In a remarkable tableau at the White House, Mr. Obama, flanked by the leaders of Israel, the Palestinians, and the only two Arab states with whom Israel has made peace, vowed to do everything within his power to achieve the comprehensive agreement that has eluded negotiators since Israel was established.</p>
<p>“We are but five men,” Mr. Obama said Wednesday night. “But when we come together, we will not be alone. We will be joined by the generations of those who have gone before.” He spoke of Anwar el-Sadat and Yitzhak Rabin, the Egyptian and Israeli leaders who lost their lives because they pursued peace; of Jordan’s King Hussein and Israel’s Menachem Begin — “statesmen,” Mr. Obama said, “who imagined the world as it should be.”</p>
<p>Mr. Obama said that he and the other leaders owed it to those men to “work diligently to fulfill their aspirations.”</p>
<p>In somber, emotional tones, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority expressed their own determination to make peace.</p>
<p>Mr. Netanyahyu, turning toward to Mr. Abbas, called him his “partner in peace.” He said he came to find a “historic compromise” but warned that any deal must be anchored in ensuring Israel’s security.</p>
<p>Mr. Abbas, for his part, said he would push hard despite “the difficulties we’re going to face tomorrow.” But he quickly foreshadowed the biggest early sticking point in the talks, calling for Mr. Netanyahu to freeze settlement activity in the West Bank.</p>
<p>The East Room gathering was a rare moment of diplomatic theater, endorsed by the attendance of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah II of Jordan, and orchestrated by Mr. Obama as part of an effort to invest the process with his own personal stature. It came after Mr. Obama held a series of one-on-one meetings with the men throughout the day, and just before they were to begin a working dinner. On Thursday, Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Abbas are to begin direct talks.</p>
<p>For Mr. Netanyahu and Mr.Abbas, the talks, with their very real chance of failure, represent a huge risk: President Bill Clinton’s failed attempt in 2000 led to the Palestinian intifada while President George W. Bush’s Annapolis peace attempt dissolved amid chronic violence in Gaza.</p>
<p>“Too much blood has already been shed, too many hearts have already been broken,” Mr. Obama said. “This moment of opportunity may not return soon again.”</p>
<p>The inclusion of Mr. Mubarak and King Abdullah underlines the administration’s hopes to forge a regional solution to the conflict. Egypt and Jordan are critical to providing Israel with security guarantees that would enable it to accept the creation of a Palestinian state.</p>
<p>Mr. Mubarak has offered to host subsequent rounds of talks in Egypt, though officials said he was pushing for Mr. Obama to take a direct personal role in the process. The standing of Mr. Mubarak, 82, in the region is such that officials said the administration was eager to get direct talks going quickly, because his health is said to be fragile and the United States is worried about the uncertainty that will come after he passes from the scene.</p>
<p>Jordan is a crucial player because of the difficult question of how to secure its border with a new Palestinian state. Israel currently has troops on that frontier and would balk at withdrawing them without a guarantee that the border would not become a conduit for missiles that militant groups opposed to the peace process, chiefly Hamas, could fire at Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities.</p>
<p>Previous attempts to involve Israel’s Arab neighbors in constructing a peace deal between Israelis and Palestinians have fared poorly. Mr. Obama’s most recent attempt, when he sought to win confidence-building measures from Israel’s neighbors like allowing Israeli carriers to fly over their countries, failed when Saudi Arabia and other Arab states refused. But more recently, the Saudis pressed Mr. Abbas to agree to the direct talks, using their financial aid to the Palestinian Authority as a lever.</p>
<p>The Arab League also has put its stamp of approval on the negotiations.</p>
<p>The success of the talks, all sides said, will depend in part on whether Mr. Obama can succeed where his predecessors have failed in pushing Palestinians and Israelis toward resolving the core final status issues that have bedeviled peace negotiators since 1979. They include the dismantling of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the borders of a Palestinian state, the security of Israel, the status of Jerusalem and the fate of Palestinian refugees who left, or were forced to leave, their homes in Israel.</p>
<p>Mr. Obama will know quickly whether he has any more chance of success than the eight failed attempts that have gone before this one. At the end of September, Israel’s 10-month moratorium on settlement construction will expire. Mr. Netanyahu so far has not indicated any willingness to extend it, and Mr. Abbas has said that he will withdraw from negotiations if settlement activity resumes.</p>
<p>American officials have been working with their Israeli and Palestinian counterparts to try to come up with a way around the issue to no avail so far.</p>
<p>During the meeting on Wednesday afternoon between Mr. Obama and Mr. Abbas, American officials said they would press the Israelis to find a way around the moratorium expiration, but they also asked the Palestinian president to try to be flexible, according to advisers to all three sides.</p>
<p>Mr. Netanyahu made no specific mention of settlements during his remarks before the dinner. The closest he came was in an acknowledgment of Palestinian claims to land.</p>
<p>“The Jewish people are not strangers in our homeland, the land of our forefathers,” he said. “But we recognize that another people share this land with us. And I came here today to find an historic compromise that will enable both peoples to live in peace, security and dignity.”</p>
<p>For Mr. Obama, the settlements issue is doubly important because if it blows up the talks, Middle East experts said, he will once again have left the perception in the Arab world of escorting Mr. Abbas out on a limb and then leaving him there.</p>
<p>Many Palestinian officials complain that Mr. Obama’s decision last year to drop his demand for Israel to halt settlement construction as a prelude to peace talks may have delayed the start of these negotiations, since it was difficult for the Palestinian leader to back down.</p>
<p>While the issues are daunting, some analysts also saw a reed of hope in the resolute response of Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Abbas to the killing by Hamas gunmen of four Israeli settlers in the West Bank on the eve of the talks. Both men immediately said the attack should not be allowed to derail the negotiations, and the Palestinian Authority condemned the killings.</p>
<p>“Normally, it’s been reliably easy to torpedo, or veto, any progress between Israelis and Palestinians,” said Ziad J. Asali, the president of the American Task Force on Palestine. “This means an incredible loss of a weapon.”</p>
<h2  class="related_post_title">Artigos Relacionados:</h2><ul class="related_post"><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/acordo-de-paz/" title="Acordo de Paz&#8230;">Acordo de Paz&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 20, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/20/israel-and-palestinians-to-resume-peace-talks-in-washington/" title="Israel and Palestinians to resume peace talks in Washington">Israel and Palestinians to resume peace talks in Washington</a> (0)</li><li>August 15, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/15/palestinian-authority-ready-for-peace-talks-ashton-says/" title="Palestinian Authority ready for peace talks, Ashton says">Palestinian Authority ready for peace talks, Ashton says</a> (0)</li><li>July 5, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/07/05/palestinos-e-israel-negociam-diretamente-apos-mediacao-dos-eua/" title="Palestinos e Israel negociam diretamente após mediação dos EUA">Palestinos e Israel negociam diretamente após mediação dos EUA</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/the-war-in-iraq/" title="The War in Iraq&#8230;">The War in Iraq&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/e-a-marvada-e-comum-na-politica-mesmo/" title="E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;">E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/for-once-hope-in-the-middle-east/" title="For Once, Hope in the Middle East&#8230;">For Once, Hope in the Middle East&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/o-futuro-incerto-dos-iraquianos/" title="O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;">O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>June 22, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/06/22/easing-the-gaza-blockade/" title="Easing the Gaza Blockade&#8230;">Easing the Gaza Blockade&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>March 25, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/03/25/obama-humilhou-netanyahu-em-encontro-diz-jornal-de-israel/" title="Obama &#8220;humilhou&#8221; Netanyahu em encontro, diz jornal de Israel">Obama &#8220;humilhou&#8221; Netanyahu em encontro, diz jornal de Israel</a> (0)</li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;</title>
		<link>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/e-a-marvada-e-comum-na-politica-mesmo/</link>
		<comments>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/e-a-marvada-e-comum-na-politica-mesmo/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Sep 2010 01:21:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jefferson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Américas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oriente Médio]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Crise]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Discussão]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Escritos]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Inglaterra]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraque]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Relações Internacionais]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/?p=863</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[O ex-premiê britânico Tony Blair revelou, em um livro de memórias que está sendo lançado nesta quarta-feira, que recorreu a bebidas alcoólicas para conseguir relaxar e lidar com as pressões do cargo. &#8220;Uísque puro ou gim e tônica depois da janta, alguns copos de vinho ou até mesmo meia garrafa com a refeição. Nada excessivamente [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>O ex-premiê britânico Tony Blair revelou, em um livro de memórias que está sendo lançado nesta quarta-feira, que recorreu a bebidas alcoólicas para conseguir relaxar e lidar com as pressões do cargo.</p>
<p>&#8220;Uísque puro ou gim e tônica depois da janta, alguns copos de vinho ou até mesmo meia garrafa com a refeição. Nada excessivamente excessivo. Eu tinha limite. Mas eu estava percebendo que a bebida estava virando um amparo ['<em>prop</em>', em inglês]&#8220;, escreve Blair no livro <em>A Journey</em> (<em>Uma Jornada</em>, em português).</p>
<p>Tony Blair, do Partido Trabalhista, foi primeiro-ministro da Grã-Bretanha entre 1997 e 2007. Sua chegada ao poder interrompeu 18 anos de governo dos conservadores no país.</p>
<p>Sob a bandeira do <em>New Labour</em> (<em>Novo Trabalhismo</em>, em tradução livre) que pregava uma Terceira Via no debate ideológico entre esquerda e direita, Blair governou a Grã-Bretanha durante a invasão do Iraque, em 2003, que marcou seu governo.</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Ele era uma pessoa difícil, às vezes enlouquecedora? Sim&#8221;</p>
<p>Tony Blair sobre Gordon Brown</p></blockquote>
<p>No livro, Blair fala sobre o seu período no poder, a guerra do Iraque e a ascensão dos trabalhistas na Grã-Bretanha, entre outros temas.</p>
<p><strong>Gordon Brown</strong></p>
<p>O livro provocou polêmica, em particular entre os trabalhistas britânicos devido a críticas ao seu sucessor no cargo, Gordon Brown. Os trabalhistas estão escolhendo neste mês quem será o sucessor do ex-premiê Brown na liderança do partido.</p>
<p>Brown renunciou à liderança do partido e ao cargo de primeiro-ministro em maio, quando foi derrotado pelo Partido Conservador de David Cameron em eleições gerais.</p>
<p>Em meio a algumas palavras elogiosas, Blair refere-se a Brown como &#8220;enlouquecedor&#8221; e diz que sabia que caso seu sucessor não mudasse algumas políticas, seu governo seria &#8220;um desastre&#8221;.</p>
<p>&#8220;Ele era uma pessoa difícil, às vezes enlouquecedora? Sim&#8221;, escreve Blair, que em seguida elogia Brown. &#8220;Mas ele também era forte, capaz e brilhante, e essas eram qualidades que eu nunca deixei de respeitar.&#8221;</p>
<p>Blair ainda diz no livro que Brown, que foi ministro das Finanças do seu governo antes de sucedê-lo como premiê, era um &#8220;sujeito estranho&#8221; e com &#8220;inteligência emocional zero&#8221;.</p>
<div>
<blockquote>
<h2>Frases de Tony Blair</h2>
<div>
<p><strong>Sobre Gordon Brown:</strong> Eu parei de receber seus telefonemas. O pobre Jon [assessor de Brown] me procurava dizendo: &#8216;o ministro realmente quer falar com você&#8217;. [...] Eu dizia: &#8220;Vou ligar para ele em breve&#8221;. E Jon dizia: &#8220;você vai mesmo, primeiro-ministro?&#8221;. E eu dizia: &#8220;Não, Jon&#8221;.</p>
<p><strong>Sobre George W. Bush:</strong> Eu passei a gostar de George e admirá-lo. Me perguntaram recentemente quais líderes políticos eram os mais íntegros. Coloquei George próximo ao topo da lista. Algumas pessoas ficaram espantadas&#8230; achando que eu estava brincando.</p>
<p><strong>Sobre familires de soldados mortos: </strong>Eles realmente acham que eu não me importo, que eu não sinto, que eu não me arrependo com cada fibra do meu ser a perda de quem morreu? Ser indiferente seria desumano.</p>
<p><strong>Sobre a morte da princesa Diana: </strong>Eu gostava dela e sentia muito pelos seus dois meninos, mas eu também sabia que isso ia ser um evento nacional, ou até global, enorme, como nenhum outro. Como a Grã-Bretanha ia se sair era importante para o país interna e externamente.</p>
</div>
<p>Blair relata que era impossível segurar a ascensão de Brown, já que o político possuía grande base de apoio entre os trabalhistas.</p></blockquote>
</div>
<p>Ele sugere que caso tivesse demitido Brown, &#8220;o partido e o governo se desestabilizariam imediatamente e de forma grave, e sua ascensão ao cargo de primeiro-ministro seria talvez até mais rápida&#8221;.</p>
<p>Em entrevista à BBC, Blair diz que seu relacionamento com Brown era &#8220;francamente difícil, quase impossível&#8221;, mas que seu ministro sempre foi também uma fonte de força para o governo.</p>
<p>O porta-voz de Gordon Brown disse que o político não fará nenhum comentário sobre o livro de Blair.</p>
<p>Mas entre os trabalhistas, que estão passando pelo processo de escolha do sucessor de Brown para a liderança do partido, houve muitas críticas a Blair.</p>
<p>&#8220;Estou surpresa que Tony Blair não tenha esperado um intervalo maior antes de enfiar a faca em Gordon Brown. Isso não ajuda o partido neste momento&#8221;, disse a trabalhista Diane Abbott, que concorre para suceder Brown na liderança do partido.</p>
<p>Um parlamentar trabalhista ligado à Brown disse que &#8220;a versão unilateral de Blair&#8221; sobre os fatos já era esperada.</p>
<p><strong>Iraque</strong></p>
<p>Sobre a guerra do Iraque, Tony Blair diz que deixar Saddam Hussein no poder no país seria &#8220;um risco maior&#8221; do que removê-lo do poder.</p>
<p>Blair foi um dos principais defensores da ideia de invadir o Iraque junto com os Estados Unidos, em 2003, para derrubar o regime de Saddam.</p>
<p>&#8220;Eu não consigo satisfazer aos desejos nem mesmo de alguns dos meus apoiadores, que gostariam que eu dissesse: [invadir o Iraque] foi um erro, mas um erro cometido de boa-fé. Amigos que se opõem à guerra acham que eu estou sendo teimoso; outros, menos amigáveis, acham que eu sou delirante. A ambos, eu posso dizer: mantenham uma mente aberta&#8221;, escreve Blair.</p>
<p>Em suas memórias, Blair reconhece que houve problemas no planejamento da invasão do Iraque. Ele escreve que &#8220;nós não antecipamos o papel da Al-Qaeda ou do Irã&#8221; no planejamento sobre o que aconteceria depois da invasão.</p>
<p>Ele também falou sobre o seu &#8220;sofrimento&#8221; com as mortes provocadas pelo conflito na Grã-Bretanha.</p>
<p>&#8220;Eu lamento desesperadamente por eles [os soldados mortos], lamento pelas famílias cujo sofrimento foi agravado pela polêmica sobre o porquê de seus amados terem morrido, lamento pela seleção injusta de que quem perdeu a vida.&#8221;</p>
<h2  class="related_post_title">Artigos Relacionados:</h2><ul class="related_post"><li>August 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/o-futuro-incerto-dos-iraquianos/" title="O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;">O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/the-war-in-iraq/" title="The War in Iraq&#8230;">The War in Iraq&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/leaders-call-for-peace-as-mideast-talks-begin/" title="Leaders Call for Peace as Mideast Talks Begin">Leaders Call for Peace as Mideast Talks Begin</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/acordo-de-paz/" title="Acordo de Paz&#8230;">Acordo de Paz&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/g20-mudanca-e-desafio/" title="G20: Mudança e Desafio&#8230;">G20: Mudança e Desafio&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 22, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/22/north-korea-demands-apology-from-japan/" title="North Korea demands apology from Japan">North Korea demands apology from Japan</a> (0)</li><li>August 22, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/22/a-rising-global-tide-of-xenophobia/" title="A rising global tide of xenophobia">A rising global tide of xenophobia</a> (0)</li><li>August 20, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/20/israel-and-palestinians-to-resume-peace-talks-in-washington/" title="Israel and Palestinians to resume peace talks in Washington">Israel and Palestinians to resume peace talks in Washington</a> (0)</li><li>August 15, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/15/palestinian-authority-ready-for-peace-talks-ashton-says/" title="Palestinian Authority ready for peace talks, Ashton says">Palestinian Authority ready for peace talks, Ashton says</a> (0)</li><li>July 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/07/27/eu-ja-vi-essa-historia/" title="Eu já vi essa história&#8230;">Eu já vi essa história&#8230;</a> (0)</li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>For Once, Hope in the Middle East&#8230;</title>
		<link>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/for-once-hope-in-the-middle-east/</link>
		<comments>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/for-once-hope-in-the-middle-east/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Aug 2010 23:06:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jefferson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Américas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oriente Médio]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Direitos Humanos]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/?p=859</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[By MARTIN INDYK The New York Times Journal NOW that President Obama has finally succeeded in bringing the Israelis and the Palestinians back to the negotiating table, the commentariat is already dismissing his chances of reaching a peace agreement. But there are four factors that distinguish the direct talks that will get under way on [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By MARTIN INDYK</p>
<p>The New York Times Journal</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/27opedimg-popup.jpg"><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-860" title="27opedimg-popup" src="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/27opedimg-popup.jpg" alt="" width="520" height="413" /></a></p>
<p>NOW that President Obama has finally succeeded in bringing the Israelis and the Palestinians back to the negotiating table, the commentariat is already dismissing his chances of reaching a peace agreement. But there are four factors that distinguish the direct talks that will get under way on Sept. 2 in Washington from previous attempts — factors that offer <a title="Times article on the talks." href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/world/middleeast/24mideast.html">some reason for optimism</a>.</p>
<p>First, violence is down considerably in the region. Throughout the 1990s, Israel was plagued by terrorist attacks, which undermined its leaders’ ability to justify tangible concessions. Israelis came to believe that the Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat was playing a double game, professing peace in the negotiations while allowing terrorists to operate in territory he was supposed to control.</p>
<p>Today, the Palestinian Authority is policing its West Bank territory to prevent violent attacks on Israelis and to prove its reliability as a negotiating partner. Hamas — mainly out of fear of an Israeli intervention that might remove it from power — is doing the same in Gaza.</p>
<p>These efforts, combined with more effective Israeli security measures, have meant that the number of Israeli civilians <a title="Data from the Israel Security Agency." href="http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/decade/Fatalities/Pages/default.aspx">killed in terrorist attacks</a> has dropped from an intifada high of 452 in 2002 to 6 last year and only 2 so far this year.</p>
<p>Second, <a title="Times article on settlement construction." href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/world/middleeast/15settlements.html">settlement activity</a> has slowed significantly. As a result of Israel’s 10-month settlement moratorium, no new housing starts in the West Bank were reported by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics in the first quarter of this year. What’s more, there have been hardly any new housing projects in East Jerusalem since the brouhaha in March, when Vice President Joe Biden, during a visit to Israel, condemned the announcement of 1,600 additional residential units. The demolition of Palestinian houses there is also down compared with recent years.</p>
<p>The settlement moratorium, however, is due to expire on Sept. 26. The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, seems unlikely to extend it, and Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority president, has declared that he will <a title="Article on Mr. Abbas’ position." href="http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/abbas-end-of-settlement-freeze-would-end-direct-peace-talks-1.309608">withdraw from negotiations</a> if settlement activity resumes.</p>
<p>However, there could be a workable compromise if Mr. Netanyahu restricts building to modest growth in the settlement blocs that will most likely be absorbed into Israel in the final agreement, while offering changes that would make a real difference to West Bank Palestinians. Israel could promise that there would be no more Israeli Army incursions into areas under Palestinian control; it could also allow the Palestinian police to patrol in most West Bank villages.</p>
<p>Third, the public on both sides <a title="Poll from the Truman Institute (PDF)." href="http://truman.huji.ac.il/upload/truman_site_poll_31_March2010.pdf">supports a two-state solution</a>. So do <a title="Poll from the Brookings Institution." href="http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0805_arab_opinion_poll_telhami.aspx">a majority of Arabs</a>. The simple truth is that most people in the Middle East are exhausted by this conflict, and if Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Abbas can reach a viable agreement, the public on all sides will likely support it by a large majority.</p>
<p>Yes, Mr. Netanyahu would face strident opposition from within his Likud party, but he could lean on the support of the Israeli center and left to ensure a Knesset majority. And because a referendum on Palestinian statehood would likely receive overwhelming support in Gaza as well as the West Bank, Hamas — always attuned to Palestinian public opinion — would have a hard time standing in the way.</p>
<p>Fourth, there isn’t a lot to negotiate. In the 17 years since the Oslo accords were signed, detailed final status negotiations have dealt exhaustively with all the critical issues. If an independent Palestinian state is to be established, the zone of agreement is clear and the necessary trade-offs are already known.</p>
<p>Security arrangements were all but settled in 2000 at Camp David before the talks collapsed. The increased threat of rocket attacks since then, among other developments, require the two sides to agree on stricter border controls and a robust third-party force in the Jordan Valley. But one year is ample time to resolve this. In fact, if the leaders are sincere in their intent to make a deal, dragging out the negotiations would only weaken them politically and give time for the opponents of peace to rally.</p>
<p>In short, the negotiating environment is better suited to peacemaking today than it has been at any point in the last decade. The prospects for peace depend now on the willpower of the leaders.</p>
<p>Does President Abbas, already a weakened figure, have the courage to defend the necessary concessions to his people, particularly when it comes to conceding the “right of return” to Israel? Does Prime Minister Netanyahu have the determination to withdraw from at least 95 percent of the West Bank and to accept a Palestinian capital in Arab East Jerusalem? And does President Obama have the statesmanship to persuade both parties to make the deal and to reassure them that the United States will be there with a safety net if it fails?</p>
<p>At the end of the Clinton administration, Shimon Peres observed that “history is like a horse that gallops past your window and the true test of statesmanship is to jump from that window onto the horse.” Arafat failed that test, leaving Palestinians and Israelis mired in conflict. We cannot know whether Mr. Abbas and Mr. Netanyahu will take the politically perilous leap. But for the time being, we should suspend disbelief and welcome the fact that American diplomacy has ensured they will soon be put to the test.</p>
<p>Martin Indyk, the director of the foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution and the author of “Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East,” was the United States ambassador to Israel during the Clinton administration.</p>
<h2  class="related_post_title">Artigos Relacionados:</h2><ul class="related_post"><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/the-war-in-iraq/" title="The War in Iraq&#8230;">The War in Iraq&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/leaders-call-for-peace-as-mideast-talks-begin/" title="Leaders Call for Peace as Mideast Talks Begin">Leaders Call for Peace as Mideast Talks Begin</a> (0)</li><li>July 5, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/07/05/palestinos-e-israel-negociam-diretamente-apos-mediacao-dos-eua/" title="Palestinos e Israel negociam diretamente após mediação dos EUA">Palestinos e Israel negociam diretamente após mediação dos EUA</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/acordo-de-paz/" title="Acordo de Paz&#8230;">Acordo de Paz&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/o-futuro-incerto-dos-iraquianos/" title="O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;">O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 20, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/20/israel-and-palestinians-to-resume-peace-talks-in-washington/" title="Israel and Palestinians to resume peace talks in Washington">Israel and Palestinians to resume peace talks in Washington</a> (0)</li><li>August 18, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/18/last-us-combat-brigade-quits-iraq/" title="Last US combat brigade quits Iraq">Last US combat brigade quits Iraq</a> (0)</li><li>August 15, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/15/palestinian-authority-ready-for-peace-talks-ashton-says/" title="Palestinian Authority ready for peace talks, Ashton says">Palestinian Authority ready for peace talks, Ashton says</a> (0)</li><li>June 22, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/06/22/easing-the-gaza-blockade/" title="Easing the Gaza Blockade&#8230;">Easing the Gaza Blockade&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>March 25, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/03/25/obama-humilhou-netanyahu-em-encontro-diz-jornal-de-israel/" title="Obama &#8220;humilhou&#8221; Netanyahu em encontro, diz jornal de Israel">Obama &#8220;humilhou&#8221; Netanyahu em encontro, diz jornal de Israel</a> (0)</li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>This Is Not a Recovery&#8230;</title>
		<link>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/this-is-not-a-recovery/</link>
		<comments>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/this-is-not-a-recovery/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Aug 2010 23:01:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jefferson</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/?p=856</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[By PAUL KRUGMAN The New York Times Journal What will Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, say in his big speech Friday in Jackson Hole, Wyo.? Will he hint at new steps to boost the economy? Stay tuned. But we can safely predict what he and other officials will say about where we are right now: [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By PAUL KRUGMAN</p>
<p>The New York Times Journal</p>
<p>What will Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, say in his big speech Friday in Jackson Hole, Wyo.? Will he hint at new steps to boost the economy? Stay tuned.</p>
<p>But we can safely predict what he and other officials will say about where we are right now: that the economy is continuing to recover, albeit more slowly than they would like. Unfortunately, that’s not true: this isn’t a recovery, in any sense that matters. And policy makers should be doing everything they can to change that fact.</p>
<p>The small sliver of truth in claims of continuing recovery is the fact that G.D.P. is still rising: we’re not in a classic recession, in which everything goes down. But so what?</p>
<p>The important question is whether growth is fast enough to bring down sky-high unemployment. We need about 2.5 percent growth just to keep unemployment from rising, and much faster growth to bring it significantly down. Yet growth is currently running somewhere between 1 and 2 percent, with a good chance that it will slow even further in the months ahead. Will the economy actually enter a double dip, with G.D.P. shrinking? Who cares? If unemployment rises for the rest of this year, which seems likely, it won’t matter whether the G.D.P. numbers are slightly positive or slightly negative.</p>
<p>All of this is obvious. Yet policy makers are in denial.</p>
<p>After its last monetary policy meeting, the Fed released a statement declaring that it “anticipates a gradual return to higher levels of resource utilization” — Fedspeak for falling unemployment. Nothing in the data supports that kind of optimism. Meanwhile, Tim Geithner, the Treasury secretary, says that “we’re on the road to recovery.” No, we aren’t.</p>
<p>Why are people who know better sugar-coating economic reality? The answer, I’m sorry to say, is that it’s all about evading responsibility.</p>
<p>In the case of the Fed, admitting that the economy isn’t recovering would put the institution under pressure to do more. And so far, at least, the Fed seems more afraid of the possible loss of face if it tries to help the economy and fails than it is of the costs to the American people if it does nothing, and settles for a recovery that isn’t.</p>
<p>In the case of the Obama administration, officials seem loath to admit that the original stimulus was too small. True, it was enough to limit the depth of the slump — a recent analysis by the Congressional Budget Office says unemployment would probably be well into double digits now without the stimulus — but it wasn’t big enough to bring unemployment down significantly.</p>
<p>Now, it’s arguable that even in early 2009, when President Obama was at the peak of his popularity, he couldn’t have gotten a bigger plan through the Senate. And he certainly couldn’t pass a supplemental stimulus now. So officials could, with considerable justification, place the onus for the non-recovery on Republican obstructionism. But they’ve chosen, instead, to draw smiley faces on a grim picture, convincing nobody. And the likely result in November — big gains for the obstructionists — will paralyze policy for years to come.</p>
<p>So what should officials be doing, aside from telling the truth about the economy?</p>
<p>The Fed has a number of options. It can buy more long-term and private debt; it can push down long-term interest rates by announcing its intention to keep short-term rates low; it can raise its medium-term target for inflation, making it less attractive for businesses to simply sit on their cash. Nobody can be sure how well these measures would work, but it’s better to try something that might not work than to make excuses while workers suffer.</p>
<p>The administration has less freedom of action, since it can’t get legislation past the Republican blockade. But it still has options. It can revamp its deeply unsuccessful attempt to aid troubled homeowners. It can use Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored lenders, to engineer mortgage refinancing that puts money in the hands of American families — yes, Republicans will howl, but they’re doing that anyway. It can finally get serious about confronting China over its currency manipulation: how many times do the Chinese have to promise to change their policies, then renege, before the administration decides that it’s time to act?</p>
<p>Which of these options should policy makers pursue? If I had my way, all of them.</p>
<p>I know what some players both at the Fed and in the administration will say: they’ll warn about the risks of doing anything unconventional. But we’ve already seen the consequences of playing it safe, and waiting for recovery to happen all by itself: it’s landed us in what looks increasingly like a permanent state of stagnation and high unemployment. It’s time to admit that what we have now isn’t a recovery, and do whatever we can to change that situation.</p>
<h2  class="related_post_title">Artigos Relacionados:</h2><ul class="related_post"><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/the-war-in-iraq/" title="The War in Iraq&#8230;">The War in Iraq&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/o-futuro-incerto-dos-iraquianos/" title="O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;">O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 16, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/16/um-monstro-ressurge/" title="Um monstro ressurge&#8230;">Um monstro ressurge&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 22, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/22/a-rising-global-tide-of-xenophobia/" title="A rising global tide of xenophobia">A rising global tide of xenophobia</a> (0)</li><li>August 20, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/20/centro-religioso-em-nova-iorque/" title="Centro Religioso em Nova Iorque&#8230;">Centro Religioso em Nova Iorque&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 17, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/17/el-agosto-griego/" title="El agosto griego&#8230;">El agosto griego&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 17, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/17/cni-e-siderurgicas-questionam-investimento-chines/" title="CNI e siderúrgicas questionam investimento chinês">CNI e siderúrgicas questionam investimento chinês</a> (0)</li><li>June 18, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/06/18/that-%e2%80%9930s-feeling/" title="That ’30s Feeling&#8230;">That ’30s Feeling&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>February 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/02/27/presidente-turco-enfrenta-crise-apos-prisao-de-militares/" title="Presidente turco enfrenta crise após prisão de militares">Presidente turco enfrenta crise após prisão de militares</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/e-a-marvada-e-comum-na-politica-mesmo/" title="E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;">E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;</a> (0)</li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;</title>
		<link>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/o-futuro-incerto-dos-iraquianos/</link>
		<comments>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/o-futuro-incerto-dos-iraquianos/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Aug 2010 22:57:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jefferson</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/?p=853</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Anxious Iraqis Look at Uncertain Future Interviewee: Jane Arraf, Baghdad Correspondent, Christian Science Monitor Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org by Council on Foreign Relations – CFR. With the pullout of U.S. combat units completed, many Iraqis, even those who deplored the presence of foreign troops, are &#8220;fearful about what happens&#8221; if the U.S. withdraws [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Anxious Iraqis Look at Uncertain Future</strong></p>
<p>Interviewee: Jane Arraf, Baghdad Correspondent, Christian Science Monitor</p>
<p>Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org</p>
<p>by Council on Foreign Relations – CFR.</p>
<p>With the pullout of U.S. combat units completed, many Iraqis, even those who deplored the presence of foreign troops, are &#8220;fearful about what happens&#8221; if the U.S. withdraws completely next year as planned, says Jane Arraf, a long-time Baghdad correspondent who served as an Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow at CFR. Beyond concerns about whether Iraq will be able to defend itself when all U.S. troops have gone, there&#8217;s also anxiety about the unsettled political situation. Arraf says Iraqis seem to be unable to forge a compromise between Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister, whose bloc had the most seats in last March&#8217;s elections, and the current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. &#8220;We keep thinking that perhaps there&#8217;s a lot going on beneath the surface, but apparently there isn&#8217;t. It is what it is. It&#8217;s stalled. There&#8217;s talk about what to do, but nothing&#8217;s been established yet.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>President Obama is planning to give a speech on Iraq next week marking the pullout of U.S. combat troops from the country. Does their departure make a big difference in Iraq?</strong></p>
<p>It really doesn&#8217;t. A lot of that is because it isn&#8217;t a development that has had much of an impact on the ground. Some have called it a &#8220;rebranding&#8221; of the conflict, and there is some truth to that. What we&#8217;ve got left are fifty thousand other troops, a substantial number, and a lot of those are actually combat troops. Any brigade here is ready, equipped, and trained for combat. It&#8217;s just that the mission is changing. So with that many troops on the ground, the latest withdrawals really don&#8217;t have that much of an impact, particularly since we haven&#8217;t been seeing the United States in unilateral combat missions since June of last year. As part of the security agreement signed by the Bush administration, the U.S. forces are taking a backseat to the Iraqi forces. The bottom line is that nothing really will change on September 1. What we&#8217;re really looking at is what happens as next year&#8217;s deadline of December 31, 2011, approaches for all the troops to leave.</p>
<p><strong>Are Americans regarded as friends or enemies? Are people happy to see the Americans out of Iraq? Or do they want the Americans to have more influence? Clearly there&#8217;s a chaotic security and political situation in Iraq, right?</strong></p>
<p>It&#8217;s a love-hate relationship that, right now, is turning into a feeling almost of abandonment. Even Iraqis who have absolutely despised the thought of a presence of a large number of foreign troops here are quite nervous, quite fearful about what happens if they pull out next year. It&#8217;s something that I hear constantly in the streets, when I stop to talk to people, when I go to the sites of these attacks. When I talk to political leaders, there is quite a lot of apprehension about what happens when there is no big U.S. presence here and Iraq can&#8217;t really defend its borders or its airspace.</p>
<p><strong>Will the United States be providing long-term air defense? Or is that supposed to end next year too?</strong></p>
<p>Everything ends next year, so it really all has to be negotiated. The commanding general in charge of training Iraqi forces told me they are in the midst of negotiating an agreement to allow NATO to continue training. Such an agreement of course to replace the Iraq-U.S. security agreement will actually have to be negotiated by whatever new government is formed. The assumption is that it will be a pro-Western, pro-U.S. government, but that&#8217;s not a certainty. What if, for instance, the Sadrists have a large role to play in the new government? What if it&#8217;s a much more Iranian-friendly government than some people are suggesting? They could turn to Iran for a security agreement.</p>
<p><strong>When terrorist attacks occur and hundreds of people get killed or wounded, is this regarded by Iraqis as comparable to another day of car crashes in the United States?</strong></p>
<p>We might think so, because on the surface, life continues on—people go to work, they open up their shops just hours after an explosion on their street, people send their kids to school. But it has had a significant effect in terms of human investment. Those Iraqis—many of them middle class, a lot of the engineers, the doctors, the professionals needed to rebuild Iraq—will look at the headlines and say, &#8220;Why should I want to come back to Iraq? What is there to come back for?&#8221; Also, because these attacks have been very focused on the Iraqi police forces, there has been an effect on the ground. With every attack on the police, they retreat further into their police stations. The hope was to have a police force that could eventually replace, first U.S. soldiers, and then Iraqi soldiers that are still here in the streets. When the police get out, they do investigations and they keep the streets safe. When they retreat back, they&#8217;re more worried about protecting themselves against these almost constant attacks, either individual or collective, and that really does eventually have a significant effect on security in urban areas.</p>
<p><strong>How do you feel when you walk on the street? Do you worry a lot?</strong></p>
<p>It&#8217;s like being a teenager—I&#8217;m not allowed to go out on the street on my own. When I&#8217;m out on the streets, there&#8217;s still obviously some danger, but I do have my Iraqi staff, one or two of them with me at all times. The prevailing feeling is uncertainty. When I go grocery shopping, the shops are full of people. They&#8217;re not letting these events deter them from going out. There are new clothing stores, there are new stores selling electronics, but this is all small investment—you don&#8217;t see the big things happening. And you don&#8217;t see a lot of faith in a near-term optimistic future. People pretty much think it&#8217;ll get better, but it&#8217;ll take a long time. A long time means a decade, perhaps. People aren&#8217;t really thinking it&#8217;s going to get better in the new year or two years from now.</p>
<p><strong>Why can&#8217;t the Iraqis get electricity working? I gather this is a major complaint.</strong></p>
<p>Most of us do not completely understand why it is there is still no electricity. Officials will tell you that it&#8217;s because there is a greatly increased demand&#8212; there are more air conditioners and other appliances. Those attacks we saw during the height of the insurgency, on refineries, on oil installations have not been repaired. Everything is on hold, waiting for those billions of dollars in investment to come in. That will happen, but it will take a long time.</p>
<p>And there is all this corruption. Corruption here is at the basis of almost everything. If you talk to Iraqis, they&#8217;re more worried about corruption than they are about terrorism. Certainly that&#8217;s a lot of the reason why a lot of money that is to be spent on things like electricity has seemed to have gone astray. And it&#8217;s part of the reason why the infrastructure, seven years on, is still in such bad shape. Here in Baghdad, people generally get one hour of electricity and then it goes off for four hours or five hours, comes back for another hour. In some places, they don&#8217;t even get that. And it&#8217;s not just the electricity, there are water shortages. We&#8217;re sweltering in 120 degrees and then the water gets cut off. There is a building resentment here and it&#8217;s more to do with basic services than it is about security.</p>
<p><strong>The corruption is among officials? Money is allocated to building up an electrical infrastructure, for instance, and somehow the money gets diverted?</strong></p>
<p>It&#8217;s as blatant as government officials, deputy ministers, directors of departments stuffing cash into their suitcases and leaving the country and as prevalent as bribes paid on contracts. On a day-to-day level, it&#8217;s very hard for anybody here to get anything done unless they pay a bribe, and that includes getting documents that you need from any government department, that includes getting an electricity meter installed so you can get city power in less than a week, instead of six months. You pretty much pay anybody to do anything here and that itself has a very destabilizing effect.</p>
<p><strong>There has been a stalemate between the top political contenders, Ayad Allawi and Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki since the election ended in March. What do you think will happen?</strong></p>
<p>Almost anything is the short answer, which is why this is so fascinating. It&#8217;s fascinating because it&#8217;s terribly important not just in the national sense, but in the regional sense. But it&#8217;s also endlessly fascinating because if you look at the shifts in political alliances, you see people who started off saying that they would never have anything to do with some of the other political leaders now saying there are no red lines. We essentially see the same players we&#8217;ve had throughout this war. We&#8217;ve got Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; we&#8217;ve got Ibrahim Jaafari, who was the prime minister in 2005; we&#8217;ve got Ayad Allawi, who was the prime minister in 2004; we&#8217;ve got Muqtada al-Sadr—the major players haven&#8217;t changed and they won&#8217;t change. It&#8217;s just really a matter of how they&#8217;re all going to fit together.</p>
<p>What the United States wants to see, and what a lot of people do want to see, actually, is some sort of government in which Maliki has a role and Allawi has a role. Maliki is the front runner among the Shiites—he has perhaps the greatest personal popularity—and Allawi represents a very important constituency that is otherwise left out. When Iraqis went to the polls in March, this election was billed as absolutely crucial to Iraqi stability, crucial for U.S. troops to be able to leave, crucial for the United States to walk away from Iraq. This election needed to be broad-based and it needed to have a government that had Sunni participation. For better or worse, Allawi—a Shiite, but a secular Shiite—has a lot of that Sunni backing. He needs to be given a role, and this is agreed by pretty much everyone.</p>
<p>The problem is that Iraqis aren&#8217;t used to compromise and almost six months later, that&#8217;s what we&#8217;re seeing: Nobody is compromising. Everyone wants to be prime minister. One of the things suggested that would be backed by the United States would be the creation of a superstructure that would oversee strategic policies and security policies, and look at all oil policies. The proposal was that it would be headed by Allawi and that Malaki would be prime minister. Now, the problem about that is it&#8217;s unconstitutional.</p>
<p><strong>So you can&#8217;t really predict, then, who will emerge as the prime minister unless they work out this new superstructure?</strong></p>
<p>I&#8217;m not discounting Maliki. The thing with Maliki is that he aligned himself with the other major Shiite players. They have proposed a series of measures that will limit his power. The Sadrists will not support him as prime minister because he sent the Iraqi army into Baghdad and into Basra to get rid of their militia. They&#8217;ve actually suggested that they could pull out of that coalition and back Allawi, which would be an interesting development.</p>
<p>But whatever way you cut it, Maliki remains a key politician simply because he has support on the street. It&#8217;s entirely unclear as to whether Allawi will back down or whether Maliki will accept a reduced role as prime minister, and agree to have his power curtailed. We keep thinking that perhaps there&#8217;s a lot going on beneath the surface, but apparently there isn&#8217;t. It is what it is. It&#8217;s stalled. There&#8217;s talk about what to do, but nothing&#8217;s been established yet.</p>
<h2  class="related_post_title">Artigos Relacionados:</h2><ul class="related_post"><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/the-war-in-iraq/" title="The War in Iraq&#8230;">The War in Iraq&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 22, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/22/a-rising-global-tide-of-xenophobia/" title="A rising global tide of xenophobia">A rising global tide of xenophobia</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/e-a-marvada-e-comum-na-politica-mesmo/" title="E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;">E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 18, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/18/last-us-combat-brigade-quits-iraq/" title="Last US combat brigade quits Iraq">Last US combat brigade quits Iraq</a> (0)</li><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/leaders-call-for-peace-as-mideast-talks-begin/" title="Leaders Call for Peace as Mideast Talks Begin">Leaders Call for Peace as Mideast Talks Begin</a> (0)</li><li>August 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/this-is-not-a-recovery/" title="This Is Not a Recovery&#8230;">This Is Not a Recovery&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 22, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/22/north-korea-demands-apology-from-japan/" title="North Korea demands apology from Japan">North Korea demands apology from Japan</a> (0)</li><li>August 20, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/20/centro-religioso-em-nova-iorque/" title="Centro Religioso em Nova Iorque&#8230;">Centro Religioso em Nova Iorque&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 15, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/15/as-arizona-went-so-goes-virginia/" title="As Arizona Went, So Goes Virginia&#8230;">As Arizona Went, So Goes Virginia&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>June 22, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/06/22/u-s-indirectly-paying-afghan-warlords-as-part-of-security-contract/" title="U.S. indirectly paying Afghan warlords as part of security contract">U.S. indirectly paying Afghan warlords as part of security contract</a> (0)</li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>G20: Mudança e Desafio&#8230;</title>
		<link>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/g20-mudanca-e-desafio/</link>
		<comments>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/g20-mudanca-e-desafio/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Aug 2010 22:50:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jefferson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Américas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Principal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Brasil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Crise]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Discussão]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[G20]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Política]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Relações Internacionais]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/?p=850</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Valor Econômico Opinião por Marcos Galvão* Em pouco mais de dois anos foram realizadas cinco cúpulas de líderes. A escolha do G-20 como principal foro para deliberação de questões econômico-financeiras foi uma das maiores mudanças ocorridas no mundo A elevação do G-20 ao papel de principal foro para deliberação sobre questões econômico-financeiras foi uma das [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Valor Econômico</p>
<p>Opinião por Marcos Galvão*</p>
<p>Em pouco mais de dois anos foram realizadas cinco cúpulas de líderes.</p>
<p>A escolha do G-20 como principal foro para deliberação de questões econômico-financeiras foi uma das maiores mudanças ocorridas no mundo</p>
<p>A elevação do G-20 ao papel de principal foro para deliberação sobre questões econômico-financeiras foi uma das maiores transformações ocorridas na governança mundial desde o final da Segunda Grande Guerra. Embora a crise tenha sido o principal catalisador desse momento de &#8220;aceleração do tempo histórico&#8221;, a transformação só ocorreu porque o crescimento econômico e a maior participação das nações emergentes no comércio e nos investimentos globais, entre outros fatores, há muito cobravam o aumento de sua presença nas grandes deliberações internacionais.</p>
<p>A ascensão do G-20 requeria, porém, duas medidas demandadas pelo Brasil desde o começo de 2008, ano em que exerceu a presidência rotativa do Grupo. Primeiro, a transformação do G-20 em foro de líderes. Segundo, o aumento da frequência e qualidade da interação entre seus membros. Criado em 1999, em seguida à &#8220;crise asiática&#8221;, o Grupo era um foro de ministros da Fazenda e presidentes de bancos centrais que se reunia apenas uma vez por ano. Tinha pouco espaço para influir decisivamente nos principais debates econômicos internacionais.</p>
<p>O próprio G-20, portanto, cuja criação havia sido um passo no rumo certo, precisava ser aperfeiçoado para melhor cumprir a sua missão.</p>
<p>E assim se fez. O Grupo tornou-se um foro de chefes de governo e suas reuniões passaram a ser convocadas de acordo com as exigências da realidade. Em pouco mais de dois anos, contados de outubro de 2008 até novembro próximo, terão ocorrido nada menos de cinco cúpulas de líderes do G-20 e dez reuniões ministeriais. Esse dado reflete com clareza o lugar central que o G-20 ocupa nas relações internacionais contemporâneas.</p>
<p>Além de representar mudança fundamental, o G-20 passou a promover importantes transformações. De início, no auge da crise, os governos do Grupo assumiram o compromisso de adotar todas as ações necessárias para estabilizar o sistema financeiro. Embora fossem respostas de caráter nacional, e variassem de acordo com as circunstâncias específicas, a coordenação sem precedentes dos esforços das maiores economias do mundo foi essencial para a reversão do clima de pânico que se vivia no final de 2008. Desde então, o G-20 conduz processos inéditos de troca de informações, avaliação mútua e articulação de políticas macroeconômicas.</p>
<p>Diretrizes emanadas do G-20 também têm sido essenciais no contexto da reforma do sistema financeiro, em dimensões como as da regulação de capital e liquidez dos bancos, transações com derivativos, remuneração de agentes financeiros e combate aos paraísos fiscais. Por proposta do G-20, o Brasil e outros emergentes passaram a integrar o Conselho de Estabilidade Financeira (FSB) e o Comitê de Basileia, principais foros de regulação do sistema, cuja composição era antes limitada a economias avançadas.</p>
<p>Diante da necessidade de se reforçar a legitimidade das instituições financeiras internacionais, o G-20 tem servido de foro para a negociação de reformas de governança no Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) e no Banco Mundial. Delas deverá resultar uma maior participação dos países emergentes e em desenvolvimento nos respectivos processos decisórios, compatível com o seu peso crescente na economia global. Foi, também, por decisão adotada no G-20, que o FMI teve seus recursos triplicados e que os bancos internacionais de desenvolvimento, com capital ampliado, aumentaram seus empréstimos em US$ 100 bilhões.</p>
<p>A folha de serviços do novo G-20 é impressionante. E não parece razoável criticar o grupo pelo defeito de suas virtudes, pela dificuldade que, por vezes, lá enfrentamos para alcançar consensos. Afinal, o grande avanço que o G-20 traz, em comparação ao G-8, é justamente sua maior diversidade, a presença de países de todas as regiões do mundo, vivendo distintas circunstâncias e estágios de desenvolvimento. É natural que suas negociações sejam mais complexas e que as decisões do grupo reflitam essa variedade de pontos de vista, experiências e interesses.</p>
<p>O Brasil tem participado do G-20 de forma ativa e construtiva. Não se trata, é claro, de um arranjo perfeito e acabado. A ordem internacional está sempre em construção. Em futuro oxalá próximo, o próprio G-20 deverá ajustar o seu papel ao mundo pós-crise.</p>
<p>Essa perspectiva de renovação da agenda gera para os membros do Grupo, sobretudo para os países emergentes, o desafio de sermos capazes de atuar de modo cada vez mais propositivo. Até aqui, o G-20 dedicou-se sobretudo à superação da crise. Logo, porém, deverá voltar-se mais para o delineamento do futuro. Temos de estar prontos para participar plenamente dessa transição, de modo a assegurar que as visões e os interesses do Brasil sejam sempre levados em conta e que o G-20 nos ajude a alcançar uma economia global mais segura, equilibrada e justa, a um ambiente que favoreça o crescimento, a superação da pobreza e a realização integral das potencialidades de desenvolvimento em todo o mundo.</p>
<p>Marcos Galvão é embaixador, Secretário de Assuntos Internacionais do Ministério da Fazenda.</p>
<h2  class="related_post_title">Artigos Relacionados:</h2><ul class="related_post"><li>September 1, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/09/01/e-a-marvada-e-comum-na-politica-mesmo/" title="E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;">E a &#8216;marvada&#8217; é comum na política mesmo&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 27, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/27/o-futuro-incerto-dos-iraquianos/" title="O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;">O futuro incerto dos iraquianos&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 22, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/22/north-korea-demands-apology-from-japan/" title="North Korea demands apology from Japan">North Korea demands apology from Japan</a> (0)</li><li>August 22, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/22/un-nuevo-mapa-del-mundo/" title="Un nuevo mapa del mundo">Un nuevo mapa del mundo</a> (0)</li><li>August 22, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/22/a-rising-global-tide-of-xenophobia/" title="A rising global tide of xenophobia">A rising global tide of xenophobia</a> (0)</li><li>August 21, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/21/o-povo-e-a-politica/" title="O povo e a política&#8230;">O povo e a política&#8230;</a> (0)</li><li>August 17, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/17/cni-e-siderurgicas-questionam-investimento-chines/" title="CNI e siderúrgicas questionam investimento chinês">CNI e siderúrgicas questionam investimento chinês</a> (0)</li><li>July 25, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/07/25/the-g-20%e2%80%99s-dead-ideas/" title="The G-20’s Dead Ideas">The G-20’s Dead Ideas</a> (0)</li><li>July 24, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/07/24/politica-externa-debate-e-balanco/" title="Política Externa: Debate e Balanço">Política Externa: Debate e Balanço</a> (0)</li><li>May 19, 2010 -- <a href="http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/05/19/impasse-nuclear/" title="Impasse nuclear&#8230;">Impasse nuclear&#8230;</a> (0)</li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Sudão planeja construir reator nuclear até 2020</title>
		<link>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/22/sudao-planeja-construir-reator-nuclear-ate-2020/</link>
		<comments>http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/blog/2010/08/22/sudao-planeja-construir-reator-nuclear-ate-2020/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Aug 2010 02:57:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jefferson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[África]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Crise]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Direitos Humanos]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Medo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Relações Internacionais]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sudão]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.politicainternacional.com.br/?p=846</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[KHARTOUM (Reuters) &#8211; O Sudão planeja construir um reator nuclear e sua primeira usina de energia nuclear para fins pacíficos até 2020, informou a agência estatal SUNA. A economia do Sudão vem sofrendo sanções norte-americanas desde 1997, além de décadas de guerra, mas conseguiu elevar a produção de petróleo a 470 mil barris por dia, [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>KHARTOUM (Reuters) &#8211; O Sudão planeja construir um reator nuclear e sua primeira usina de energia nuclear para fins pacíficos até 2020, informou a agência estatal SUNA.</p>
<p>A economia do Sudão vem sofrendo sanções norte-americanas desde 1997, além de décadas de guerra, mas conseguiu elevar a produção de petróleo a 470 mil barris por dia, impulsionando seu crescimento.</p>
<p>O país também construiu usinas no entorno dos rios Nilo Azul e Branco, que se unem no Sudão, para gerar eletricidades. Entretanto, grandes áreas do país ainda não contam com energia elétrica regular.</p>
<p>Citando o diretor-geral da Agência de Energia Atômica Sudanesa, Mohamed Ahmed Hassan el-Tayeb, a agência informou que o governo começou a planejar no início deste ano o desenvolvimento de energia nuclear.</p>
<p>O Ministério de Eletricidade e Usinas já começou a preparar o projeto para produzir eletricidade a partir de energia nuclear em parceria com a Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica e deve construir a primeira usina em 2020&#8243;, segundo a agência.</p>
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